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As a long-standing issue both for the main actors of the conflict and the international 
community, Cyprus has been on the UN’s agenda including several attempts at 
brokered solutions. The international efforts to resolve the enduring problems have 
borne little fruit. However, one of the most innovative has been the establishment of 
the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) in the north to address claims relating to 
property abandoned by Greek Cypriots who fled south. 
This thesis considers two sets of question raised by these events. The first concerns 
why the IPC was established, how it functions, the challenges it faces and how these 
might be addressed. As a lawyer working for this unique institution, I fully recognize 
that, together with other methodological issues, this privileged perspective creates a 
host of well-rehearsed challenges considered more fully later. 
The second concerns how the IPC can be characterized with respect to the vast and 
varied literatures on, for example, security, peace, conflict, civil war and transitional 
justice. This study concentrates upon the IPC alone, and situates it within a 
transitional/transformative justice framework, for the following principal reasons. 
First, rising to the challenge of describing how this unique institution operates, and 
seeking to identify its strengths and weaknesses, would make a distinctive 
contribution to scholarship allowing others to make comparisons they may deem 
appropriate. Second, because the IPC is undeniably a “justice” institution which has 
emerged out of a series of transitions Cyprus has undergone since the 1960s, these 
two characteristics would necessarily occupy centre stage whatever the governing 
analytical framework. Finally, in addressing one type of injustice, the IPC may also, 
paradoxically and inadvertently, be contributing to others, including the deeper 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
I. Background and Research Questions 
According to Bryant, “in the aftermath of war, those who remain must rebuild lives 
in spaces that bear the scars of conflict”.1 The "new regime" must deal with the 
consequences of the conflict and address the "many faces of injustices".2 Cyprus is 
among the societies which have experienced conflict, displacement and redistribution 
of “enemy" property.3 The island, partitioned following the intercommunal strife and 
Turkish military intervention in 1974, presents one of the world’s most enduring and 
largely ignored conflicts.4 Greek Cypriots (GCs) who fled from the north left behind 
an estimated 1,350,000 donums5 of property and Turkish Cypriots (TCs) about 
400,000 donums of property in the south.6 Abandoning their property, approximately 
142,000 GCs from the north fled south. Many were settled in empty TC houses or in 
houses built on TC land. Again, approximately 55,000 TCs abandoned their property 
and fled north, and were settled in GC property.7  
Active armed hostilities have ceased since partition in 1974 and in recent 
years there have been signs of possible resolution. However, all attempts have so far 
ended without agreement.8 The island, including the capital Nicosia, is divided into 
northern and southern zones. In 1983 the northern zone declared itself the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is recognized as a State only by Turkey 
and regarded by the rest of the world as an illegally occupied part of the independent 
Republic of Cyprus (RoC).9 
                                                            
1 Rebecca Bryant, 'History's Remainders: On Time and Objects After Conflict in Cyprus' (November 
2014) 41 (4) American Ethnologist 681, 681 
2 Erin Daly, ‘Transformative justice: Charting a path to reconciliation’ (2001) 12 International Legal 
Perspectives 73, 79-80 
3 Bryant, 'History's Remainders’ (n 1) 681  
4 See Deniz Ş Sert, ‘Cyprus: Peace, Return and Property’ (2010) 23(2) JRS 238, 239–40 
5 Unit of measurement of the area of land used in Cyprus (1 donum = 0.33 acres =1,338 squaremeters) 
6 Mensur Akgün and others, ‘Quo Vadis Cyprus?’ (Tesev Working Paper, April 2005) 35 (The 
displacement and donum numbers vary. For example; according to GCs, land ownership in donums 
left in the north by the GCs is 1,463,382 donums, whereas 413,177 donums of land is left by the TCs 
in the south. TC claims are 1,228,838 donums and 679,057 donums respectively. Again, for example; 
according to official GC sources, 142,000 GCs (almost 30% of the entire Greek population at that 
time) were displaced; and according to official TC sources 45,000 TCs (almost 40% of the population 
at that time) were relocated. (Ayla Gürel and Kudret Özersay, 'The Politics of Property in Cyprus, 
Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities' (Prio 
Report, 3/2006) 3, 8-9)  
7 Rebecca Bryant and  Mete Hatay, ‘Suing for Sovereignty: Property, Territory and the EU’s Cyprus 
Problem’ (Global Political Trends Center, Policy Brief, 2009) 4 
8 ‘Cyprus Talks End without Agreement, Says UN Chief’, The Guardian (7 July 2017) <https:// 
guardian.ng/news/cyprus-talks-end-without-agreement-says-un-chief/> accessed 3 December 2018 




The physical division between the two major ethnic groups (the TCs and 
GCs)10 was justified and still perceived by some as a way of promoting the physical 
security of the island’s inhabitants. This has resulted in considerably less attention 
being paid to efforts to promote justice and reconciliation.11  
With this in mind, the starting point of this research has been the work of the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) between March 2009 and April 
2011 in Cyprus under a project funded by the European Union. The goal of this 
project was to help civil society and victims groups in addressing the island’s violent 
past. The focus was on sharing experiences of other countries, holding workshops on 
truth-telling, memorialization and documentation with civil society organizations, 
local community leaders and politicians, and providing assistance on developing 
educational materials with respect to missing persons.12 In 2012, the two co-
managers of the ICTJ Cyprus Team for the project published a report “Legacies of 
Violence and Overcoming Conflict in Cyprus, The Transitional Justice landscape”, 
addressing transitional justice issues in Cyprus.13 The report noted the importance of 
a cross-communal discussion in Cypriot public opinion about coming to terms with 
the past in Cyprus.14 The authors identified four particular areas of transitional justice 
(TJ) relevant to Cyprus which came to the fore over the course of their work - truth-
seeking initiatives, criminal prosecutions, memorialisation efforts, and 
documentation projects.15  
Cyprus represents a complex case since there are two distinct authorities, 
namely the RoC and the TRNC, that have still been contemplating the future of the 
island under the mediation efforts of the United Nations (UN). If a comprehensive 
settlement for the resolution of the Cyprus problem is reached, a transition to a united 
Cyprus will take place. On the other hand, Cyprus has already undergone a series of 
                                                            
10 There are Maronites, Armenians and Latins considered as minorities in Cyprus. In this thesis, 
reference was made to two major communities of the island. This should not be understood as 
ignoring the existence of these groups as members of Cyprus, but because the main ethnic struggle 
was between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots which was also formalised in the post-independence 
(1960 – the RoC) period when these groups were compelled to become members of either dominant 
community. 
11 The UN Secretary-General described the Cyprus conundrum in the following terms: “Each side felt 
vulnerable to a larger potential enemy – the GCs feared the Turkish Goliath, the TCs feared the GC 
Goliath.” (UN Secretary-General, 'Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in 
Cyprus' S/2003/398 (1 April 2003), 5 
12 <https://www.ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/cyprus> accessed 3 November 2016 
13 Umut Bozkurt and Chrystalla Yakinthou, ‘Legacies of Violence and Overcoming Conflict in 
Cyprus, The Transitional Justice Landscape’ (Prio Cyprus Center 2/12) 
14 Ibid 3 




transitions. The period when the island was under British rule until the establishment 
of the RoC in 1960 following an anti-colonial struggle, and the period after the 
establishment and the collapse of the Republic could be considered as transitions. 
The latter is from a relatively peaceful unitary state to a partitioned island. It has not 
been a transition from authoritarianism to democracy because the RoC has been a 
democratic state. However, currently there are separately governed States, namely 
the TRNC and the RoC, in both sides of the island which have been running under 
their respective Constitutions. On the other hand, TCs, as one of its constituent 
communities, are absent from the RoC institutions in contravention to its 
Constitution and each side has different perspectives on how the situation has 
evolved.16 Further transitions are also possible but not imminent. Bell observes, there 
is a lack of a clear definition of transition which “creates difficulties for the 
disciplines engaged in studying particular types of transition (for example political 
science or peace studies) in their attempts to dominate the discourse”.17 In both sides 
of the island, both authorities attempt to deal with the reflections of the partitition, 
such as property rights of each communities which can be considered as processes of 
transition of property rights. The situation on the island resembles to that of the 
Northern Ireland where Campbell, Ni Aolain and Harvey conceive of it “as a site of 
multiple transitions”, beginning with the disintegration of the old regime in 1968-
1972, followed by significant reforms to the state under direct rule (1972-1998). This 
is evident in the scale of ongoing human rights violations at the time of the Good 
Friday Agreement, very much lower than in the past despite the legacy of earlier 
violations remaining unaddressed.18  
Turning to Cyprus again, Bozkurt and Yakinthou note in their report 
mentioned above that Cyprus “is not a post-conflict society”.19 Furthermore, the 
authors argue that, on a deeper level, if “one of the aims of transitional justice is the 
restoration of trust between citizens and institutions, there should be at the very least 
some internal agreement on the legitimacy of those institutions”. Observing that “the 
institutions themselves are one of the primary sites of intercommunal contestation” 
                                                            
16 Hoffmeister F, Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem, Annan Plan and EU Accession (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2006) 31 (The GCs put forth the doctrine of necessity to justify the said 
contravention claiming that the legal order had to be preserved.) 
17 Christine Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’’ 
(2009) 3 IJTJ 5, 24 
18 Colm Campbell, Fionnuala Ni Aolain and Colin Harvey, ‘The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: 
Reframing the Transition in Northern Ireland’, (2003) 66 Mod L Rev 317, 337 




on the island, the authors state that violations committed by both state and non-state 
groups remain unaddressed.20 They particularly note that TJ is immediately relevant 
to the issue of the continuing violation of the rights of the families of those missing 
whose fate is still unknown as a result of the conflict and of acts of violence between 
1963 and 1974. These issues not only affect specific institutions and policies such as 
security sectors and the education systems, but also remain as an obstacle for the 
ongoing peace process under the auspices of the UN.21  
It was observed by Bozkurt and Yakinthou during the meetings held under 
this project that Cyprus also presents a rather complex case for TJ, concerning a 
society dealing with the legacy of conflict-related violence, while, at the same time 
being held hostage by an ongoing peace process.22 Since negotiations to solve the 
problem have continued for more than 50 years, disputes and legal claims 
particularly over property and uncovering the remains of the missing have “led to the 
realization that everyone has his or her own Cyprus problem, and that for many 
people solving their own Cyprus problems is more than enough.”23 Currently, 
alternative truth-seeking approaches have been ongoing, documentation efforts have 
been increasing, and some forms of compensation and restitution have been offered 
to GC displaced persons for their property.24 And although there is no agreed 
solution, there are attempts to seek redress for human rights violations. However, 
these processes sit alongside, and are often at odds with the peace process.25 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also addressed relevant 
issues from missing persons to property rights.26 The property dispute is one of the 
many faces of the Cyprus problem, and we are concerned here only with those 
relating to abandoned Greek property in the north. The ECtHR became a more 
important actor in Cyprus in the 1990s following the individual applications of GCs 
especially with the landmark judgment in Loizidou v Turkey in 1996.27 There was no 
mechanism for abandoned GC properties in the north until the Immovable Property 
Determination, Evaluation and Compensation Commission (IPDECC) was 
                                                            
20 Ibid 6 
21 Ibid 6-7 
22 Ibid 7 
23 Mete Hatay and Rebecca Bryant, ‘Negotiating the Cyprus Problem(s)’ (Tesev Publications 2011) 22 
24 See Bozkurt and Yakinthou (n 13) 
25 This is considered in Chapters 2 and 3 
26 See for example Cyprus v Turkey Appl Nos 6780/74, 6950/75 Commission Report (10 July 1976); 
Cyprus v Turkey Appl No 8007/77 Commission Report (4 October 1983) 




established in response to the Loizidou case. From 2003 onwards, a shift can be 
observed with the Xenides-Arestis and Demopoulos and others cases, in which, the 
Court accepted that the Immovable Property Commission (IPC - established in 2005 
replacing the IPDECC as a Convention compliant mechanism) in the north (the 
TRNC - administered by the TCs) constituted an adequate and effective remedy 
under Article 35 of the Convention.28 This thesis focuses on this part of the problem; 
i.e. property, and the work of the IPC, for whom I work as a lawyer, as a mechanism 
established to remedy property claims of GCs unresolved for 40 years. In this 
respect, the IPC deals with issues where “traditional legal mechanisms prove difficult 
or undesirable politically (for whatever reason)”.29 The reason for solely addressing 
GC claims to property in this thesis is the fact that there is no such special 
mechanism for TC properties remaining in the south (the RoC – administered by the 
GCs).  
The GC policy for TC properties has been significantly different from that of 
the TCs’. TCs are considered by the TRNC as legal owners of their properties but 
were placed under the administration of the Minister of the Interior as “the 
Custodian” under Law No 131/1991. The Custodian has all the rights and obligations 
which a TC owner would have. TC claims over these properties are dependent on 
strict conditions set forth in the Law. The Law was challenged various times before 
the ECtHR by TCs, the leading one being Niazi Kazalı and Hakan Kazalı. In this 
case the application was declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies pursuant to Article 35 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).30 As mentioned above, the property rights of TCs in the south is not within 
the scope of this research since, first of all, a mechanism similar to that of the IPC is 
not available. Secondly, the system in the north, which will be examined in Chapter 2 
in detail, indicates that the TCs assumed the property issue would be solved by way 
of comprehensive exchange between the two communities.31 In other words, the 
maximalist position considered the property issue as a finished matter and this has 
been reflected in the property legislation in force in the north. 
                                                            
28 Xenides-Arestis v Turkey App No 46347/99 Merits (22 December 2005); Xenides-Arestis v Turkey 
App No 46347/99 Just Satisfaction (7 December 2006); Demopoulos and others v Turkey Apps Nos 
46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04 Admissibility (1 
March 2010) 
29 Bell, ‘Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-Field’’ (n 17) 24 
30 Niazi Kazalı and Hakan Kazalı v Cyprus (Apps 49247/08 1545/07 1760/05 30792/05 3240/05 
34776/06 38902/05 4080/06 49307/08 ) Admissibility (6 March 2012) 




The limited literature on GC property claims and the work of the IPC has so 
far been dominated by and confined to juridical commentary upon the background to 
the establishment of the IPC solely from a human rights perspective. However, 
human rights is not an end in itself and may not be an appropriate response to a 
particular kind of conflict. Since the Cyprus problem itself has wider implications, 
the questions of what the IPC is supposed to do, how it functions, whether it fulfills 
its mandate, whether it is autonomous to the political conflict and whether it could be 
improved need to be addressed beyond a human rights framework. Bearing all this in 
mind, the objective of this research is to consider TJ for its possible analytical and 
policy contribution to Cyprus with a particular focus on the IPC as an institution.  As 
a mechanism for remedying property rights of the displaced GCs, I attempt at 
considering whether it is capable of making a positive contribution to community 
relations in Cyprus. The difficulty entailed here is the fact that TJ has not been part of 
an official policy in Cyprus, but, as addressed by Bozkurt and Yakinthou, “more and 
more people from civil society, academia, the arts community, and within political 
circles are beginning to think about how to overcome the burden of the past in order 
to create a more peaceful future”.32 In other words, it is unclear how the trajectory of 
TJ debate, policy and practice in Cyprus might be incorporated in official policy. 
Recent TJ literature in Cyprus proposes initiatives referring to Tunisia for country-
wide fixed-term consultation processes and Colombia for government-to-
victim/survivor dialogues.33  
In all its complexity, the issue is also related with other fields considered in 
the next section. 
 
II. Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding  
Cyprus presents a case illustrating the spread of nationalism and the impact this has 
on social and political institutions. Identity has shaped the discourse on the conflict 
and suggested that cooperative resolution is much needed.34 It is a protracted conflict 
which Fisher describes as “clearly an identity-based conflict . . . in which group 
                                                            
32 Bokzurt and Yakinthou (n 13) 3 
33 Christalla Yakinthou, ‘Transitional Justice in Cyprus, Challenges and Opportunities’ edited by 
Ahmet Sözen and Jared L Ordway (Security Dialogue Project, Background Paper, Berlin: Berghof 
Foundation & SeeD 2017) 
34 David Reilly, ‘Teaching Conflict Resolution: A Model for Student Research in Cyprus’  (2013) 4 




identities and needs have been expressed, frustrated, and threatened, leading to 
escalation and stalemate”.35 This is also related to the concepts of war and peace. 
Engstrom states that there is no clear cut line between “war” and “peace” in many 
contemporary conflicts where there have been attempts to implement TJ policies in 
very fragile and unstable situations including “before any discernible transition (from 
‘war’ to ‘peace’)” is in place.36 There has also been a growing tendency within TJ to 
include the adoption of broader components which may include not only criminal 
prosecutions, truth telling, institutional reform and reparations as core interventions, 
but also commemorative practices and memory work, educational reform and 
reconciliation initiatives. Such understandings may accommodate further connections 
between TJ and broader notions of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.37 
Trending “international judicial interventions in ongoing conflicts has also brought 
the field of TJ in much closer contact with the related, but distinct, fields of conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding”.38  
Peacebuilding and human rights have also been part of the agenda of the UN, 
and in the management of international peace and security. The United Nations 
Security Council has mandated peace building missions over the course of the last 
two decades including election observation, provisional administration and coercive 
rules of military engagement.39 This has created significant normative and 
operational overlaps between the traditionally distinct fileds of TJ and peacebuilding 
theory and practice. As the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan states: “Justice 
and peace are not contradictory forces. Rather, properly pursued, they promote and 
sustain one another. The question, then, can never be whether to pursue justice and 
accountability, but rather when and how.”40 
Peacebuilding involves the introduction of political, humanitarian, 
developmental, and human rights programmes and mechanisms to prevent the 
outbreak, recurrence or continuation of conflict. Their purpose is to pave the way for 
                                                            
35 See Ronald J Fisher, ‘Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based 
Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse’ (2001) 38 JPR 307, 321 
36 Par Engstrom, ‘Transitional Justice and Ongoing Conflict’, 4 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228142666> accessed 14 January 2020 
37 Paul Gready and Simon Robins, 'From Transitional to Transformative Justice: A New Agenda for 
Practice' (2014) 8 IJTJ 339, 350-352 
38 Engstrom (n 36) 6 
39 See ibid 6-7 
40 Report of the UN Secretary General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 




sustainability in the security, political, economic and justice spheres,41 relevant for 
the purposes of this thesis since it involves a "social and associative process that 
rebuilds fractured relationships between people."42  
In the words of the UN itself, there is an ongoing “peace process” and/or 
“peace talks” in Cyprus.43 The UN acts as the mediator for the resolution of the 
conflict in Cyprus. Several peace proposals have been debated between the two 
communities for decades, notably the Annan Plan which was put to simultaneous 
referendums on both sides of the island in 2004.44 The content of ongoing 
negotiations are examined in detail in Chapter 3. However, it is controversial whether 
positive peace, as defined by Galtung, could be achieved through this UN-sponsored 
process.  
In this respect, the term “post-conflict” should be clarified as well. It simply 
means termination of hostilities through negotiation or on the battlefield.45 However, 
many post-conflict countries have relapsed into conflict rapidly without having 
achieved a negotiated peace agreement (such as Angola and Sierra Leone), or 
gradually even many years after they concluded a peace agreement (such as 
Zimbabwe).46 Societies that formally conclude hostilities have been described as 
“post-conflict societies”, but, in fact the insecurity and instability marking these 
countries with the possibility of a relapse into political violence should be cautiously 
recognized.47 From this point of view, it is difficult to situate Cyprus within the 
“post-conflict” framework. The details of the conflict in which the island finds itself 
will be addressed in Chapter 2. But, it suffices to note here that according to Bryant, 
partition of the island is marked by a “ceasefire line”, acting as a “closed border and 
preventing Cypriots from crossing to the other side”.48 In other words, Cypriots “live 
in a prolonged ceasefire, a suspension of war, while ongoing negotiations promise a 
                                                            
41 UN Security Council, ‘Statement by the President of the Security Council’ S/PRST/2001/5 (20 
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radical change in the status quo”.49 A distinction should also be made between 
“negative peace” where the conditions which caused violent conflict remain, and a 
“positive peace” which eradicates the causes of violence, and focuses on broad social 
issues and the demands of transformative justice.50 In other words, there is no 
positive peace in Cyprus, but rather relapsing into conflict is averted meaning that 
negative peace is in place.51 Webel calls this an “absence of war and other 
widespread violence” in which there is also injustice and personal discord and 
dissatisfaction; a “weak or fragile peace”.52 According to Yakinthou, indicators that 
each side of the conflict continues to regard the other as “the enemy” include the 
commemoration and celebration of historical events which are symbols of sorrow or 
loss for the other community, continuing compulsory military service by both 
communities, and blame-gaming by political elites about where responsibility for the 
non-resolution of the conflict lies.53  
The concepts of peacebuilding, conflict transformation and resolution are 
therefore complementary in the Cyprus conflict. Conflict transformation has become 
a priority in TJ literature, encouraged by the UN and the ICTJ on the grounds that TJ 
should address the root causes of violence, empower citizenry, strengthen democratic 
structures, and facilitate civic participation.54 The role of justice in peacebuilding 
have also become important for TJ.55 Furthermore, it should strengthen societal 
bonds and relationships through prioritization of social and reparatory justice, which 
in turn would require a greater and more long-term commitment. The mainstream 
literature characterises TJ as involving parallel and complementary processes of 
justice, truth, reparations, institutional reform, and guarantees of non-recurrence,56 
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generally implemented through a set of mechanisms, namely, trials, truth 
commissions, reparations and institutional reform.57 There has also been increased 
attention on the economic components of violence58 expressed in terms of 
counteracting the “constructed invisibility of economic questions”.59 This more 
expansive understanding of TJ has given rise to terms such as “fourth generation 
transitional justice”60 or “transformative transitional justice”.61 It is not necessary to 
engage into a detailed discussion of whether transformative justice is a new field or a 
sub-field of TJ. It suffices to state that this thesis considers TTJ as the last stop to be 
achieved and, thus, it has been necessary to consider it in this thesis as well.62  
TJ and TTJ have been identified as the frameworks for this study for two 
reasons. First, the ongoing negotiations in Cyprus illustrate that a future peace 
agreement would aim to rectify grievances between the communities on the island. 
Some measures of TJ were already addressed in the Annan Plan in 2004, the details 
of which are considered in Chapter 3. These include restitution and compensation for 
property loss and a proposed Reconciliation Comission. Currently, initiatives like the 
Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) and education initiatives continue regardless 
of the state of the peace process. According to Bozkurt and Yakinthou, TJ issues are 
therefore not a far cry from what is already being done in Cyprus. A much closer 
analysis of what is needed by those directly affected by the conflict, as well as the 
tools to create space for multiple perspectives about the past and debates about 
visions of the future are now, therefore, required in order to construct an overarching 
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strategy, and ensure policy coherence.63 Secondly, this thesis is concerned with the 
property rights of the displaced GCs. As noted previously, property disputes are one 
of the most important elements of the Cyprus problem, leading, from time to time, to 
disruption of the peace process. A core issue here concerns the type of justice and 
reparations (e.g. remedying loss of property); key issues in TJ undertakings. As a 
serious social and political problem in Cyprus, particularly for the GCs (the details of 
which will be addressed in Chapter 2), I attempt to consider how the negative impact 
of ongoing violation of property rights may be reduced.  
 Although the concept of transformative justice will be addressed in Chapter 2, 
it would be useful to consider it briefly here. For example, Lambourne – one of the 
first to articulate a model of transformative justice - encourages the use of the term 
“transformative justice” indicating that to account for the contexts that may impact 
on participants’ needs and expectations of justice it "implies long-term, sustainable 
processes" instead of an "interim process that links the past and the future".64 She 
also argues that analysing TJ in terms of its contribution to peacebuilding enables a 
more holistic approach that takes into account the needs of conflict participants and 
the links between dealing with the past and the future,65 a feature which makes this 
paradigm especially relevant for Cyprus. Proposing to reframe TJ as “transformative 
justice”, Lambourne states that it not only deals with the past but also establishes 
conditions to provide for justice with a longer term vision than the term “transitional 
justice” offers.66 If the values of any given new regime are to take root, the culture in 
which they operate should be transformed.67 Lambourne’s transformative justice 
model, has also been situated within the peacebuilding paradigm, and blends 
elements of retributive and restorative justice.68 In her definition, socioeconomic 
justice “incorporates the various elements of justice that relate to financial or other 
material compensation, restitution or reparation for past violations or crimes 
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(historical justice) and distributive or socioeconomic justice in the future (prospective 
justice)”.69  
Given the choice of the IPC in Cyprus as a case study, it is useful to address 
how the IPC Law aims to remedy past injustices:  
The purpose of this Law is to regulate the necessary procedure and conditions 
to be complied with by persons in order to prove their rights regarding claims in 
respect to movable and immovable properties within the scope of this Law, as 
well as, the principles relating to restitution, exchange of properties and 
compensation payable in respect thereof, having regard to the principle of and 
the provisions regarding protection of bizonality, which is the main principle of 
1977-1979 High level Agreements and of all the plans prepared by the United 
Nations on solving the Cyprus Problem and without prejudice to any property 
rights or the right to use property under the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus legislation or to any right of the Turkish Cypriot People which shall be 
provided by the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem.70 
This extract draws attention to two important points. First of all, the Law 
provides for the procedure and conditions for persons claiming to have rights over 
abandoned movable and immovable properties, and remedies; i.e. compensation, 
restitution and exchange. Secondly, the Law not only refers to principles envisaged 
by the 50 year-old UN negotiation process, but also to a possible future 
comprehensive settlement agreement for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Persons 
claiming to have rights in this respect can well await a political solution or, instead, 
apply to the IPC. Since property rights of the displaced have still been the subject of 
negotiations under the auspices of the UN, the IPC process is a form of interference 
with respect to the matter. On the other hand, since it is established to provide for a 
form of justice, TJ and TTJ have ben considered as the most suitable frameworks for 
the purposes of this thesis. This is not to say that the thesis immediately considers the 
IPC as a transformative mechanism, but investigates its potential as a step towards 
TTJ. Because, one should not latch duties to an institution more than it can deliver.  
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III. Methodological Issues 
A. Doctrinal Analysis 
The first stage of the research involved analysis of the existing secondary literature 
on the history and politics of Cyprus. This included academic books, journal articles, 
UN documents, NGO reports, evaluation reports, press news and reviews. The 
research also relied on examination of a selection of primary data. The materials 
included relevant national legislation in Cyprus (Constitution and legislation on 
property) and cases of the ECtHR brought by both GCs and TCs to shed light on how 
and why the IPC was established. Loizidou v Turkey is the landmark case which set 
the precedent for future cases originating from Cyprus, Xendies-Arestis v Turkey led 
to the establishment of the IPC in line with the principles set by the ECtHR and 
finally, with Demopoulos and others v Turkey the ECtHR accepted the IPC as an 
effective remedy for GC property rights. The same applies for the cases brought to 
the ECtHR by TCs. Niazi Kazali and others v Cyprus was selected as the main case 
setting out ECtHR’s the key principles with an examination of the legislation applied 
in the RoC. Cases on post-communist countries, pointed as “transitional property 
cases” in literature relating to the ECHR were also examined to shed light upon the 
ECtHR’s stance in this respect. This approach was chosen, not for a comparative 
analysis, but to set the background for property restitution in the ECtHR context and 
because the IPC has been a product of litigation there. The right to return home in 
international law, restitution in transitions and the passage of time have also been 
addressed through reference to other relevant countries and cases. Many sources in 
this Chapter include both TJ and human rights literature.  
The research is both evaluative and descriptive.71 In this respect, history and 
political science were used to complement empirical/socio-legal research.72 The 
research findings rely on all the data used. 
 
 
B. Empirical and Ethical Challenges 
Yin has described case study methodology as a distinctive means of empirical 
enquiry particularly suitable for exploring the “how” and “why” of contemporary 
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phenomena within a real-life context.73 In this thesis I attempt to empirically examine 
the political and socio-legal dynamics and trajectory of the IPC established in north 
Cyprus in 2005 through a TJ framework. It is essentially a case study, which uses 
detailed, in-depth contextual analysis to develop a better understanding of TJ in its 
“real-world context”.74  
The research identifies what TJ tends to achieve and considers whether it 
could contribute to contexts such as that of Cyprus, a divided country where negative 
peace is preserved, and, at the same time tries to deal with a justice issue. I address 
two central themes. The first is how TJ could contribute to the work of the IPC. The 
second is to see if the work of the IPC could contribute to the Cyprus problem. The 
discussions and findings of this research can have a generalizing function in terms of 
its contribution for public policy debates in Cyprus and implications for other TJ 
contexts.75  
The question of “single or multiple-case designs?” has been raised in the 
literature. Although all designs can lead to other case studies, multiple-case designs 
(comparative case studies) may be preferred over single-case designs as they provide 
for a more reliable basis for generalization.76 A multiple-case (comparative) study 
could have been the approach chosen if the purpose of my research had been to take 
the example of Cyprus to test TJ as a theory. However, my purpose has been to 
assess TJ for its possible application in Cyprus. I nevertheless considered making 
comparisons with TJ experiments in Colombia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and 
Northern Ireland but several issues led to the elimination of all these cases. 
Colombia’s 2011 Victims Law, a TJ reparation process seeking to return land to 
people displaced by violence since 1991, has been an example of TJ with reparations 
and GNR elements. However, the conflict in Colombia was more a result of historic 
land inequality where in Cyprus, the property issue is a consequence of ethnic 
conflict and partition. By contrast, BiH was an ethnic conflict with property rights 
having crucial importance and impact as in Cyprus. The Dayton Agreement ending 
the Bosnian conflict introduced a strong right to return for the displaced to reverse 
ethnic cleansing, Annex 7, of which established a Commission for Real Property 
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Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees.  Initially, I thought that the work of this 
Commission could be a good comparison with that of the IPC. However, the 
similarities are superficial since the BiH Commission was the result of an 
internationally- brokered peace agreement with no parallel in Cyprus. In Northern 
Ireland, although displacement occurred as a result of violence rather than, for 
example state appropriation, this issue has never been central to the peace process. In 
the final analysis, this thesis considered the IPC as a specific institution in the 
contexts of the Cyprus problem and TJ without exploring other ostensible parallels, 
which, in closer inspection, turned out to be quiet different. One of the conclusions of 
this research is that the IPC is unique. Nevertheless, lessons from it could be 
applicable in other conflict contexts in designing processes for housing, land and 
property rights. 
An alleged weakness of case study methodology is its objectivity and the 
vulnerability as being shaped by the researcher’s own interests and perspectives.77 
Working as a lawyer at the IPC, this was a concern for me. To address this, it was 
important to be aware of retaining as much of an objective perspective as possible 
throughout. For this, semi-structured interviews were included with key-players 
involved directly or indirectly in the IPC’s work. Prior to initiating the empirical part 
of the research, approval was sought and obtained from the University of Bristol Law 
School Research Ethics Committee.  
As Halse and Honey state, “semi structured interviews are inherently 
emergent, reflexive, and messy, and the planned focus of an interview can easily shift 
as new issues and accounts emerge”,78 an observation confirmed by my own 
experience. Such interviews can assist the process of information gathering by 
allowing for the building of rapport and interaction with each participant, gauging 
how deep questioning might go, and the direction it might take.79 I used semi-
structured interviews due to their flexibility as, for instance, being able to respond to 
interviewees’ particular area of knowledge and further exploration of additional 
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themes that could arise.80 Hakim advises that as case studies involve specialised 
interviewing of informants, discussion should take place on “a basis of equality”81 
requiring the researcher to have a good knowledge of the subject matter. The 
selection of participants, and drafting of questionnaires, were guided by my many 
years of professional work experience and research related to the subject matter.  
Interviews were conducted with four categories of respondent: 
 Applicants before the IPC. Originally, I intended to conduct five to ten 
such interviews. 
 Lawyers/Representatives of applicants pursuing cases before the IPC. 
Six lawyers having the highest number of such applications were 
envisaged in order to achieve as much information as possible on a 
variety of claims. 
 The IPC President and Vice-President of the IPC facilitating their right 
of reply. 
 Representatives of Political Parties from both north (the TRNC) and 
south (the RoC) of the island according to the percentage of their 
electoral vote. 
In total, 22 interviews, carried out between November 2017 and July 2018 
each taking about an hour to an hour and a half, were conducted. Non-probability, 
purposive and snowball sampling was used to identify the most relevant interview 
subjects.82  
Purposive sampling technique, used for the selection of interview participants, 
allows for an intentional selection of participants that can best generate the 
understanding of the specific social process being studied.83 Hakim states that 
collection of data contributing to case study methodology may involve “specialised 
interviewing of informants, professionals and organisational or public role-
holders”.84 In this manner, purposive sampling permitted the selection of 
interviewees according to their specific experience and knowledge of 
proceedingsbefore the IPC and the Cyprus problem in general. To understand the 
context further, some information was also sought regarding the number of 
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applicants at the IPC and the kinds of properties concerned. As of 26 January 2020 
6,314 applications have been lodged with the IPC, 990 of which have been settled 
either through formal hearing or friendly settlement. Some applications concern more 
than one applicant or more than one property in one or more districts. Properties 
might include a house, a field, a building plot, a shop, a building or a hotel.85 
Considering the number of applications and the variety of properties, it is unlikely 
that respondents could be identified as a result of participating in the research. I 
intended to select as respondents both the original owners of the properties in 1974 
who were displaced (first generation) and their legal heirs (second/third generation 
etc.). These two groups would have allowed me to assess the difference of approach, 
if any, between them.  
The purpose of the applicant interviews was to gain insight into aplicants’ 
motivation to apply to the IPC rather than await a political solution to the Cyprus 
problem, how they perceive the IPC as a remedy, what factors affected their 
preference for a particular remedy (compensation, restitution or exchange of 
property), whether they felt hardship or distress during the process before the IPC 
and what they thought about reunification of Cyprus and “return” to their properties. 
Assistance was sought in selecting and contacting applicants as interviewees since it 
would have been unethical to contact them through information available at the IPC 
itself. Furthermoe, as a lawyer employed by the IPC, applicants might have felt 
obliged to participate in the research because of my professional position. I, 
therefore, communicated with those lawyers/representatives active in the highest 
number of applications before the IPC who could lead me to applicants willing to 
cooperate with my study. This part of sampling design can be considered as snowball 
sampling, and the rest as purposive sampling. However, in the event I was only able 
to conduct three such interviews. Having considered leaving them out altogether I 
nevertheless decided not to on the grounds that they nevertheless complement the 
information obtained through interviews with lawyers/representatives. 
By contrast, I interviewed six lawyers and/or representatives pursuing cases at 
the IPC with approximately 2,900 applications in total. These provided me, among 
other things, with an insight into the motivation of applicants and their experience 
there. Lawyers/representatives pursuing cases at the IPC might have not felt 
                                                            




comfortable with participating if they thought their ongoing applications might have 
been affected by having been commented on the IPC’s work.  In order to avoid this 
possibility, I attempted to ensure anonymity. However, among the lawyers to be 
interviewed were those who had applied to the High Administrative Court (for 
appeal) or to the ECtHR. Lawyers were therefore informed that it might be difficult 
to provide complete anonymity. According to the literature, in such circumstances, 
researchers are advised to obtain written consent that an individual wishes to waive 
their right to anonymity.86 Considering that this might cause difficulties, the consent 
forms stated that in case the data resulted in their identification, those concerned 
would be able to see what data and/or quotes would be used for this study. 
I also carried out interviews with both the President and the Vice-President of 
the IPC mostly about the effectiveness of the procedure. It was not possible to 
guarantee anonymity and they were informed accordingly. In any case, this did not 
present a particular problem since, from time to time they participate in press 
interviews. Again, the participants were able to see what data and/or quotes would be 
used in the research.  
Since one of the wider objectives of my thesis is to discover the relationship 
between the IPC and Cyprus problem, interviewing political parties in north and 
south Cyprus to canvas their views on the negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus 
problem, the contribution of the IPC and their opinions on the process at the IPC and 
the property dispute in general was of considerable importance. I managed to 
interview five political parties with representatives in the Parliament in the south and 
all political parties in the north. Currently there are six political parties at the General 
Assembly of the TRNC and eight parties at the House of Representatives of the 
Republic of Cyprus. I contacted the President, the Secretary General or the 
Spokesperson of each political party to identify suitable respondents. The interviews 
were carried out with either the President of the Party or another representative to 
whom I was referred. Information I gathered through the interviews with political 
parties can be considered as representing the views of some key players and 
stakeholders capable of providing insight into the process, a form of purposive rather 
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than random sample selection.87 In the event this constituted one of the most valuable 
dimensions of the interviews. Again, it was not possible to guarantee anonymity for 
this group and they were informed accordingly. In any case, this did not present a 
particular problem since, from time to time they also participate in press interviews. 
Again, the participants were able to see what data and/or quotes would be used in the 
research.  
The main problem with the interviews was distinguishing between when the 
intervieews were neutrally describing an issue or expressing their own opinion about 
it. Thus the importance of triangulation has been at the fore and different sources of 
evidence (as explained above; i.e. literature, cases, news clippings) were used to 
assess the credibility of the information gathered and to highlight the variety of 
different narratives on the same set of events.88 As Yin points out, a case study such 
as mine could combine personal experience with other sources of evidence.89 While 
it cannot be considered within the framework of “observation”, it nevertheless falls 
within the framework of a “well documented” study. While not resorting to 
participant observation, carrying out interviews was a choice made to reduce biases 
and further objectivity and reliability.  
Having said all this, the fact that the respondents would know that I work at 
the IPC as a lawyer was an ethical challenge. By sharing their experiences with me, 
participants could mistakenly expect to recruit me to solve their problems.90 In my 
case, it was made clear that I do not have the power to change what applicants may 
deem inadequate about the IPC.  
In order to ensure research integrity, I ensured that interviewees made an 
informed decision regarding participation by supplying each participant with an 
Information Sheet containing such information as research purpose, proposed use of 
data and what participation would entail. All interviewees were informed that their 
participation in the study was voluntary. Each participant was provided with and 
asked to sign a consent form requiring the interviewee to confirm they had been 
provided with details of the study, given the opportunity to ask questions and discuss 
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the research, and that they had received sufficient information to make a decision 
regarding participation. Anonymity of data attribution was guaranteed and where not 
possible, this was also explained to participants as addressed above. The right to 
anonymity was waived by all but two lawyers/representatives whose names were 
replaced by pseudonyms. One of the applicants declared that his name could be 
revealed and one expressed that he would not mind, yet anonymity for the latter was 
preserved. For other participants, it was not possible to guarantee anonymity and they 
were informed accordingly. All were able to see, read and approve what data and/or 
quotes which might be used in the thesis. Names and any other details of 
interviewees have been kept in a separate file so that this information could not be 
linked to interview notes and breach participants’ anonymity. They were further 
informed that they could withdraw at any point, and should they change their mind 
on completion of the interview, they could also withdraw from the study at any time 
up to and including submission of the thesis. I also informed them about my 
involvement in the IPC as a lawyer and emphasised that I could not assist them with 
their own cases.  
I took notes during the interviews but they were not electronically recorded. 
The Ministry of Interior did not respond to my invitation letter of 23 July 
2018 to be interviewed for this project. 
 
   
IV. Thesis Structure 
A brief introduction to Cyprus problem, the background to the property issue and its 
relevance to TJ has been made in this Chapter. In Chapter 2, I seek to describe and 
analyse in detail the state of partition of the island and the displacement of almost 
half its population institutionalizing a culture of resentment. To this end, I begin by 
addressing the history of the island to establish how the ethnic division originated 
and developed. The legal framework regarding the GC properties left in the north 
following partition in 1974 is also examined.  Following this, I offer a TJ framework 
to shed light upon the goals and problems in the field. Chapter 3 then considers 
negotiations and mediation efforts seeking to resolve the Cyprus problem under the 
auspisces of the UN. In Chapter 4, the role of property restitution in other transitions 
in post-Soviet Central and Eastern Europe in particular, "property restitution" and 




contexts in general and of Cyprus property cases are examined. This was undertaken 
as a result of the fact that the IPC has emerged from a human rights background and 
is a product of the ECtHR. Using a wider range of sources, i.e. semi-structured 
interviews, how the IPC has fared in practice is addressed in Chapter 5.  
Finally, Chapter 6 draws the following main conclusions. The IPC, a 
mechanism for GCs in search of remedies for their properties remaining in the north, 
could have provided a space for the building of trust. The problems the IPC has 
faced, indicate that it is important to understand the extent to which institutions, 
processes and developments affect the situation in Cyrpus positively, negatively or 
not at all. The potential of the IPC in this regard is important since it serves as an 
example for a pre-solution mechanism to be established both for GC and TC 
properties abandoned in both sides of the island, thus paving the way for delinking 

























Chapter 2 Cyprus Problem and Transitional Justice 
I. The Cyprus Problem  
A. Historical Background 
Since 1974, the Mediterranean island of Cyprus has been ethnically divided, with a 
UN buffer zone separating TCs in the north from GCs in the south.1 The historical 
background of the island is marked with the interethnic struggle between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot communities. Although the line dividing the island dates back to 
1974, the island's history sheds light on the roots of the division between the island's 
two main communities that has existed long before 1974.2 GC and TC history 
narratives are similar: a model of ethnic nationalism focusing on the suffering of the 
self where the suffering of others is silenced.3  
 Cyprus has often been invaded, bought, sold, and changed hands from one 
ruler to another without its inhabitants ever having been consulted.4 Between 1571 
and 1878, it was ruled by the Ottomans and Muslims migrated from southern 
Anatolia following the initial conquest.5 The number of TCs has generally been 
smaller than Greeks.6 The Ottomans administered the island under the millet system 
where communities were given rights and privileges as well as electing their own 
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judicial and administrative officials, a system not based on "ethnicities" but on 
"religious identities".7   
 In 1878, as part of the Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great 
Britain and Turkey against Russian expansion, Turkey agreed to hand over Cyprus to 
be occupied and administered by the United Kingdom (UK).8 With the British rule 
(1878-1960) the millet system ended, but prior autonomy of religious communities 
continued.9 The process of modernization of multiethnic traditional social structure 
of Cyprus gave rise to two distinct and opposing national projects and national 
consciousnesses. During this period, and particularly since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Cypriot society evolved along various lines, ranging from 
anticolonial struggle against the British to interethnic tensions between GCs and 
TCs.10 In the early 20th century the GC aspiration of union of Cyprus with 
"motherland Greece" (enosis), and the TC aspiration of "union" with "motherland 
Turkey" in the form of partititon of the ethnically mixed Cypriot society to establish a 
purely separate Turkish state (taksim), became the basic goals of the island's 
conflicting nationalisms,11 with Turkish nationalism generally being "a counter 
nationalism" to Hellenic enosis.12 As enosis gained momentum, the Greek Cypriot 
Orthodox Church, under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios III, held a plebiscite 
on 15 January 1950 among GCs, excluding TCs where 96 per cent voted in favour of 
enosis.13 The result was referred to the UN Secretary General who like Great Britain 
and Greece at that time remained inactive and did not take the issue on their 
agenda.14 Following this development and to fight against British control over 
Cyprus, GCs established EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), a 
paramilitary force, in 1955 and embarked upon violent activities.15 The British 
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2010)  20 
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attempted to suppress EOKA through harsh tactics with TCs joining the auxiliary 
police to help quell the rebellion.16 Although EOKA refrained from targeting TCs, 
fearing Turkish involvement in the conflict, killings of TC auxiliary police were 
taken as an attack on TCs as a whole, and reprisals became common.17 In the 1950s, 
Turkish nationalism became the ideology, supported by the majority, popularized by 
a meeting held by 3,000 people in 1958 with the slogan "either taksim or death".18 As 
in the words of Kızılyürek and Gauter, “[f]rom now on, Turkish Cypriot nationalism 
ceased to be merely a romantic attachment to ‘mother Turkey’ and […] gradually 
became a separatist ideology and cultivated the myth that two communities cannot 
live together.”19 
 The expectation of TC leaders that the campaign of terror for enosis would 
sooner or later be directed against the TC community, led to the establishment of the 
Volkan, which later became TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization).20 However, 
largely because TCs were economically weaker than their GC counterparts, and 
unlike enosis which evolved more progressively and gradually, taksim took a 
reactionary form.21 Turkey and the UK have each been accused of contributing to 
these developments in pursuit of their respective national interests.22 Some scholars 
also maintain that the leaderships of both communities have influenced the creation 
and perpetuation of the conflict.23 Kızılyürek states that, under these circumstances it 
had not been difficult for the two communities to re-engage with the establishment of 
the RoC.24 However, "the battle of status" continued and led to the collapse of the 
Republic.25 
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 The UN addressed the Cyprus problem between 1954 and 1958. During the 
General Assembly debates about the Greek claim for enosis in this period, the 
General Assembly urged the parties to seek a peaceful, just and democratic solution 
in line with the UN Charter.26 In February 1959, the Greek and Turkish Prime 
ministers reached an agreement in Zurich following consultations with Cypriot 
leaders for the establishment of an independent state of the RoC.27 However, 
following the establishment of the Republic the limited participation of the 
community leaders from each of the two communities paved the way for substantial 
unrest and dissatisfaction.28 As in the words of Mallinson, Cypriots were hardly 
involved in deciding their own future.29 In this respect, it can be said that the 
establishment of the RoC was mainly driven mainly by the UK, Greece and Turkey, 
and was not desired either by the TC or the GC leaderships. Thus, with both 
nationalisms in Cyprus ascendant, the Constitution of the RoC of 196030 did not lead 
to reconciliation between them but was perceived to be "the interim period for the 
goals of taksim and enosis" to be realised.31 
 
 
B. The Republic of Cyprus 
The RoC was a result of the framework envisaged by the London and Zurich 
Agreements drafted by Britain, Greece, and Turkey who agreed to act as guarantor 
powers of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new state.32  
 Its Constitution was criticised for being too rigid and complicated with its 
strong bi-communal character displeasing GCs who have always seen TCs as a 
"minority" population rather than having a politically equal status with the GCs.33 
Following its establishment, Archbishop Makarios declared that the national aims of 
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the GCs were unalterable and that enosis had to be achieved.34 In the meantime, 
Makarios put forward a 13-point proposal35 in November 1963 to amend the 
Constitution which Turkey and TCs rejected stating that it left the Turks "at the 
mercy of the Greeks".36 
 Chrysostomides, who rejects Necatigil's claim that the 13-point proposal was 
a precursor to the abolition of the 1960 Treaties and the beginning of a journey 
towards union with Greece, claims this is a biased interpretation of the conflict which 
followed.37 In this respect Chrysostomides refers to a document signed by Vice 
President Dr Küçük and President of the TC Communal Chamber Denktaş, setting 
out the parameters for partitionist aims.38 Different narratives of historical events and 
their presentation show each side's tendency to blame the "other", an obstacle to 
reconciliation. Chrysostomides asserts in this regard that it would be more equitable 
and historically correct to admit that "in both communities there were forces which 
wanted confrontation".39 
The TC leadership and TMT had considered the Zurich and London 
Agreements as a temporary solution where their main aim was still taksim as 
reflected in official documents.40 The GC position was similar for enosis, where the 
GC leadership was influenced by AKRITAS, the name of the Plan to reach Enosis as 
well as for the organisation set up after a short period of time following the 
establishment of the RoC.41 Thus, the irreconcilable position of TC and GC elites led 
to the collapse of the Republic.42 
  Tensions rapidly expanded through the summer and autumn of 1963 and an 
incident between the TCs and GCs sparked the outbreak of inter-communal 
violence.43 Although ethnic segregation had taken place in the 1910s, and had further 
increased during 1955-1959, the displacement of many Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
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reached its peak following the inter-communal strife of the 1960s.44 The estimates on 
the number of deaths between 1963–4 vary.45 109 villages, most of them TC or 
mixed villages, were totally or partially destroyed or damaged.46 25,000 – 30,000 
TCs, about a quarter of the TC population, were uprooted and internally displaced.47 
In other words, TCs suffered greater loss during this period.48 The Security Council 
recommended the creation of the United Nations Peace Keeping Force (UNFICYP) 
to prevent recurrence of violence and to contribute to the restoration of law and order 
but further fighting could not be prevented.49 The violence resulted in the withdrawal 
of TCs from government and their retreat into ethnically homogeneous enclaves.50 
 Tensions decreased in 1968, and negotiations, which would continue for more 
than 40 years, started.51 Following the military coup of 15 July 1974 in Greece which 
spread to Cyprus to oust Makarios, and Turkey’s military intervention of 20 July 
1974, TC nationalists’ proposal for partition became a practical reality. The 
establishment of the TRNC in 1983 enabled Turkish nationalism to become the 
official ideology of the state recognized by no other state except "motherland" 
Turkey.52 
The intervention of Turkey in 1974 had profound effects on the GCs.  At a 
national level, they lost their dream of a “Greek Cyprus” and their hold over every 
part of the territory and every aspect of Cypriot life. At a personal level, many were 
killed, suffered or were forced to move from their place of birth and leave behind 
homes, land and possessions.53  In addition, there was the trauma of seeing part of 
their country “occupied” by an alien force – Turkey and the Turkish army.54 The next 
section turns to TJ before addressing its relevance to Cyprus. 
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II. Transitional Justice 
A.  The History of the Concept and its Definition 
TJ has increasingly been subject of debate in the academic and policy mainstream in 
recent decades as a means of understanding and dealing with violent or authoritarian 
pasts through processes to prosecute wrongdoers, reveal truth, redress harm, facilitate 
reconciliation and prevent the recurrence of violence and violation of rights.55 Teitel 
defines TJ as “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, 
characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive 
predecessor regimes”.56 She focused on dealing with past wrongs through purely legal 
means which leads to contentions that “transitional justice is at its root modelled on 
criminal justice systems”,57 or that it “mostly emphasizes corrective justice”.58 This 
reflects developments following the Allied-run Nuremberg Trials after World War II 
when the purpose of TJ was "accountability" of individuals for egregious violations 
of human rights.59 Teitel states that, these processes reflected “the triumph of 
transitional justice within the scheme of international law” which created a legacy for 
holding states accountable for wrongdoing that has also become the basis of human 
rights law.60 The focus was on individual accountability instead of states’.61 This 
impacted the initial emphasis of TJ on individual criminal responsibility for 
international crimes and for civil and political rights.62 According to Waldorf, 
“transitional justice is inherently short-term, legalistic and corrective. As such, it 
should focus on accountability for gross violations of civil and political rights.”63 On 
the other hand, Posner and Vermeule state that TJ is not different from ordinary 
justice which faces same difficulties on a larger level.64 The Nuremberg model and 
the turn to human rights and international law played a crucial role in TJ 
                                                            
55 Ruti Teitel, ‘Transitional justice genealogy’ (2003) 16 Harv Hum Rts J 69, 69-72; Rosemary Nagy, 
‘Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections’ (2008) 29 (2) Third World Quarterly 275, 
275-278; Dustin N Sharp, ‘Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation 
Transitional Justice’ (2013) 26 Harv Hum Rts J 149, 149-150 
56 Teitel, ‘TJ Genealogy’ (n 55) 69 
57 Louise Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’ (2007) 40 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 1, 2 
58 Lars Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the past: Transitional justice and socio-economic wrongs’ (2012) 21(2) 
Social & Legal Studies 171, 180 
59 Teitel ‘TJ Genealogy’ (n 55) 70-73 
60 Ibid 70 
61 Ibid 73 
62 Arbour (n 57) 1-2 
63 Waldorf (n 58) 179  
64 Eric A Posner and Adrian Vermeule, ‘Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice’ (2004) 117 (3) Harv 




development and debates.65 There is also debate about the influence of law on TJ and 
some scholars think that TJ could be too legalistic.66 Collins maintains that a 
combination of some form of truth-telling along with compromise on the 
implementation of legal justice through the courts constituted a transitional 
“blueprint” in Latin America and other contexts.67 The TJ paradigm recognizes that 
social, political and historical realities make ordinary justice mechanisms inadequate 
at the time of political change.68 Even Teitel who is an exceptionalist noted that TJ is 
a pragmatic balancing of justice with political realism, both informed by and 
constitutive of its conditions.69 
The adoption of the report by the UN in 2004 marked the inauguration of TJ 
as an international concern, which, at the same time, set out a wider framework of 
multiple goals and processes.70 As the UN Secretary General noted in 2004, 
experience shows that the establishment of peace in immediate post-conflict periods, 
and its maintenance in the long term, can only be achieved by ensuring relevant 
populations are confident that “redress for grievances can be obtained through 
legitimate structures for peaceful settlement of disputes and fair administration of 
justice”. In this regard, the restoration of the rule of law plays a crucial role.71 In 
order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation, the full range 
of processes and mechanisms associated with societies’ attempts to come to terms 
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses came to fore. These could be both judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms, with or without international involvement and 
individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and 
dismissals, or a combination thereof.72 The definition in 2004 was intended to pave 
the way for future policies and actions of the UN, states and other organisations, and 
included a range of mechanisms many of which have forward-reaching implications. 
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The UN’s adoption initiated further action in the field that can be seen in similar 
definitions of TJ as a “set of practices, mechanisms and concerns that arise following 
a period of conflict, civil strife or repression”73 and “the array of processes designed 
to address past human rights violations following periods of political turmoil, state 
repression, or armed conflict”.74 
 Defining the key concepts of justice and transition is also necessary at this 
point:  
 According to the UN report of 2004, justice is an ideal of "accountability and 
fairness in the protection and vindication of rights and the prevention and 
punishment of wrongs. Justice implies regard for the rights of the accused, for 
the interests of victims and for the well being of society at large.”75 As 
Arbour argues this definition is problematic because the sentence, “fairness in 
the vindication of rights” may imply the need to guarantee economic, social, 
and cultural rights. However, she adds that the language of “the victim” and 
“the accused” in the second sentence appears to circumscribe the concept of 
justice with a more traditional dispute resolution approach focusing on 
violations of civil and political rights.76 This was heeded by several 
practitioners and scholars, and reflected a broadening of TJ further from its 
focus which, “traditionally”, was on “on serious human rights abuses... as 
well as violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes.”77 
 "Transition" refers to the process or a period of significant change from one 
set of circumstances to another, for example; from conflict to peace or 
dictatorship to democracy78  or, to the "interim process that links the past and 
the future".79      
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There is also the question of what constitutes TJ; i.e. what are its components, 
indicators or processes? TJ as a field cohered particularly in the early 1990s around 
prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations, and institutional reforms.80 De Greiff refers to 
these as the implementation of criminal justice (prosecutions), truth-telling, 
reparations and institutional reform. Institutional reform was later defined as 
guarantees of non-recurrence (GNR).81 The GNR component was among reparations 
and, it now encompasses other measures which were previously labelled as 
institutional reform involving actions targeted at civil society and individual 
participation.82  
Since the subject of this thesis is property rights and the IPC as an institution, 
the GNR/institutional reform component is particularly important. In addition, 
building sustainable peace requires changing and transforming the societal relations 
and structures which permitted armed conflict, repression and human rights 
violations.83 International standards on GNR have grown significantly since 1993, 
demonstrated, inter alia, by the explicit reference to “guarantees of nonrepetition” in 
the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance.84 Economic and social conditions have also increasingly found their 
way on to the agenda, paving the way for a more transformative approach to TJ.85 
Changing institutions will not however automatically reduce violence in transitional 
societies. Rather, it will contribute to societal transformation by creating more 
responsive and democratic state structures that are necessary to address violence and 
inequalities.86 The measures must address social and economic issues in order for TJ 
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to maintain credibility.87 It is this expansion that puts transformative justice at the 
forefront as an approach that can contribute to TJ; a concept deemed of particular 
value for the purposes of this research. 
 Reparations are also of particular importance here since the IPC was 
established to be an effective remedy for violation of property rights for GCs. The 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law call for “adequate, effective and 
prompt reparation for harm suffered” and access to equal and effective justice and 
information.88 Reparations encompass various measures to repair the damage 
suffered by victims of human rights violations; i.e. restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. The UN Special 
Rapporteur Pablo De Greiff devotes his report in 2014 to reparations paying it a 
particular importance and emphasizing participation of victims in defining, 
designing, implementing and monitoring reparations processes.89 Reparations satisfy 
victims’ urgent basic needs, support their dignity and pave the way for the conditions 
under which they can participate in social and political life.90 A deep participation of 
individuals, groups and communities and bottom-up initiatives can build constructive 
cooperation between interested stakeholders,91 a comprehensiveness which could 
facilitate transformative potential of reparations.92  
 
 
B. Limitations of Transitional Justice and Relevant Responses  
Balasco notes that TJ is facing a "paradox of success" where the less effective its 
mechanisms become to reconstruct democracy and peace, the more we demand the 
expansion of their missions.93 Furthermore, with its "incredibly fast trajectory", the 
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"pressure to include broad agendas and issues" within its framework has also 
increased.94 In this regard, according to Bell, TJ only became a "field" from the 
2000s and covered a broader sphere than "transitions to democracy", marking 
transitions in a range of societies, especially ones attempting negotiated settlements 
in protracted social conflicts.95 The Good Friday Peace Agreement and the transition 
associated with it in Northern Ireland can be regarded as an example of negotiated 
settlements in protracted disputes.96 However, enduring grievances and resentments 
can continue to preserve intergroup divisions preventing reconciliation even after 
peace agreements have been signed.97 
Despite expanded practices of TJ,98 the performance and impact of these 
measures have been criticised, for example, for treating the symptoms rather than 
"the causes of conflict".99 In this regard, when the issue is “justice”, Lambourne 
states that it may be sought as a redress for crimes as well as a way of “building a 
new future”.100 While there is thus a relationship between justice, reconciliation and 
peacebuilding, TJ has not often been understood as a field to understand sustainable 
peacebuilding.101 Lambourne examines how conflict participants view TJ in the 
context of peacebuilding after mass violence using her findings to develop a model of 
transformative justice which supports sustainable peacebuilding.102 Whether a 
particular TJ mechanism has been adopted in line with the factors related to the needs 
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of those affected by the conflict is important for the credibility of processes103  and to 
assess its effects and its reception by the population.104 In this regard, the following 
sub-section examines transformative justice and its development. 
 
 
C. Transformative Justice 
As Mani states, a significant shortcoming of TJ is that it tends to be limited "to a 
preoccupation with the injustices related to the consequences of the conflict, to the 
neglect of the injustices implicit in the causes and symptoms of transitional 
justice".105 The need for a new agenda which offers a concept of justice that is more 
"transformative" emerged which can be considered as a response to limitations of 
TJ.106  A more transformative concept of justice provides an alternative that can be 
applicable anywhere and at any time to address structural and everyday violence,107 
which can further reform politics, locus and priorities of TJ and have an impact on 
the social, political and economic status of a wide range of stakeholders.108 In other 
words, the emergence of transformative justice relies on the idea that existing models 
of TJ are not adequate for addressing structural violence and land inequalities or for 
ensuring the realization of socioeconomic rights, with transformative justice offered 
as a framework which may address these shortcomings. However, this is not the 
reason for including it as a framework in this thesis, but rather because 
transformation is considered as encompassing more wide-reaching change 
throughout society.109  
 Setting out the limitations of TJ, Gready and Robins state that, TJ is 
embedded in liberal peace, implying a project of liberal state building as an endpoint 
within the process. The authors also note that “liberal peace” has been widely 
criticised in "fragile transitional contexts" for prioritizing the setting up of institutions 
over a contextualized engagement with the population for their benefit, resulting in 
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the creation of "empty" top-down institutions undermined by a lack of capacity and 
unable to respond to the needs of society.110 Furthermore, TJ practice is said to be 
dominated by international networks rather than local movements; i.e. the agenda is 
externally driven and those most affected by violations have little or no opportunity 
to participate or to have an impact on the process.111 Lambourne also emphasises the 
importance of consultation with the people affected while determining a specific path 
to take within a particular transitional justice context.112 Thus, the definitions of TJ 
are broadened to include wider political and social processes integrating unofficial 
local initiatives including not only criminal prosecutions, truth telling, institutional 
reform and reparations but also commemorative practices, memory work, educational 
reform and reconciliation initiatives. However, this still does not necessarily provide 
a transformative approach; i.e. integrating social and economic policies for social 
justice and radical approaches impacting communities directly. In an effort to  
respond to criticisms, new perspectives provided a shift towards a more 
transformative approach, for example: policies and approaches having an impact on 
the social, political and economic status of a large range of stakeholders; 
GNR/institutional reform with reference to the needs of local people rather than a 
reform in line with external concerns and neoliberal economic agendas; reparations 
targeting the transformation of victims' circumstances to address inequalities; a new 
agenda focusing on how violence is perceived and tackled; and access and 
participation in design, implementation and evaluation of processes at all levels.113 
But how does transformation differ from transition? Transition can be defined 
as a concept referring to change from one state of being to another. On the other 
hand, transformation is a deeper and more uncertain process, which involves cultural 
and behavioural change. The distinction between the two is important as "transition" 
does not necessarily reach "deep into the soil of the new society where the 
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commitment to democratic values actually takes root".114 Lambourne encourages the 
use of the term transformative justice indicating that it "implies long-term, 
sustainable processes" instead of an "interim process that links the past and the 
future" to account for the contexts that may impact on participants’ needs and 
expectations of justice.115 Proposing to reframe TJ as “transformative justice”, she 
states that it not only deals with the past but also establishes conditions to provide for 
justice with a longer term vision than the term TJ offers.116 
McAuliffe also labels transition as “a finite and contained phenomenon, with 
temporal limits at the undemocratic and democratic ends of the interregnum between 
regimes”.117 Daly characterizes transformation as encompassing fundamental 
changes in a society’s culture, structures and patterns of relations. If the values of the 
new regime are to take root, the culture in which they operate should be 
transformed.118 She also notes that transformation is necessary to ensure non-
recurrence of violations.119 In other words, "tolerance" to human rights violations that 
once existed should be replaced by "resistance" to those violations. While simply 
changing the government may not provide for this, the new government's response to 
past abuses matters for transformation.120   
According to Gready and Robins, transformative justice is “transformative 
change that emphasizes local agency and resources, the prioritization of process 
rather than preconceived outcomes and the challenging of unequal and intersecting 
power relationships and structures of exclusion at both the local and the global 
level”.121  
There is debate as to whether transformative justice is a new field or not. 
Normative discussions about whether transformative justice is a set of ideals to 
integrate in the established TJ mechanisms (a subfield of TJ) or a new phenomenon 
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originating in transitional societies (a field on its own) requires the identification of a 
set of transformation indicators.122 Evans argues that transformative justice is not part 
of TJ, and that existing mechanisms can have very little impact on the structural 
social and economic issues which are currently underestimated in TJ.123 Other 
scholars raise the question of whether transformative justice represents a prism 
through which to re-evaluate TJ or a schism in the field.124 Since this debate falls 
outside this research, there is no need to consider the issue further. It suffices to state 
that transformative justice is considered as a framework with expanded components 
of institutional reform/GNR, encompassing wider social and political policies to 
develop existing mechanisms to have deeper social impacts which could pave the 
way for altering a culture of mistrust and encouraging resistance to violations of 
rights.  
 Two other concepts to consider here are “retributive justice” and “restorative 
justice”. The former involves punishment of the wrongdoer and is usually associated 
with trials.125 Teitel states that, "trials offer a way to express both public 
condemnation of past violence and the legitimation of rule of law necessary to the 
consolidation of future democracy" and that "criminal proceedings are well suited to 
affirm the core liberal message of the primacy of individual rights and 
responsibilities".126 According to Cassese, where they also fulfil the goal of 
reconciliation, retributive mechanisms provide a record so that future generations can 
remember what happened.127 For societies in transition facing a variety of complex 
problems, injustices do not always lend themselves to correction by retributive 
justice or punishment. Furthermore, the need for justice is necessary for society as a 
whole, and not just for individuals who are typically the focus of retributive 
justice.128 These problems as Daly states, have many different faces. Examples 
include deep divisions arising from varying socio-economic situations, lack of 
information regarding the previous regime, lack of housing, health, education or 
provision for other needs, racial or religious divisions within society, and economic 
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instability.129 Depending on the nature and form of injustice, the mechanisms for 
redress also vary.130 For example, if the central feature of society is "the social cleft", 
the main aim of the transition must be reconciliation whereas if it is "sheer 
turbulence", then the focus should be on stability.131 Whether criminal trials achieve 
desired outcomes in transitional settings is also debatable.132 It should be noted that, 
societies facing transition often start by drafting constitutions, improving economies, 
and adopting policies to strengthen the rule of law and democracy.133 In this vein, 
public participation, as stated above, is important as a dominant culture is likely to 
have harboured injustice. Therefore, countries in transition also need to change the 
culture that permeates society as well as changing governments.134 In other words, 
this brings us again to TTJ: justice must have a transformative aspect in order to 
prevent backsliding by rulers and societies themselves.135 For example, in the case of 
South Africa, Lange states that transformation was considered as a holistic project 
aiming to change the "attitudes, consciousness and material conditions" of people to 
reflect the values featured in the constitution for which the struggle was conducted.136 
 By contrast, restorative justice is justice that restores communities or 
relationships and it is deemed an alternative to the formal court system.137 In other 
words, restorative justice is centred on the idea that justice must involve efforts to 
“restore” a lost balance and to aim for reconciliation and that prosecutions may not 
be the only means to achieve this.138 Lambourne proposes a combined approach to 
restorative and retributive justice in order to avoid compromises while also 
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acknowledging that the processes are unavoidably complicated and inadequate to 
deal with enormous psychological and physical pain and the destruction of war/mass 
violence.139  
TTJ builds on reparative and restorative justices that place the community at 
the heart of relevant processes. Mani characterises reparative, restorative and 
transformative justice as parallel concepts, which could facilitate reconciliation.140 
Daly maintains that “transformative justice” has two goals -reconciliation and 
deterrence. She regards reconciliation as people learning to live together, and 
continuing to do so in the future.141 Daly notes that it is crucial to understand the 
meaning of reconciliation in order to identify the goals of transition and to identify 
whether they are being realised or not.142 In other words, even if the transitional 
period is over in any given country, reconciliation might not yet have been achieved. 
It is said that the process of reconciliation requires both sides of any given conflict to 
leave their own comfort zones and to consider themselves and their actions from the 
other side's perspective.143 It can be argued that once achieved, reconciliation 
provides for transformation as a condition of social peace and stability.144 But, the 
issue is connected with restorative justice since reconciliation is concerned with the 
restoration of damaged relationships and with building trust within society.145  On the 
other hand, Restorative justice scholas themselves call for a more transformative 
approach emphasizing behaviours, relations, structures and systemic injustices.146 
Institutions which contain this express mandate include, for example, the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa whose role according to 
Mamdami is, in fact, to set the terms for a social debate.147 It can be noted that, the 
institutions can be seen as public spaces in which the groundwork for reconciliation 
is laid.148 People who agreed with the historic narrative constructed by the South 
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African Truth and Reconciliation Commission showed a more favourable attitude 
towards reconciliation, confirming that social cohesion is strengthened by a common 
collective memory of the past integrating different views.149  
Civil society and governments provide important sites for reconciliation. In 
other words, the actual work cannot be done by transitional institutions themselves 
which can merely start the process.150 But the extent to which they lay the 
groundwork for reconciliation matters with respect to how the success of the 
institution can be measured.151 In other words, whether the institution provides the 
tools to promote new values, and whether these values are both desired and feasible 
in society should be taken into consideration when measuring success. It should be 
added that, in some cases the test should not only be “how the institution functions” 
but also “how the society functions once the work of the institution is over”.152 For 
example; gacaca courts in Rwanda served as a first step towards reconciliation, but 
they could not provide trust between many perpetrators and survivors.153 
Furthermore, the promises of reparation and compensation were not fulfilled either in 
Rwanda or in South Africa.154 However, a longitudinal study showed that Rwanda’s 
gacaca courts had positive intergroup effects.155 Daly observes that it is a symbol of 
unstable societies to have successive transitions, because the cause of instability – a 
cultural tolerance of oppression156- has not been rooted out. Kosovo, where the same 
conflicts arose many times, is an example showing repeated cycles of violence and 
thus the importance of transformative justice as a means of reconciliation and 
deterrence.157 Since reconciliation and deterrence can be achieved by various 
mechanisms and/or institutions, some aspects of particular relevance to this study 
should also be pointed out here. The officers of the institutions, their budget, their 
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independence, the way they are created, their terms and their structural features are 
all important.158 It can be noted that transformative justice is essential to ensure that 
injustices shall not be repeated. If the culture of injustice stands as it is, then there is 
no guarantee that violence and/or injustices will not recur.159Although, the context 
has an impact on the choice of mechanism to be established, some ingredients could 
be identified. 
 An institution the establishment of which is under consideration is also an 
early reflection of the values of the new government and, if trust is to be promoted, it 
should be structured accordingly.160 For example, its transparency and its officers’ 
integrity are important matters.161 Or, for example, if the primary goal is to provide 
for participation, it should include a variety of voices, both in terms of the society 
and the officers of the institution.162 Thus, it is essential to guarantee that the 
structural features of an institution reflect the values of the new regime, the new 
government and society as a whole.163 It should be added that to deem the relevant 
mechanism successful these values should be digested not only in theory, but also in 
practice. In this vein, the institution’s authority and/or its mandate are crucial. In 
addition, it should of course have sufficient resources and/or budget to do its work 
appropriately and effectively.164 It is a fact, even for ordinary times, that a 
mechanism insufficiently empowered cannot work effectively. In transitional times, 
an insufficient mechanism, i.e. one favouring the status quo, would even be more 
prejudiced for the purposes of transformative justice since it would harm the entire 
process.  In transitional societies if the state’s legitimacy is too weak, the legitimacy 
of the institution will be affected accordingly with potentially widespread negative 
effects.165 
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 In addition, an institution which does not respond to those whose rights have 
been violated cannot transform society because there will be no chance of 
distinguishing the new regime from the old and of paving the way for transforming 
society and social relationships.166 But, if we focus entirely on victims’ interests and 
transformation, non-victims will be excluded from the process, and thus, the chance 
of reconciliation will be diminished.167 For example in Rwanda, a perception of 
victor’s justice caused displeasure among the Hutu majority, while the government 
was seen as being controlled by the Tutsi minority.168 If excluding a part of the 
population is repeated, the political justice necessary for successful implementation 
of measures is unlikely to be achieved.169 In this case, it would not be wrong to state 
that neither reconciliation nor transformation could be maintained effectively. The 
inclusion of the population as a whole is also connected with the fact that the 
transformative power of a mechanism derives from its social connections. 
Understanding a particular society is essential in order to be able to transform it,170 
while the institutional response within transformation is also important. It is a fact 
that institutions of ordinary times are shaped by past practices and existing cultures. 
By contrast, transitional institutions should not be constrained by past practices as it 
is the past practice which is often challenged in transitional times.171 In this regard, 
transitional governments are often restrained as a result of heavy reliance upon 
international recognition and aid. Transitional governments therefore usually shape 
their institutions in line with international norms. But, as mentioned previously, they 
should remain aware of their own needs and transform their own cultural habits of 
tolerating human rights violations.172 Implementation depends on circumstances on 
the ground such as political will, the capacity of the relevant state and the resources 
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D. Types of Transition 
Some TJ practices are initiated before regime change, or during an ongoing internal 
armed conflict.173 Among the examples of processes of TJ174 which took place while 
the conflict was/is ongoing are the Ugandan Amnesty Act 2000, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) investigations in Northern Uganda in 2003, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2002, the ICC 
investigation of DRC in 2004 and the ICC arrest warrant for Bashir in Sudan in 
2007.175 When this is the case, trade-offs between justice and peace are inevitable 
since the players are forced to struggle with the complexities of bringing to justice 
the leaders with whom peace settlements or regime change are being actually 
negotiated causing delays with regard to the actual peace and/or end of violence.176 
Posner and Vermeule also distinguish “transitions led by the elite of the old 
regime”, “transitions forced on the elite by the opposition”, “transitions that are 
bargains between the elite and the opposition” and “transitions that are imposed by a 
foreign nation”.177 Spain is an example of an “elite-led” model of transition centred 
on King Juan Carlos’ democratic reforms after the death of Francisco Franco.178 By 
contrast, the coalition of civil and military groups which defeated the Greek Colonels 
in 1970 and established a constitutional democracy is an example of an “opposition-
led” model of transition.179 An example of a “bargain-led” model is the Polish 
transition resulting from the threat of economic collapse where the reformers in the 
Communist Party were strengthened leading to negotiations for a quasi-
democracy.180 Finally, Japan and Germany provide examples of the “power-led” 
model where the Allied powers ended the old regimes and installed liberal 
democracies following World War II.181 It is said that the type of transition has an 
impact on the kind of transitional justice that will take place. For example, 
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“transitional justice increases” where the involvement and impact of elites 
“decreases”,182 often the result of elites negotiating with the opposition in an attempt 
to protect themselves from post-transitional punishments.183 
New/transitional governments may also struggle to confront the legacy of past 
abuses and to consolidate the rule of law such as in Argentina in the 1980s, Chile and 
South Africa in the 1990s, Peru in the 2000s and Tunisia in 2011.184 Other situations 
such as Kenya and Cote D’Ivoire fit less easily into clear categories where extensive 
post-electoral violence cost many lives and displaced huge parts of the populations in 
both cases.185 Again, sometimes, the issues of scale and fragility are clear but the 
opportunity is more limited in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq where conflicts 
continue.186 
Although change might not be realised in a defined period of time where, in 
practice, transition may cover decades,187 there have also been cases where 
transitional processes have followed the conclusion of a peace agreement between 
conflicting parties. In other words, transitional justice opportunities have arisen most 
of the time in and around peace processes seeking to end internal armed conflicts 
where parties to negotiations and others, such as civil society and victims’ groups 
may seek to incorporate justice issues as part of agreements to end the conflict. 
Examples include Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Liberia, South Sudan, the Philippines, Nepal, amongst others.188 
For example; Guatemala’s history is marked by great structural injustice, the 
marginalization of indigenous people, and a 36-year internal armed conflict between 
government and insurgents. UN-brokered peace accords, finalized in 1996, ended the 
war and brought promise of truth, reparations, and reforms to address deep-rooted 
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problems.189 More than forty years of the apartheid in South Africa produced a long 
history of human rights violations, including massacres, torture, lengthy 
imprisonment of activists, and crippling racial discrimination. Nelson Mandela’s 
release in 1990 led to negotiations and elections in 1994 with the South African 
Parliament mandating the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
in 1995.190 Sierra Leone continues to try to address the legacies of a 10-year conflict 
marked by violence against civilians, recruitment of child soldiers, corruption and 
struggle for control of diamond mines, the death of tens of thousands, rapes, 
mutilations and tortures. In July 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
Revolutionary United Front rebel group signed the Lomé Peace Agreement agreeing 
to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission which began working in late 
2002.191 A peace agreement put an end to 50 years of internal conflict with the 
country’s biggest guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revoulcionarias de 
Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) in Colombia. The peace negotiations 
positioned the rights of the conflict’s victims to accountability, truth and reparation at 
the fore of the political life of the country.192  
Measures taken during peace processes depend on the context of each case. 
Essentially, what is appropriate, possible or feasible in a given set of circumstances 
may not be possible in others. Generally, TJ processes take place following the 
cessation of aggression, the striking of a peace deal or the end of a period of 
repressive rule. More specifically, truth commissions and other TJ measures 
(prosecutions, civil lawsuits, amnesty, lustration or cleansing of security forces, 
reparations programs and state-sponsored commemoration or memorialisation 
provisions), have been incorporated into peace accords in places such as El Salvador, 
Guatemela, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Nepal and 
Liberia.193 
TJ mechanisms and/or tools are not expected to bring peace but are means to 
consolidate an existing peace and to prevent the recurrence of violence.194 For 
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example, although there is no rule to conclude that reconciliation may only be 
achieved during times of peace, since a level of consensus between the parties is 
needed, far reaching measures are best pursued following a peace settlement. While 
it is difficult to transform relationships and to reconcile in the absence of a stable 
environment,195 this should not mean that some kind of confidence building measures 
cannot be undertaken. On the other hand, TJ mechanisms, introduced as a result of 
peace agreements, can be considered idealised sequencing arrangements.196  
It is difficult to situate the case of Cyprus in any of the types of transition 
considered above. On the other hand, the fact that it is unknown what Cyprus is 
transitioning to does not undermine TJ as a relevant framework here. In fact, the 
situation with significant transitions already having occurred and the current position 
far from permanenetly settled, make TJ an important framework for Cyprus as 
explained in Chapter 1. The IPC as an institution for transition of property rights 
could be considered as an “imposed” mechanism as a result of the decisions of the 
ECtHR in the absence of a peace settlement agreement. The process for a solution of 
the Cyprus problem has been ongoing for more than 40 years and will be considered 
further in Chapter 3. Property rights of the displaced Cypriots are an important 
component of the negotiations and it is likely that more balanced and efficient 
remedies than those afforded by the IPC Law would be afforded to right holders of 
an agreement were reached.197 Therefore, despite the fact that the IPC provides 
remedies to GCs within the limited framework provided by its Law, it is not possible 
to achieve more than it currently affords. The property problem for GC properties 
could therefore be considered constrained by the current mandate of the IPC. The 
same applies for TC properties which are within the mandate of the Custodian as 
explained in Chapter 1 and considered by the decision of the ECtHR in Niazi Kazali 
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E. The Relevance of Transitional Justice to Cyprus 
As outlined in the beginning of this Chapter, the historical background of the island 
of Cyprus is marked with the interethnic struggle between Cypriot communities. It 
can be said that the underlying historical, economic, social and cultural reasons for 
the antagonism that exists between the two communities, in turn has made achieving 
a political solution difficult, if not impossible. As a result of 300 years of Ottoman 
rule of Cyprus, 100 years of gradual Greek emancipation, from which Cyprus was 
excluded because it was handed over to the UK, Cyprus can be seen as a piece of 
unfinished business between Greeks and Turks dating at least from the 1920s. 
In addition, there have been factors which are specifically Cyprus-related that 
reinforced GCs’ sense of their Greek identity and their entitlement to govern Cyprus 
alone, namely, the GC campaign for enosis, which by the 1950s had a political leader 
Makarios, the 1960 Constitution which, in the GCs’ eyes, was too generous to the 
TCs, who accounted for 18% of the population, growing GC economic power – 
dominating all sectors of the island’s finance, trade and all important tourist sectors – 
TCs were increasingly marginalised economically as well as politically. It is also 
important to point out the TC response to the prospect of increasing GC dominance 
during the final stages of British rule. A substantial number of TCs responded in kind 
to violence from the GCs. On top of all that, both Greece and Turkey intervened, 
often secretly and almost always for their own interests, in support of their 
communities in Cyprus. Finally, the allegedly divisive role of Great Britain have 
played a significant role in the development of Greek and Turkish nationalism in 
Cyprus.198 All this is the backdrop to the international negotiations about Cyprus 
which started in 1968 outlined here to understand the background to the difficulties 
facing those trying to negotiate a settlement.  
According to Bryant, “the partition of the island and displacement of almost 
half its population led to the memory of the “other side” becoming institutionalized 
as a political strategy"199 with GC resentment centred on TC enjoyment of GC 
property, and TC resentment centred on the view that GCs silenced TCs before 
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1974.200 Furthermore, the period between 1963 and 1974 is referred to and 
remembered by many TCs as a siege, while it is surrounded by silence and referred 
to as “the troubles” by GCs,201 with the summer of 1974 remembered by GCs as a 
period of destruction and invasion.202 Referring to the people who were killed, 
threatened or suffered during the period between 15 July Greek coup and 20 July 
1974 Turkish intervention, the TC narrative tends to see the 1974 intervention as a 
victory and a sacrifice required for their community’s liberation and salvation.203 
The Cyprus conflict is in other words frozen as if “someone has pressed the 
“pause” button”.204 The commitment of the rest of the world as well as the Cypriots 
themselves to improve the situation is frozen as well. In Cyprus there have been 
voices from time to time calling for “coming to terms with the past,” or “healing the 
wounds of the past.” However, they tend to be drowned out by others uttering “the 
time is not right,” or “we should first deal with the Problem.”205 
In this sense, it would not be wrong to assert that achieving peace is a matter 
not only of politically negotiating a “solution” but also of radically reorienting the 
present.206 
Bryant, in her paper about “de facto states on the threshold of the global”, 
asserts that de facto states suffer from economic and political isolation and turn into 
“de facto enclaves”. She continues by stating that “the metaphor of waiting on a 
doorstep” leads us to long-term "liminality" as their feature.207 In anthropology, to be 
at the limen means “to be caught between one state of being and another”.208 The 
"liminal", "a threshold", a point between the past and future is a liminal present.209 In 
other words, de facto states are stuck between “the political form they once were” 
and “the recognized body politic they wish to become” which prevents them from 
crossing the said threshold that would allow them to exist as “real” sovereign states. 
Although, Bryant refers to de facto states in general, and to the case of the TRNC in 
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particular, “the metaphor of waiting on a doorstep” leads us to a feature of Cyprus. 
The threshold is the point between a partitioned and a united island.  
As pointed out in Chapter 1, Bozkurt and Yakinthou note that while some 
NGOs and civil society actors, as well as journalists, film-makers, activists, and 
academics have explored the legacy of conflict, there has been very little public 
discussion about how the past has been dealt with at the political level and by the 
media in Cyprus. Furthermore, many attempts to come to terms with the past have 
been met with the refrain not to “rock the boat”. Policy makers are especially 
concerned that truth-seeking efforts have significant potential to destabilise the peace 
process by stirring up old animosities (both between and within communities) about 
who killed whom and why.210 This reluctance, along with the reluctance on the part 
of dominant media communities to deviate from hegemonic victim/aggressor 
narratives, have significantly contributed to the lack of public debate on the past.211 
However, Yakinthou and Bozkurt add that the lack of public debate does not 
necessarily amount to disinterest in coming to terms with the past, and opinion polls 
reveal that there is strong support for truth-seeking and reconciliation processes in 
Cyprus.212  
Yakinthou refers to the four principal TJ processes distinguished above as 
“the right to truth”, “the right to justice”, “the right to reparation” and “the guarantee 
of non-recurrence”213 and considers them relevant to Cyprus.214 She makes 
recommendations in this respect and notes that the necessary tools to realise these 
should be included in a peace agreement focusing on “dealing with the past” or 
“transitional justice” establishing commitment to them as “the four key principles of 
transitional justice”.215 The only mechanism established to date has been the 
Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) examined more fully below. Following this, 
the challenges presented by the property rights of the displaced and its legal 
framework will be addressed. 
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1. The Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) 
1,510 GCs and 492 TCs went missing in Cyprus.216 The bi-communal CMP 
was established in 1981 under the aegis of the UN but remained inoperative for more 
than 25 years. However, by the late 2000s, it had become a successful bi-communal 
project.217 The CMP has exhumed 1224 victims and identified 868 persons so far, 
enabling thousands of families from both communities to bury their loved ones after 
decades of distress and uncertainty.218 Carried out predominantly by GC and TC 
experts (forensic archaeologists, geneticists, etc.), the UN Secretary General has 
described it as “a model of successful cooperation between the GC and the TC 
communities”.219 Kovras asks, why were families of the missing trapped in 
institutionalized silence for almost 30 years and what changed to catalyze the 
transformation of CMP?220 There are various reasons. With the prospect of the RoC 
acceding to the EU in the 1990s, a group of policy makers and bureaucrats succeeded 
in convincing political leaders of the need for the implementation of a new policy 
based on the need to decouple the solution of the Cyprus problem from the issue of 
missing persons and to manage this issue transparently both for TCs and GCs.221 
Although unilateral exhumations were attempted, this proved unsuccessful and in 
2000, with the inclusion of TCs relatives for the first time, an authoritative list of 
missing persons was prepared.222 This policy change was also strengthened by 
decisions against Turkey by the Council of Europe and the ECtHR which affected the 
TC political actors. These factors culminated in the policy of forensic truth and the 
resumption of the CMP.223 Furthermore, although not implemented properly, in 
1997, the two Cypriot leaders Rauf Denktaş and Glafkos Klerides agreed that all 
information available about burial sites would be circulated and investigated to 
facilitate identification.224 In 2004, the TC leader sent a letter to the UN Secretary 
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General to assist in resuming the activities of the CMP and since then it has become 
the most successful bi-communal project.225 
 The CMP is a humanitarian body which cannot “attribute responsibility for 
the death of any missing persons or make any findings as to the cause of such 
deaths”.226 Confidentiality is also a reason for its success. The anthropological team 
of the CMP updates families about the forensic process and answers questions except 
about cause of death.227 Persons providing information to the CMP would not be 
legally liable and would be immune from prosecution as directed by the Attorney 
General of the RoC. For this, the CMP was criticised for trading-off forensic truth 
with immunity for perpetrators/eyewitnesses.228 On the other hand, this is the reason 
for its success regarding exhumations. To sum up, the CMP’s current mandate 
(“forensic truth”) does not include the relatives’ right to truth for the missing which 
should include the right to know the truth about the abuses suffered, including the 
identity of perpetrators, the causes of death and violations, and the right to a remedy 
(which includes the right to an eff ective investigation, verification of facts, and 
public disclosure of the truth; and the right to reparation).229 A non-governmental 
organsiation called “Truth Now” and lawyer Achilleas Demetriades propose to 
amend the terms of reference of the CMP to transform it into a committee which 
“will not attribute responsibility for the deaths of any missing persons but will make 
findings as to the circumstances and cause of such deaths”.230 Demetriades also 
suggests that there’s no impediment to summon the relevant records of the CMP in a 
civil case in search for remedies. However, Kovras notes that this will affect the 
work of the CMP negatively since the eyewitnesses will be reluctant to provide 
information to the CMP.231 It is not within the scope of this project to assess what 
kind of a truth-seeking process should be followed. Nevertheless, while addressing 
the needs in Cyprus in this regard, the expectations and the existing circumstances 
addressed above should be carefully considered.232 
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The CMP is nevertheless a welcome experiment which, amongst other things, 
indicates that the two major communities in Cyprus can work together to solve this 
sensitive issue in the absence of a wider political solution to the Cyprus problem.233 
As Kovras indicates, a policy of delinking humanitarian exhumations from the 
prospect of a wider political solution paves the way for positive transformation in 
protracted human rights problems providing an opportunity to grassroots actors.234 
His argument is based on the fact that emotional, symbolic and identity issues, such 
as those of missing persons, are often taken hostage by hardliners who drag their feet 
to prevent solutions.235 In other words, decoupling human rights issues and TJ 
policies from political negotiations can depoliticize debates.236 In addition, the 
Cypriot experience can assist policy makers and TJ experts in dealing with similar 
problems in other parts of the world.237 This is a point which the CMP experience 
can assist policy makers in dealing with property issues the same way. 
   
 
2. Property Rights of the Displaced 
Turkey's intervention on 20 July 1974 left 37 per cent of the island's territory in 
control of TCs238 and resulted in the displacement of GCs from the northern part of 
the island and TCs from the south. It is estimated that GCs who fled from the north 
left behind an estimated 1,350,000 donums239 of property and TCs about 400,000 
donums of property in the south.240 Approximately 142,000 GCs from the north 
became refugees in the south.241 Many were settled in empty TC houses or in refugee 
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houses built on TC land. Again, approximately 55,000 TCs fled to the north, and 
were settled in GC property.242  
It was noted in Chapter 1 that GC policy for TC properties remaining in the 
south has been significantly different from that of the TRNC. TCs are considered as 
legal owners of their properties in the south which were placed under the 
administration of the Minister of the Interior as “the Custodian” under Law No 
131/1991. The custodian has all the rights and obligations which a TC owner would 
have. TC claims over these properties are dependent on strict conditions set forth in 
the Law. The Law was challenged various times before the ECtHR by TCs, the 
leading one being Niazi Kazalı and Hakan Kazalı, in which the application was 
declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 
35 of the ECHR.243 It should be noted that the rights of TCs with respect to their 
properties remaining in the south is not within the scope of this research since a 
mechanism such as that of the IPC is not available there.  
 In this respect, the legal framework with regard to the properties of GCs left 




3. Legislative Framework in the North Following Partition  
In November 1974 following partition, the Turkish Administration enacted the 
Regulation on Resettlement and Rehabilitation to address the problem of displaced 
TCs in need of resettlement in the north. Primarily, these displaced TCs were 
allocated abandoned GC properties. The Regulation indicates that the Administration 
did not have the intention to grant a definite right and/or ownership to TCs who were 
allocated GC properties. In other words, the intention was to provide temporary 
shelter where the displaced TCs were given "allowance documents (tahsis 
belgesi)".244 Allocation of properties was the subject of serious debates both by the 
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politicians at the Assembly and ordinary people at this time. It has also been alleged 
that fraudulent claims were made, and that some GC properties were allocated by the 
authorities without proper examination of claims.245 This exacerbated the problem 
because if property was allocated to someone who did not have the right to it, and if 
that person was later faced with the cancellation of that transaction, enormous 
objections were raised. In other words, "wrongful acts" became "rights" and 
legitimized looting during the post war period.246 The system which was previously 
only related to properties, reflected itself in other fields of social life including early 
retirement laws, high premiums upon retirement or severance pay, low interest 
credits, complimentary grants, public sector jobs and promotions and unnecessary 
subventions.247 
In August 1975, the two major community leaders Rauf Denktaş and Glafkos 
Klerides reached the Vienna Agreement III,248 according to which TCs residing in 
the south would be able to move to the north if they wished to do so, GCs residing in 
the north would be able to stay in the north and would be provided facilities needed 
to carry on normal life, and GCs would also be able to move south if they wished to 
do so. Priority would also be given to the reunification of families. By September 
1975, only 130 TCs remained in the south. The number of GCs in the north declined 
more gradually with 3,582 moving south during 1975, 5,820 during 1976, and 900 
during 1977. By November 1981, 1,076 GCs remained in the north. The number later 
decreased further to 666, many very old. GCs claim this situation was ‘the result of a 
sustained, campaign of harassment, discrimination and oppression’ by the 
administration in the north that led to ‘expulsion and gradual deterioration of the 
living conditions of the enclaved’.249 
It is important to state how both sides interpret the Vienna III Agreement as 
this may indicate how they perceive the division of the island and the property issue. 
As Özersay and Gürel states, the TC side refers to the Agreement as the "Population 
Exchange Agreement" or the "Voluntary Re-grouping of Population Agreement". 
While the GCs refer to it as the "Vienna III (Humanitarian) Agreement", claiming "if 
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implemented properly, it 'would have allowed 20,000 GCs and Maronites to stay and 
live a normal life in the occupied Karpasia Peninsula and the Maronite villages'".250 It 
has also been claimed that the GC side accepted the agreement despite their fear that 
it might further institutionalise partition, because at that time, this was considered the 
only way to prevent the expulsion of the remaining 10,000 GCs from north to south 
as well as preventing TCs from being attacked by Greek paramilitaries while 
crossing to the north.251 In other words, by allowing TCs to move north, GCs feared 
this would imply acceptance of bizonal federation impeding the return of all refugees 
to their homes.252 However, the principle of bizonality was accepted as the basis of a 
solution in 1975 by GC leaders Clerides, in 1977 by Makarios and in 1979 by 
Kyprianou.253 TCs believed that the two sides would negotiate "the respective 
compensation due to either community arising from this exchange".254 
In 1977, Law No 41/1977 (the Law for Housing Allocation of Land, and 
Property of Equal Value (ITEM Law)) was enacted in northern Cyprus which, 
according to Özersay and Gürel, further indicated that the TCs assumed the property 
issue would be solved by way of comprehensive exchange between the two 
communities.255 
Establishing a "points-based" system with the primary criterion that the 
properties "abandoned" in the south were of equal value in the north, this Law 
authorised abandoned properties belonging to GCs in the north to be allocated to TCs 
and to Turkish nationals who came to Cyprus after July 1974 upon condition that the 
owners relinquished all rights over their properties in the south for the benefit of the 
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.256 In fact, the system was designed to provide 
housing, land and livelihood in the north for TCs who had been displaced from the 
south, for example farmers with an average annual income below a specified 
minimum, and relatives of people killed during hostilities. However, the category of 
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beneficiaries was later broadened257 with points allocated to people who ”served the 
state” and to those arriving from Turkey after July 1974, a system allegedly used for 
political purposes and unjust enrichment.258  
Most importantly, Law No 41/1977 was amended in 1995 to permit the 
granting of title deeds, i.e. ownership, to various categories of TRNC citizens who 
had been allocated GC properties enabling current users to sell and for properties to 
change hands multiple times.259 In 2005, the former TC leader Rauf Raif Denktaş 
said during an interview that this was to ensure people could buy, sell and deal with 
property freely to facilitate economic development in northern Cyprus.260 While it 
might be said that GC properties abandoned in the north were means of rehabilitation 
for TCs, this would only be true if the system was limited to people displaced or 
those whose relatives were killed as a result of hostilities and in any case, allocating 
the properties of GCs was already a means for promoting economic stability. The 
argument by Denktaş in favour of the amendment in Law No 41/1977 is therefore 
difficult to accept.  
 Laws Nos 49/2003 and 67/2005 establishing the IPC were passed in the 
presence of the above legislation and mentality.  
 
 
III. Conclusion  
This Chapter reviewed the evolution of TJ in order to shed light on the goals and 
problems in the field. TJ provides a framework for dealing with the past in 
democratic transitions from armed conflict and authoritarianism. It attempts to 
advance more peaceful futures through institutional reform/GNR, reparations, truth 
and justice. While the limitations of TJ were addressed, it was observed that the field 
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5,500 damaged and 5,700 inhabited by the GC displaced people. (See 'Cyprus: Bridging the Property 
Divide' (n 238) 3) 




has expanded leading to the inclusion of a more transformative approach. Together 
with TJ, TTJ was chosen as a paradigm for this study as it emphasizes a longer term 
vision of rebuilding or transforming community relationships appropriate for the 
Cyprus context. At this point, we should distinguish negative peace, where the 
conditions which caused violent conflict remain, and a positive peace which 
eradicates the causes of violence, and focuses on broad social issues, and the 
demands of transformative justice.261 In other words, there is still no positive peace, 
but rather relapsing into conflict is averted meaning that negative peace is in place.262 
Webel calls this an “absence of war and other widespread violence” in which there is 
also injustice and personal discord and dissatisfaction; a “weak or fragile peace”.263   
As Yakinthou states, “the infrastructure […] perpetuates a culture of mistrust” in 
Cyprus.264 A power-sharing peace agreement will not fix this automatically, so it 
must be dealt with separately.265 
The members of both communities in Cyprus do not feel they belong to a 
common State, and their mutual distrust and suspicion prevents each from seeing the 
other in a positive and constructive spirit. The collapse of the RoC indicates how 
inadequately constructed relationships are prone to repeatedly fragment. It is evident 
that it will take a long time for the communities in Cyprus to restore their 
relationships while addressing the root causes of the conflict. While TJ would prove 
useful for both analytical and policy purposes, TTJ as the final stop on a TJ 
continuum should be considered as another useful framework which builds on the 
restorative and reparative justice approaches, with the institutional reform/GNR 
components of TJ being the main linking points between the two frameworks.  
The number, type and timing of TJ mechanisms around the world were also 
addressed in this Chapter. The IPC as an institution for transition of property rights 
could be considered as an imposed mechanism as a result of the decisions of the 
ECtHR in the absence of a peace settlement agreement.  
The framework for properties left in the north and south of the island 
following partition also illustrates the position of both sides. Since there is no 
positive peace in Cyprus, ambiguity prevails with the process for a solution of the 
                                                            
261 See Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, peace, and peace research’ (1969) 6 (3) JPR 167 
262 See ibid 
263 Charles Webel Toward a philosophy and metapsychology of peace in Charles Webel and Johan 
Galtung eds Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies Routledge 2007 , 11 





Cyprus problem ongoing for more than 40 years. Property rights of the displaced 
Cypriots are an important component of the negotiations and it is likely that more 
balanced and efficient remedies than those afforded by the IPC Law would be 
afforded to right holders in case of an agreement. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
IPC provides remedies to GCs within the limited framework provided by its Law, it 
is not possible to achieve more rights than those afforded by it. From this 
perspective, the property problem for GC properties could be considered as stalled 
within the current mandate of the IPC. The same applies to the TC properties which 
are within the mandate of the Custodian as addressed in Chapter 1 and considered by 
the decision of the ECtHR in Niazi Kazali and others. This is why living in liminality 
is considered as a feature of contemporary Cyprus. As long as partititon remains as it 
is, it is important to understand the extent to which institutions, processes and 
developments affect this positively, negatively or not at all. The potential of the IPC 
























Chapter 3 Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Efforts  
I. Introduction 
It was noted in Chapter 1 that, in Cyprus, there is an ongoing “peace process” and/or 
“peace talks” in the words of the UN itself1 with the UN acting as mediator for the 
resolution of the conflict. In the last decade of the negotiations to resolve the "frozen 
Cyprus conflict",2 the parties came close to a settlement on the basis of the Annan 
Plan. However, the process ended without success when, in referendums held on both 
parts of the island on 24 April 2004, GCs rejected the Plan with a 76% "No" vote 
while TCs supported it with a 65% "Yes" vote. Although it was said that the TC 
leader Mustafa Akinci and GC leader Nicos Anastasiades had made unprecedented 
progress in the chapters on “governance and power-sharing”, “property”, “territory”, 
“EU and economy” in the previous two years, this round of negotiations also ended 
without agreement in July 2017.3  
 On many occasions, the UN has played a central role in attempting to 
overcome the Cyprus deadlock. Resolution 186 (1964)4 established the UN operation 
in Cyprus which “tried to provide a comprehensive peace-keeping, peace-making and 
peacebuilding structure in order to bring peace to the island”.5 The 1964 resolution 
stated that the goals of the UN mission for peacekeeping and peacemaking were to 
find a constitutional settlement and to control the outbreak of war in Cyprus. Over 
the years, the UN’s involvement in the conflict has been extensive.6  
Major UN entities including the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Office of the Special Advisor for the Secretary General 
(OSASG), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have been 
involved in Cyprus. The UNFICYP focuses on monitoring the ceasefire and 
maintaining the security of the buffer zone. The OSASG has the duty of facilitating 
the Cypriot-led peace process.  The UNDP has focused on both the official-level 
negotiations and on the environment around the process, including through 
                                                            
1 See http://www.uncyprustalks.org> accessed 14 January 2020  
2 Iosif Kovras Grassroots activism and the evolution of transitional justice: the families of the 
disappeared (Cambridge University Press 2017) 154 
3 ‘Cyprus talks end without agreement, says UN chief’, The Guardian (7 July 2017) 
<https://guardian.ng/news/cyprus-talks-end-without-agreement-says-un-chief/> accessed 13 July 2017 
4 UN Security Council Resolution 186, S/5575 (4 March 1964)  
5 Oliver Richmond, ‘UN Mediation in Cyprus, 1964–65: Setting a Precedent for Peace-making?’, in 
James Ker-Lindsay and Oliver Richmond (eds) The Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace and 
Development (Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) 102 
6 Chrystalla Yakinthou, Political Settlements in Divided Societies: Consociationalism and Cyprus 




supporting the technical committees, confidence building measures, and gender and 
civil society initiatives.7  The full history of peacebuilding activities to date has been 
documented by Hadjipavlou and Kanol.8 Most of the activities have taken the form 
of problem-solving workshops complemented by others such as bi-communal camps 
for young people. Some events have also concentrated on peace advocacy in the form 
of bi-communal demonstrations and inside lobbying in the form of one-on-one 
communication with the policy-makers.9  
Being aware of its limited ability to further domestic incentives for resolution, 
the UN has also relied on American and British organisations to develop relations 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.10 For example, the Fulbright Commission and 
Scholarship Program, the British Council, and USAID have often worked with 
relevant UN agencies.11 The Fulbright Commission also has an assessment report of 
conflict resolution trainings for the period 1993 to 1998.12 There are other studies 
which have considered the failures of mediation in the conflict.13 There are many 
NGOs and conflict resolution agencies operating in Cyprus on separate but similar 
agendas. However, track-two diplomacy has largely failed to shift the entrenched 
positions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.14 
Fisher argues that mediation efforts have resulted in parties being “caught in 
self-defeating processes of antagonism, including blaming the other side, attributing 
negative qualities to them, and polarizing one’s own side against them”.15 Some 
scholars suggest that a lasting peace requires both sides to overcome both internal 
and external conditions— psychological and contextual factors—since these continue 
to create obstacles for a solution.16 Mediation, arbitration, and negotiation are some 
                                                            
7 See <https://www.cy.undp.org/content/cyprus/en/home/about-us/undp-and-the-un.html> accessed 10 
February 2020 
8 Maria Hadjipavlou and Bülent Kanol, ‘Cumulative impact case study: The impacts of peacebuilding 
work on the Cyprus conflict’ (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 2008) 
9 Bülent Kanol and Direnç Kanol, ‘Roadblocks to Peacebuilding Activities in Cyprus: International 
Peacebuilding Actors’ Handling of the Recognition Issue’ (2013) 4 (2) Journal of Conflictology 39, 41 
10 Yakinthou, Political Settlements in Divided Societies (n 6) 127-8 
11 Ibid  
12 See Marion Peters Angelica, ‘Conflict Resolution Training Efforts Sponsored by the Fullbright 
Commission (1993-1998) (Nicosia: Cyprus Fullbright Commission 1999) 
13 See David Reilly, ‘Teaching Conflict Resolution: A Model for Student Research in Cyprus’ (2013) 
30 (4) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 447, 452; Ronald J Fisher, ‘Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation 
and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse’ (2001) 38 (3) Journal of 
Peace Research 307   
14 Yakinthou, Political Settlements in Divided Societies (n 6) 127-8 
15 Fisher (n 13) 322 
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of the main options and traditional conflict management tools used to resolve 
conflicts in a nonviolent manner. The UN acts as the universally accepted third-party 
mediator in the case of Cyprus. Conflict resolution efforts has not concentrated on 
common interests and needs as suggested by the prenegotiation, social-psychological, 
and needs theories.17 These were often brushed aside and the needs for security, 
recognition, identity, equality, justice, dignity, and the three freedoms (of movement, 
settlement, and ownership) were addressed only in a political and legalistic context. 
Each side expected the other to make compromises and concessions unilaterally. In 
other words, each party worked to fulfill its own needs; i.e. there has been no concern 
for integration.18  
 In order to understand where we are today, how the negotiations have 
continued so far shall be outlined in this Chapter. In this respect, basic parameters of 
negotiations will also be touched upon in general to show how much the two sides 
have been ready to take a step back from their original positions and how much they 
have been willing to compromise, if at all.19 The phases of the negotiations are 
addressed in detail in order to give an idea of the course of events. Furthermore, the 
factors behind the outcome are also outlined and assessed.  
  The Annan Plan is the most concerted and detailed agreement put forth by 
the UN to reach a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. The property scheme it 
envisages will be considered to shed light on the importance attached to this issue by 
the two communities. 
 
 
II.  An Overview of the Inter-communal Negotiations 
A. 1963-67: Attempts by External Powers 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the RoC was established in August 1960. Through the 
summer and autumn of 1963, tensions rapidly built up with the differences between 
the two communities coming to a head over the issues of tax laws, municipalities, 
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18 Ibid 346 
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police and gendarmerie.20 In November, Makarios submitted proposals for amending 
the Constitution but Turkey and the TCs rejected these stating that the intention was 
to abrogate the fundamental elements of the Constitution and their rights as 
considered in Chapter 1.21 The tensions not only greatly disturbed the Greek and 
Turkish Governments but also caused a rift within NATO.22 The US and the UK in 
particular, considered the Cyprus problem as a dangerous dispute which had to be 
controlled before it escalated into an armed conflict between two NATO allies; 
Turkey and Greece.23 However, the first attempts by the US to mediate were 
unsuccessful.24  
On 4 March 1964 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 186 calling for 
stationing of UN peacekeeping-force (UNFICYP) with the consent of the 
Government of Cyprus and recommended that a mediator be appointed.25  
 The main objective of the negotiations during this period was to prevent a 
conflict between Greece and Turkey and most of the time, the two Cypriot 
communities were not even invited to negotiations.26 The efforts during this period 
were similar to those establishing the RoC in 1960 and, as stated in Chapter 1, 
following the establishment of the Republic the limited participation of the two 
Cypriot community leaders led to substantial unrest and dissatisfaction.27 To sum up, 
this period can be defined as mainly externally driven and dictated by the interests 
and/or motivations of the external powers; i.e. a top-down process. No steps were 
taken to pave the way for reconciliation, restoration or any other mechanism of 
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transitional justice. Attitudes and actions of the disputants also undermined any 
peacemaking potential.28 The result was therefore not surprising.  
 
 
B. 1975-79: The Basis of Future Negotiations 
Between 1968 and 1974, negotiations continued on and off until the Greek coup of 
15 July 1974. The TC side wanted to follow a ”total package” approach insisting that 
all issues should be agreed before an agreement was signed, while the GCs wanted a 
“piecemeal” approach insisting that the issues should be considered and agreed upon 
separately.29 
Following the unilateral military intervention of Turkey on 20 July 1974, the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 353 calling for the guarantor powers to 
negotiate to restore peace in Cyprus.30  
 In 1975-76, two conferences were held in Geneva but the two communities 
were only invited to the second one.31 On 13 February 1975, the TCs proclaimed the 
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. In Resolution 367 the Security Council expressed 
its regret and called for new efforts to resume negotiations.32 The inter-communal 
talks in Vienna between 28 April 1975 and February 1976,33 lead to the Vienna 
Agreement which enabled the transfer of TCs wishing to leave the south and GCs 
wishing to leave the north as noted in Chapter 1. This was also the first time the 
island was officially divided into two distinct zones. 
 Meetings between Denktaş and Makarios continued including one on 12 
February 1977 in the presence of the UN Secretary General.34 It was envisaged that 
an independent, non-aligned bi-communal federal republic would be sought, the 
territory under the administration of each community would be discussed in the light 
of economic viability or productivity and land ownership, questions of principle 
(such as freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right to property and other 
specific matters) would be open for discussion, certain practical difficulties which 
may arise for the TC community would be taken into consideration and, the powers 
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31 Sözen ‘The Cyprus Negotiations’ (n 23)  4 
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and functions of the central federal government would take the bi-communal 
character of the state into account.35 On 18-19 May 1979, Denktaş and Kyprianou36 
settled the “Ten-Point Agreement” confirming the four guidelines and envisaging, 
among other things, the resettlement of the fenced-off area of Varosha37 under the 
auspices of the UN.38 In addition to the four guidelines, the Agreement became the 
reference point for future negotiations culminating in the 1977- 79 High Level 
Agreements,39 which provided a clear policy for the first time.40    
 
 
C. 1984-86: Further UN Efforts  
On 15 November 1983, the TC legislative assembly declared the establishment of the 
TRNC, which only Turkey recognised as legitimate and which was condemned by 
the rest of the international community.41 The talks stalled once again until 1984.42  
During 1984-86, the UN abandoned the "mini-package" approach and 
resorted to a "comprehensive solution" which, to preserve their “bargaining power” 
on major concerns, was always favoured by the Turkish side.43  
 In 1984, Perez de Cuellar drafted a Framework Agreement, modified several 
times, which was finally announced by Kyprianou as unacceptable.44 In 1985, a new 
document was drafted, but, this time, rejected by Denktaş.45  
 In 1986, a new draft was proposed which was accepted by Denktaş and 
rejected by Kyprianou after consultations with Greece.46  
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 During this period, the US and the UK reflected the Draft Framework 
Agreement as the last and best chance for the two communities.47 Chrysostomos 
states that the efforts of 1984-86 failed whilst, in May 1985, a referendum was held 
in the north for the constitution of the TRNC and that no actual negotiations took 
place until 1988.48  
In the final analysis, it can be said that the will of the two sides to solve the 
problem was not strong enough during this period. Furthermore, as it turned out, this 




D. 1988 -1992: Renewed Efforts to Find a Solution 
Although Vassiliou49 was more flexible, he, like the previous GC leaders, considered 
the Cyprus problem as an issue of foreign attack by Turkey assuming that the whole 
conflict started in 1974.50 Denktaş on the other hand, brought such concepts as 
"separate sovereignty for each community" forward, which were inconsistent with 
the UN Secretary-General's resolutions and 1977-79 High Level Agreements.51  
An important outcome of this period was the adoption of the UN Security 
Council Resolution 649 on 12 March 1990, the first time to state52  that the two 
communities were to be treated on “equal footing”. There were no reference to "the 
Government of Cyprus" or to "the Turkish Cypriot community", but to "the two 
communities" and "the leaders of the communities".53  
 In August 1992, the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali put forth a "Set of 
Ideas" based on content previously prepared by Perez de Cuellar.54 This was a very 
detailed plan consisting of 100 paragraphs where the bi-zonal, bi-communal 
federation model, with two politically equal federated states, took shape and was 
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submitted on 21 August 1992 to the Security Council with the Report of the 
Secretary General.55  The Report also included a map for territorial adjustments and 
envisaged a property settlement.56   
However, since the Set of Ideas was rejected57 and by 1992, the UN was 
getting fed up with the future of the two communities to reach agreement,58 attention 
turned instead to 'confidence building measures'. 
 
 
E. 1992-94: Lack of Trust Between the Two Communities 
The Secretary-General was of the opinion that a number of confidence building 
measures should be adopted by each side to advance the goal of the forthcoming joint 
meetings for an overall settlement agreement.59 Thus, on 24 November 1992, he 
drafted 15 confidence building measures (CBMs) which were endorsed by the 
Security Council.60 These included humanitarian, social and economic measures 
amongst which were the opening of the fenced-off Varosha and the opening of 
Nicosia International Airport discussed by both sides in detail.61 As was the case for 
negotiations, the talks with respect to the CBMs were inconclusive. Sözen, who 
worked in the Political and Legal issues Sub-committee of the TC side for CBMs, 
claims the CBMs were politicized by both sides and acceptance or rejection of any of 
them was merely a bargaining tactic. Thus, the main goal of the CBMs, "building 
trust", proved futile.62 In addition to this environment, the fact that Greek Cypriots 
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hailed the decision of the European Court of Justice on 5 July 1994 banning TRNC 
exports to the UK worsened the situation.63 
 
 
F. 1994-2001: The Republic of Cyprus Accession Negotiations with 
the European Union 
The two leaders did not meet again until July 1997 and prior to the EU opening 
accession negotiations with the RoC in March 1998.64 
 With the support of the UK and the US, the UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan initiated a new process in the autumn of 1999.65 At the EU Council Helsinki 
Summit in December 1999, the EU encouraged a solution but did not make it a 
prerequisite for accession of Cyprus to the EU. In addition, the candidacy of Turkey 
was expected to contribute to a solution on the island when it was announced.66 
While criticising Turkey’s acceptance of the conditions set forth at the Helsinki 
summit, Denktaş nevertheless remained at the negotiating table due to pressure from 
Turkey.67 In 2000, the talks plunged into deadlock again as a result of Denktaş 
leaving the negotiation table denouncing the Secretary General's new framework for 
not including the term “confederation”.68 In 2001, the two parties decided to initiate 
face-to-face talks, and in November 2002, the first version of what became known as 
the Annan Plan was presented to both sides.69 
 
 
G. 2002-03: The Annan Plan 
1. The Framework put forth by the Plan 
The Annan Plan revised five times to accommodate GC and TC demands is the most 
comprehensive and detailed plan put forward so far for the resolution of the Cyprus 
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problem.70 It was built on the 1977-79 High Level Agreements, de Cuellar's Draft 
Framework Agreement, the Set of Ideas and the guidelines set out by the UN 
Security Council.71 The process leading to the referendums in 2004 was also unique 
because the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan invited the representatives of the two 
communities, Turkey and Greece to New York in February 2004 to see whether they 
accepted his conditions for the resumption of talks. Due to pressure from Greece, 
Turkey, the US, the UN and the EU, the TCs and GCs accepted them.72 The two 
sides were to negotiate until 21 March and had they not agreed by 29 March, the UN 
would have filled in the gaps in the agreement.73 The fifth version of the Annan Plan 
dated 31 March 2004 was produced by the UN under these circumstances. As already 
indicated, the Plan was put to separate and simultaneous referendums on 24 April 
2004 and was rejected by 76% “No” vote of the Greek Cypriots, and 65% “Yes” of 
the Turkish Cypriots.74 
 The Plan proposed a “United Cyprus Republic” as a federal state based on the 
principle of consociational democracy.75 The two communities would have 
acknowledged that their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but of 
political equality.76 The State would have consisted of two constituent states; the 
Greek Cypriot Constituent State and the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State,77 each 
exercising powers not vested in the Federal State.78  
 Mallinson notes that there were partitionist elements in the Annan Plan V and 
argues that disproportionate power was given to the minority (TCs), the Senate being 
composed of an equal number of members from each community.79 However, it is 
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not possible to agree with Mallinson since the structure proposed by the Plan was 
based on “political equality” which was accepted by the parties and endorsed by the 
Security Council.80 Furthermore, as noted by the Secretary General, political equality 
should be reflected in various ways: in the effective participation of the two 
communities in all organs and decisions of the federal Government, in safeguards to 
ensure that the federal Government cannot make decisions against the interests of 
one community, in the requirement that the federal Constitution be amended with the 
concurrent approval of both communities and in the equality and identical powers 
and functions of the two federated states.81 Furthermore, according to Elazar, a 
federal arrangement is a partnership reflecting a sharing of powers based on a mutual 
recognition of the integrity of each partner.82 Therefore, proposing otherwise would 
have been against the parameters established by the UN as well as the concept of 
power-sharing. Although there is a lot to examine on the structural features of this 
new state of affairs, it is not necessary to address them all here since these are not 
particularly relevant to this thesis. 
 The Plan also set out the establishment of an independent, impartial 
Reconciliation Commission which would not have prosecutorial or criminal legal 
functions or powers to promote understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between 
the two communities.83 Among other things, the Commission would have prepared a 
report on the history of Cyprus based on the experiences of TCs and GCs.84 It would 
in other words, have been a mechanism establishing a historical account on the basis 
of subjective experience, and its work would have provided for the basis of 
transitional justice policy recommendations. It should be stated however, that 
although the issue of “reconciliation” is vital in post-conflict societies, the 
Commission envisaged by the Annan Plan had not even been a matter of public 
discussion during the process which led to the referendums. The lack of debate, at 
official/political as well as at social level, can probably be explained partly in terms 
of a sense by the two sides that they would have little to gain or perhaps even more to 
lose by accepting such a contentious proposal. It can further be considered to reflect 
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the continuing meta-conflict; i.e. the lack of consensus on what the conflict is about 
or whom to blame for it.  
  
 
2. Reactions to the Plan 
As stated above, the vast majority of the GCs rejected the Plan on the grounds that 
there were no satisfactory guarantees in place for its implementation, the Treaty of 
Guarantee (which was part of the system created by 1959-60 London-Zurich 
Agreements) would have been applied mutatis mutandis in the new state of affairs, 
withdrawal of Turkish troops would have not taken place soon enough, the number 
of troops to remain on the island was not acceptable, the complex restitution scheme 
was not satisfactory because of the amount of compensation it provided for each 
displaced person’s property, Turkey's contribution for the compensation of properties 
was not satisfactory, and the issue of settlers (Turkish nationals who came to Cyprus 
after 1974 intervention) was deemed not to have been satisfactorily addressed.85 
There was also the assumption that Turkey could informally intervene in Cyprus' 
political affairs.86 Moreover, concerns were raised that the complex governmental 
arrangements were unworkable and that there were no provisions to deal with the 
situation if the Plan collapsed.87 Finally, the Greek Cypriot side believed that when 
the Republic of Cyprus became a member of the EU, the opportunity for them to 
reach a solution in line with their point of view would be enhanced.88  
 Papadopoulos, the President of the Republic, also addressed these issues 
among others in his emotional speech on television on 7 April 2004. He urged the 
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Greek Cypriots to say “No” to the Plan declaring in tears, “I received a state; I will 
not deliver a community”.89  
The general atmosphere was also negative. Only the former President 
Clerides’ Democratic Rally (DISY) and Vassiliou's (former President (1988 – 1993) 
of the Republic of Cypurs) liberal party campaigned for a “yes”. The Greek 
government under Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis also supported the plan. Even 
Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), the political party most oriented 
towards a solution, went for a cautious/soft “no”. The “No” campaign also found a 
considerable voice in the press.90  
On the TC side, Denktaş preserved his negative position. However, supported 
by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan who made it clear that the Plan was in the 
interests of Turkey, Prime Minister Talat was in favour of the Plan.91 TCs demanding 
a solution which would pave the way for them to join the EU with their GC partners 
as a unified state under a federal system and protesting against Denktaş’s 
intransigence, flooded on to the streets.92 A further but expected disappointment for 
the TCs was the success of the Republic of Cyprus’ application to join the EU on 1 
May 2004 as a single state although it could not exercise effective control over the 
whole island.93 The application of the EU acquis is suspended in north Cyprus 
pending a political settlement.94  
 
 
3. After the Referendums 
Sözen states that the Annan Plan was not an ideal one for any of the parties since, 
from every point of view, it did not leave enough room for demands to be 
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maximised.95 He also claims, the result of the referendums showed that the TC side 
had the necessary goodwill while the GC side was not ready to embrace power-
sharing and political equality with the TCs. Despite this, they "were rewarded by the 
EU membership".96  
In his report of 28 May 2004 submitted to the Security Council, the Secretary 
General Kofi Annan welcomed the decision of the TCs noting that by accepting the 
Plan, the TCs had deconstructed the decades-old policies of seeking recognition of 
the TRNC.97 He called for the international community, including the Security 
Council, to reconsider the restrictions and barriers the TCs facing as “embargoes”, 
adding of course that recognition is clearly contrary to Security Council resolutions. 
On the other hand, he was of the opinion that the vote had undone the rationale for 
pressuring and isolating the TCs.98 In fact, although the EU Commission proceeded 
to lift the isolation for the TC community, as a member of the EU, the RoC had the 
power to prevent the straightforward adoption of the regulations it proposed. Thus, 
lifting isolation for the north was only partially fulfilled. Naturally, this caused a 
sense of injustice among the Turkish Cypriots.99  
After the referendums, observers noted that “the Cyprus problem is all about 
property”.100 Furthermore, it was asserted that the property provisions of the Plan 
were central for a “Yes” or “No” at the referendums101 and starting from 2008, the 
TCs proposed restitution, exchange and compensation as remedies for dispossessed 
owners where “eligibility” was determined by a clear set of criteria taking the Annan 
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4. The Annan Plan Property Scheme 
The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan states in his report of 1 April 2003 that 
almost half of the people of Cyprus lost properties as a result of inter-communal 
strife or military action between 1963 and 1974.103 Therefore, the property issue has 
widespread economic, social, legal and political implications making it one of the 
most important aspects of the Cyprus problem intimately connected with “bi-
zonality” and “respect for human rights”.104 Furthermore, since these two parameters 
have been interpreted differently by each side, the property issue has become even 
more difficult to solve.105  
The GC side originally accepted that all displaced persons should have the 
right to return to their properties since this is a matter of respect for human rights. In 
other words, they consider bi-zonality is nothing more than having two distinct 
zones, each under the administration of the two communities and, taking into account 
full respect for human rights where this does not allow the exclusion of any former 
GC inhabitants from the TC zone.106  On the other hand, the TC side has argued that 
the rights of the displaced should be restricted in so far as it is necessary to preserve 
the principle of bi-zonality, “preserving as much as possible the present pattern of 
settlement of the TC and GC populations”.107 In addition, according to the TC side's 
maximalist approach, property claims should be settled through a global exchange 
and compensation scheme.108  
Although in order to reach an agreement the leaders of the two communities 
have adjusted and converged their positions on this, the emotional aspect associated 
with the property issue cannot be overcome so easily.109 This also contributes to the 
                                                            
103 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus S/2003/398 (1 April 
2003) para 107  
104 Gürel and Özersay, ‘The Politics of Property’ ( n 88) vii 
105 Ibid 2; Ayla Gürel, Mete Hatay and Chrystalla Yakinthou ‘Displacement in Cyprus, Consequences 
of Civil and Military Strife, An overview of events and perceptions, Report 5’ (Prio 2012) 
106 Gürel and Özersay, ‘Politics of Property’ (n 88) 2 
107 ‘Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus’ S/2003/398 (1 April 
2003) para 107; Sözen, ‘The Cyprus Negotiations’ n (23) 21 
108 Gürel and Özersay ‘Politics of Property’ (n 88) 11; The global exchange and compensation was put 
forward by Denktaş in February 1976 and presented at the fifth round of the Vienna Talks. This was 
the idea of exchanging all TC properties in the south for all GC properties in the north, with 
compensation to be paid, if necessary, for any difference in the value of the properties. It was stated in 
Chapter 2 that GC properties in the north were allocated to TCs including the titles in the following 
years; see Gürel and Özersay, ‘Politics of Property’ (n 88) 13-14. This approach can be considered as 
abandoned in light of the TC proposals since 2008; see Hatay and Bryant ‘Negotiationg the Cyprus 
Problems’ (n 92) 14. 




potential problems to be faced both before reaching a reunification agreement and 
during its implementation.110 
 The issue of “return” is also relevant and was taken up during the 2002–04 
UN-sponsored inter-communal talks under “residency rights”; a broader concept 
concerning anyone from either community willing to establish residency in the other 
constituent state.111 The UN-Secretary General states in this regard that: 
[…] the Turkish Cypriot side wanted the constituent states to have the unfettered 
right to decide who could establish residency therein – this was their concept of 
‘bi-zonality’. The Greek Cypriots argued that [...] basic human rights and the 
principles of the acquis communautaire should allow any Cypriot citizen to 
settle anywhere on the island, any limitations being acceptable only in the first 
few years – for them ‘bi-zonality’ meant only two distinct zones administered by 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots respectively.112  
In order to support the bi-zonal character of the State, the Annan Plan set out 
temporary limitations and followed a gradual approach for the establishment of 
residency by former inhabitants and other GCs in the Turkish Cypriot State.113 
 While proposing his scheme with respect to reinstatement of affected 
properties, Kofi Annan emphasised not only international developments since the 
Second World War, the ECtHR decisions recognizing the property rights of GC, the 
positions adopted by the UN and the international community in the former 
Yugoslavia, but also the fact that the events in Cyprus took place 30- 40 years ago 
and that the displaced persons, roughly half the TC population and a third of the GCs, 
have had to rebuild their lives and economies elsewhere during this time.114 In this 
respect, he stated that the way out of the dilemmas presented by conflicting 
legitimate claims of owners and current users had to be based on compromise.115 For 
this, Kofi Annan's scheme gave priority to claims of current users who had 
themselves been displaced, and allowed them to obtain title in return for exchanging 
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their property on the other side of the island. The Plan also gave to anyone who 
significantly improved a property the opportunity to obtain title on condition that 
he/she paid for the value of the property in its original state.  For reinstatement of 
properties, the Plan provided for a range of incentives to encourage dispossessed 
owners to sell, lease or exchange their properties or seek compensation.116 
 The Plan's property provisions can be summarised as follows: 
 An impartial, independent, administrative body comprising Cypriot members 
from each constituent state and non-Cypriot members not citizens of Cyprus, 
Greece, Turkey or the UK named the Cyprus Property Board consisting of the 
Claims Bureau, the Cyprus Housing Bureau and the Compensation Bureau 
would have been established.117 
 A dispossessed owner would have been entitled to claim compensation for or 
reinstatement of his/her property.118 
 Any claims for compensation for loss of use would have been managed by the 
relevant constituent states.119 
 The Property Board would have been able to refer any parties on request to a 
list of real estate agents for advice about sale and/or exchange of lease 
transactions. The Board’s involvement in this regard would only have been 
limited to provising information to the parties.120 
 Through territorial adjustments, the TC constituent state’s territory would 
have been reduced from 37% to approximately 29%. In areas subject to such 
adjustments, properties were to be reinstated to dispossessed owners.121 It was 
said that this would allow 54% of GC displaced people to return to their 
original homes and properties which would have been under GC 
administration.122 Of course, under this scheme, TCs living in these areas (a 
quarter of the population) would have had to be relocated.123  
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 In areas remaining outside areas of territorial adjustment, the owners of 
affected properties would have had the right to reinstatement or 
compensation. Dispossessed owners would have had the right to one-third of 
their property in value and land area, and to “full and effective compensation” 
for the remaining two-thirds.124 
 Full reinstatement would have been possible with respect to a dwelling which 
the owners had built, or in which they had lived for at least ten years, and up 
to one donum (1337 meter squares) of adjacent land (even if this were more 
than one-third of the total value and area of their properties).125 
 Dispossessed owners would have been able to choose any of their properties 
for reinstatement, except for those which had been exchanged by a current 
user or bought by significant improvement in accordance with the scheme 
defined in Article 1 of Attachment 1, Annex VII. A dispossessed owner 
whose property could not be reinstated, or who voluntarily deferred to a 
current user, would have had the right to an alternative property.126 
 If they agreed to renounce their title to a property, current users could have 
applied for and received title of similar value and in the other constituent state 
from which they were dispossessed.127 
 Persons who had made significant improvements to the properties could have 
applied and received title upon payment of the value of the property in its 
original state.128 
 Occupants would have been expected to move out of any property when 
adequate alternative accommodation was provided.129 
 A Compensation Fund would have been established in the Central Bank of 
Cyprus administered by the Compensation Bureau of the Cyprus Property 
Board. The federal government would have provided 100 million Cyprus 
pounds no later than 18 months upon the entry into force of the settlement 
with contributions from the international donors also available. The fund 
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would also have received all proceeds from the use or disposal of properties 
which would have been transferred to the Property Board.130 The 
compensation fund would have been funded by the sale of properties by the 
Property Board provided no one obtained title to property without paying for 
it through exchange or in cash.131 
 Compensation to be paid would have been in the form of guaranteed 
“compensation bonds” with a maturity of 25 years and “property appreciation 
certificates” linked to real property assets.132 
 Compensation bonds and appreciation certificates at market value and via the 
Property Board could have been used for the purpose of purchasing property 
located in the relevant constituent state, for sale to any person or institution or 
to procure the payment of a deposit for purchase of alternative 
accommodation on the open market.133 
 Properties which were not reinstated would have been transferred to the 
Property Board which would have had to dispose of them or lease them at 
market prices. This would have enabled the Board to generate revenue from 
the management, sale or use of such properties which would have been 
deposited in the Compensation Fund and any profits of the Board would have 
been distributed as dividends to the owners of appreciation certificates.134 
 The whole relocation procedure would have been carried out by the 
Relocation Board.135 
 The Plan provided for preferential loans, mortgage guarantee and mortgage 
subsidy systems for dispossessed owners, current users and owners of 
significant improvements to be administered by the Property Board and the 
scheme was to be guaranteed by the federal government supported by 
donors.136 
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While this appears to be a fair, well-conceived and comprehensive scehme, Palley 
states that it omits details and conceals the real impact of the Plan's provisions on 
displaced persons and property owners.137 She explains that this was the result of 
unlinking residency rights from the issue of reinstatement. According to her, this 
established double barriers to return for displaced people. In this respect, they would 
not only be subject to quotas under the residency ceilings to support “bi-zonality”, 
but also to limitations for restitution.138  As a result, although some would be able to 
return, they would not be reinstated in their homes, while some would be reinstated 
in their properties but would be excluded, as a result of the residency quotas, from 
the other constituent state.139 Kofi Annan had in fact disagreed with arguments 
similar to this, stating in his 2003 report that, the dispute over the issue was based on 
unrealistic assumptions. According to him, these limitations would have little 
practical effect because fewer GCs than the percentages envisaged by the limitations 
would wish to establish residence in the TC constituent state.140 In any case, because 
of the controversy, the Secretary General revised the later versions of the Plan 
(Annan III - V) to improve the provisions in line with concerns expressed by both 
sides of the conflict.141  
 
 
5. Reactions to the Annan Plan Property Provisions 
Although TCs said “Yes” to the Plan, they had doubts about its property scheme. As 
mentioned above, a large number of TCs would have had to be relocated as a result 
of reinstatement of properties or territorial adjustments. In addition, some TCs were 
opposed to the Plan because of its incompatibility with their long-lasting preferred 
goal of global exchange and compensation, and their concept of bi-zonality.142 On 
the other hand, as mentioned earlier, for TCs the prospect of EU membership, the 
desire to be a subject of international law, and Turkey’s support for the Plan had an 
important role regarding the outcome of the referendum.143 They were however 
persuaded by the fact that the Plan restricted restitution and permanent settlement of 
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persons from other community preserving the TC majority status in their own 
zone.144 
 GCs were concerned about the economic impact of the property regime of the 
Plan and believed it meant that they would have to pay a heavy price for the 
settlement of the Cyprus problem.145 They argued that the property compensation 
methods and the system of payment by way of bonds were too complex146 and they 
also doubted the GCs who wished to return to their properties in the adjusted areas, 
or to their properties in the TC constituent state would be able to do so.147 The 
limited restitution scheme was another negative factor for GCs since this was against 
their long-lasting position of full-restitution. Many also believed that this was the 
“legitimation of ethnic cleansing of GCs from northern Cyprus”,148 that the scheme 
was in violation of international law, and the EU acquis, and that their stance on the 
issue of property was more in line with ECtHR judgments at that time.149 However, 
according to the Report of the UN Secretary General, bi-zonality means that “each 
federated state would be administered by one community which would be guaranteed 
a clear majority of the population and of land ownership in its area.”150 From this 
point of view, the provisions of the Plan aimed to preserve this majority as a matter 
of principle. It can be said that, there was no political will to convince the majority of 
GCs to accept the Plan explaining these concepts in detail in public debates. 
  
 
H. 2008-15: After the Annan Plan 
Following the missed opportunity of the 2004 referendums, it took four years "to 
pick up the pieces" and restart negotiations in 2008 between pro-solution leader Talat 
and newly elected President Christofias, Secretary General of the leftist party 
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AKEL.151 At that time, it looked as if "a dark age" had come to an end152 with a new 
terminology in the negotiations of “Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owned solution”.153 The two 
representatives initially established six working groups to pave the way for high-level 
negotiations,154 and seven technical committees to deal with the daily problems 
arising from the Cyprus problem and to increase trust and cooperation between the 
communities.155  
Except for the two most sensitive issues, “territory” and “security and 
guarantees”, convergence increased between the leaders.156 Since most of the 
decisions of the technical committees had never been endorsed by the two leaders 
and the cooperation activities had never been implemented, the working groups were 
mostly dissolved towards the end of September 2008.157 As indicated by Sözen, the 
negotiations returned to the traditional “track-one level process” at “a snail's pace”.158 
In other words, stalemate persisted between the two leaders,159 who had local 
political concerns wishing to preserve the support of their respective communities. 
Furthermore, the talks also stalled a few times due to both communities' respective 
election seasons.160  
 In 2013, Anastasiades became the new President of the RoC. He promised to 
work for a settlement with a better plan than Annan V.161 At that time, the President 
of the TRNC was Eroğlu; a right-wing politician. On 11 February 2014, the two 
leaders made a joint declaration stating that the talks revolved around a loose 
federation with sovereignty emanating from the two communities rather than the 
people of Cyprus as a whole.162  
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I. 2015-Present: Hopes Rise Again 
When Akıncı was elected in April 2015 as the new President of the TRNC, 
expectations were high again since, during the 2004 Annan Plan referendums, he and 
Anastasiades were each pro-solution having expressed their intention to implement 
various CBMs such as uniting the two electricity grids and having a mobile roaming 
agreement to build trust.163 A positive atmosphere also with the two appearing 
together at social events in both parts of the island, increased optimisim.164 
 The leaders reached agreement on a number of substantive issues, yet there 
was no real progress on CBMs165 - the most important issues for reaching a 
settlement and upon matters impacting on people’s daily lives. The two leaders also 
set up three new technical committees dealing with daily problems to increase 
cooperation and trust between the two communities.166 Their work, especially those 
on health matters, environment, humanitarian matters, crossing points and 
telecommunications, has been subject to criticism in the press.167 On the other hand, 
notably, the Technical Committee on Education launched a programme providing 
opportunities for children from both sides to interact, and for teachers, to acquire and 
practice techniques for peace education.168 The Technical Committee on Cultural 
Heritage completed three major architectural restoration projects providing 
opportunities for GCs and Maronites to visit and worship at those sites. However, 
although other committees continued to meet, their achievements have been 
limited.169 Participation of a wide range of elites as members of the committees has 
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also played an important role in including people other than politicians in the 
process. However, other factors has limited the expected impact.  
 The talks between Anastasiades and Akıncı built upon the existing 
agreements; they managed to produce a greater level of agreement than in the past; 
they agreed on most of the issues under "governance and power-sharing" apart from 
the issue of rotating presidency and effective participation in decision-making by the 
two communities at federal level; agreement on economic issues has almost been 
completed; and the only remaining issue with respect to EU affairs, to prevent the 
agreement from being challenged at the international courts, has been to find a 
formula to ensure the Cyprus settlement is part of the EU acquis.170 The two leaders 
faced one particularly challenging issue with respect to "property"; "the emotional 
attachment" of displaced persons to what they had lost.171 Since it would enable the 
determination of the scope of restitution, this was particularly important as Akıncı 
emphasised when the parties met in Mont Pelerin, Switzerland in November 2016. 
Although the atmosphere was positive, the outcome was a great disappointment. For 
the first time, the parties had started to engage seriously with "territory", and, as 
Akıncı stressed, to produce a provisional "map". The plan was to set a date for the 
international conference with the participation of Greece, Turkey and the UK as 
guarantor powers particularly regarding security.  
However, according to Akıncı, the Greek Cypriot side insisted on negotiating 
the number of displaced persons to return. Furthermore, he noted that Greece 
proposed the withdrawal of all troops from the island as a pre-condition for a five-
party conference and insisted upon abolishing the current guarantee and security 
system. Akıncı stated that the GC side wanted to fulfil its demands on these issues 
without any concessions on rotating presidency and effective participation of TCs in 
decision-making, issues reflecting political equality which have always been vital for 
Turkish Cypriots. The GCs wanted "ambiguity" to be preserved for the return of the 
displaced with emotional attachment to properties remaining in the TC constituent 
state with no clarification of relevant criteria, while the TCs wanted clarity. Akıncı 
indicated that the numbers put forward by the GCs were not reasonable and did not 
                                                            





take into account the realities on the ground172 while Anastasiades accused the 
Turkish side of not showing sufficient flexibility during the talks. He added that, if 
no agreement was reached on territory, GCs would find themselves in a multi-party 
conference where they would be pressured to agree to Turkish proposals regarding 
guarantees in exchange for concessions on territorial adjustments.173 This blame 
game further eroded trust between the communities. 
 When the two leaders met again in Geneva in January 2017, they presented 
their maps under the "territory" dossier in line with the percentages agreed 
previously, the first time the two sides submitted and exchanged such details. It was 
also the first time that the relevant parties to the Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of 
Alliance (the three guarantors) came together to discuss security and guarantees.174 
The latest collapse of negotiations happened in Crans Montana, Switzerland 
with the participation of guarantor powers where the parties convened at the end of 
June 2017 for an exhausting ten-day conference where the Secretary General 
presented his framework for negotiating security and guarantees, and effective 
participation of TCs in decision-making, territory, property and equivalent treatment 
of permanent resident Turkish nationals. While the parties were expected to adjust 
their positions and put forward their proposals in line with this framework,175 the 
outcome was no different from that of the past. The UN Secretary General 
announced the failure in a three-minute speech wishing the best for all Cypriots.176 
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Following Crans Montana, the words of Espen Barth Eide, Special Advisor on 
Cyprus, were remarkable when he stated that: 
The climate, the tone, the way people spoke about each other and to each other 
didn't sound like people that were about to unify their homeland.177  
It was obvious that there was no trust between the parties and the blame game was in 
play again with the main issue concerning the presence of troops on the island and 
unilateral intervention rights insisted upon by Turkey. Immediately after the collapse 
of the conference, the Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu blamed the Greek Cypriot 
side and Athens insisting on the withdrawal of all troops from day one of the 
settlement agreement (zero troops-zero guarantees).178 On the other hand, 
Anastasiades blamed the Turkish side for insisting upon maintaining the Treaty of 
Guarantee and keeping Turkish troops on the island.179 Independent sources and 
diplomats acknowledged that Turkey did its best with its offers regarding security 
and guarantees, but the GC side insisted on zero troops-zero guarantees.180 It has also 
been suggested that towards the end of 2016, as a result of political concerns 
indicated by the polls that voting in favour of a new plan by the GC side was far from 
certain and that in turn Anastasiades became a "rejectionist" with respect to the idea 
of reunification of Cyprus. Furthermore, it has been claimed that a great majority of 
GCs have been consistently bombarded by misinformation supported by numerous 
mass communication media and endorsed with most GC political parties.181 Some 
have argued that a solution would not improve the status quo for the GCs given the 
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belief that Turkey’s aim was to replace the RoC with a new state on which it would 
have political influence.182  
The choice to be made in Crans Montana was between 40,000 Turkish troops 
in 146 locations in a divided country, or 650 troops in one location for a certain 
period of time in a unified federal state.183 In other words, as mentioned above, the 
short-term political agendas of the GCs won in Crans Montana. But, the same applies 
to the TCs; the choice was between a symbolic rotating presidency and a united 
Cyprus as a member of the EU.  The idea of permanent partition as an alternative 
deal had also already started to find a place on the agenda of some circles.184 
 
 
J.Can the Problem be Solved? 
1. In General 
From the beginning of the intercommunal negotiations, the constitutional aspects of 
the problem and the issue of security/guarantees have been at the fore.  Despite the 
parties being on an "equal footing" as indicated by the UN resolutions, it seems that 
the GC side has not, in fact, accepted this since they are already the sole 
representative of the RoC recognised by the international community.185 Apart from 
this, each side has maintained that their point of view is in line with the High-Level 
Agreements on the main parameters.186 The parties would not step back from their 
original positions if this would mean renouncing their “sovereignty”. In this regard, 
as mentioned previously, for the majority of the GC side bi-zonality would imply 
accepting partition and this is unacceptable to them. This is connected with the 
distinct positions of the two sides regarding the form of federation; weak or strong.187 
In addition, for "security" reasons, the TC side would not tolerate a "strong" federal 
government.188 Considering that the principle of equality and equal representation is 
fundamental for federalism,189 it can be said that the parties should take steps to 
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understand and accept the essence of a federal state. As Kızılyürek highlights, 
rejecting "the most possible" in favour of asserting "rightfulness" has resulted in 
many failures in the political arena so far.190  
Since the parties have perceived the steps to be taken towards building trust as 
“concessions”, to a great extent, the lack of progress regarding CBM's is also related 
to the issue of "sovereignty".191  
Özersay notes that almost all alternatives for a solution within the UN 
framework have been exhausted as has a variety of leaders, diplomatic methods and 
techniques.192 Yet there is no result. According to him, a new platform for 
negotiations and an alternative model is needed - a plan B.193 For example, he asserts, 
if the GCs are willing to maintain a unitary state, they could continue to do so as they 
have since 1963, and while TCs would have their own independent state, they might 
be ready to show extra flexibility in respect of territorial adjustments and restitution 
of properties. Furthermore, Özersay is of the opinion that a special agreement might 
be made regarding the relationship between Turkey and TCs to address GC fears 
related to Turkey.194 The model would also provide for the Turkish Cypriot state to 
be a member of the UN where unification with another state might be prohibited by 
the UN Security Council.195 He also proposes that, in this case, it would be easier to 
handle other issues such as the number of GCs to settle in the TC state, and to enjoy 
the four freedoms of the EU within the territory of an independent TC state.196 The 
essence of this model is Özersay’s belief that “both communities will be able to get 
more than they formally expect from a settlement based on the existing UN basis”.197  
Tzimitras and Hatay advocate “linkage politics” according to which 
cooperation between the communities should be expanded through increased 
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interaction in fields such as education, tourism and energy.198 According to these 
authors this could be done by way of new initiatives going beyond CBMs to create 
new interdependencies on the island.199 It has also been suggested that steps could be 
taken to resettle the former inhabitants to fenced-off Varosha and to compensate 
displaced persons on both sides of the island whose properties have been irreversibly 
developed for public purposes.200 Hatay is also of the opinion that the concept of 
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”, has led to a deadlock and that it should 
be abandoned in favour of a piecemeal approach instead.201 Hatay and Bryant state 
that piecemeal solutions might contribute to “building confidence along the way”.202 
More recently, Sözen and Pantelides proposed a transitional period to enable the two 
communities to develop the necessary culture and experience for cooperation; a step 
by step approach to federation instead of an instant federation following the 
referendums. Accordingly, there will be an agreed roadmap which will specify steps 
such as troop withdrawals, resettlement of Varosha, economic integration and 
property, and the return of the displaced. In this scenario, integration in common 
federal structures would be the last step rather than the first.203 
 Some indicators with respect to the two sides’ understandings of issues and 
political concerns are addressed below. 
 
 
2. The Cyprus Problem: A Comfortable Conflict? 
As Galtung puts forward, negative peace "is the absence of violence, absence of 
war", and positive peace "is the integration of human society".204 Although Cyprus is 
a "protracted conflict case",205 it has not experienced any violence since 1974 except 
from rare shootings across the buffer zone in the 1970s and 1980s and the killings of 
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two GC protesters in 1996.206 Following the opening of crossing points in April 
2003, numerous incidents have also been reported such as attacks by GC extremists 
on TC vehicles visiting south, an attack against former President of the TRNC 
Mehmet Ali Talat at an event on the Cyprus problem in Limassol and the stabbing of 
a TC musician in a festival held in Larnaca in 2010.207 
As Adamides and Constantinou claim, the post-Cold War traditional view of 
peacebuilding may not be appropriate for Cyprus since many aspects which liberal 
peace building activities aim to promote are already in place on the island such as 
liberal democracy and market economics.208 They argue that, as a result of the high 
standard of living on both sides of the island,209 the democratic environment, and the 
EU accession of the RoC, there is already a form of liberal peace in Cyprus even in 
the absence of a settlement agreement.210 According to them, these factors have 
created a “comfortable conflict” that can be considered "peace" both for locals and 
outsiders.211 According to most GCs, “true” peace can only exist with the withdrawal 
of Turkish troops and the abandonment of the Treaty of Guarantee.212 Other political 
concerns have also been outlined with respect to the structure of a new state, in 
particular in the sub-section on negotiations between Akıncı and Anastasiades. Of 
course, these arguments do not mean that there are no pro-solution groups in both 
sides of the island. It should be added that, the system established in north Cyprus is 
not sustainable since it depends on exploitation of abandoned GC properties and 
nepotism without any concern for the future.213 In addition, as a result of the 
circumstances of being a de facto state recognised only by Turkey, the TCs are 
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consumers but not producers, receivers of aid from Turkey but not participants in a 
wider democratic process.214  Recent surveys show that the majority believes the 
status quo is unsustainable and desires a solution.215 However, considering the course 
of negotiations as explained above, it seems the status quo is accepted as it stands. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that short-term political gains are at the fore for some.  
Elites have always played a crucial role in Cyprus both with respect to how 
they controlled the conflict in the past and in the determination of its future.216 As 
argued by Lacher and Kaymak a considerable majority of the political elite in the 
north has an interest in maintaining the status quo. As they put it “Political 
connections allow a socio-economic elite to enjoy relative wealth and privilege, of 
which landed property is the single most important source”.217 GC property left in the 
north had been such a financial source in this respect. The situation was also reflected 
at the electoral level where pro-secession parties have generally received over 60 per 
cent of the popular vote since 1974.218 The change only occured in 2003 during the 
Annan Plan period, which was, as Lacher and Kaymak state as a result of “the 
exhaustion of the distributive capacities of the North Cypriot state, and its 
diminishing ability to integrate society beyond the elite groups mentioned … that is 
at the heart of this transformation”.219 In the south, as a result of strong economic 
growth since partition, and accession to the EU, there has been little pressure on 
elites to find a solution.220 Unlike the north, no price was paid for failure to do so. 
Furthermore, since the RoC enjoys international legitimacy, its elites also enjoy a 
high degree of public loyalty,221 also a hindrance to solution-oriented cooperation. 
Papadopoulos’ call for Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004 is an 
example of such behaviour also considered further below.222  
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3. Prevailing Ethno-centric Nationalisms and Political Manipulation 
According to Anastasiou, nationalism has considerably eroded over the years with 
respect to both communities. However, he adds that nationalist political leaders and 
their impact on politics and public culture has nevertheless prevailed on both sides of 
the island at the most crucial historical junctures.223 In other words, even when the 
conditions were in favour of a settlement, nationalism proved to be the main obstacle 
to success.224 The UN-led Hague talks of March 2003 and the Annan Plan 
Referendums of April 2004 were historical landmarks and significant attempts to find 
an answer to the question of what accounts for the failure.225 According to a study 
undertaken just before the Annan Plan referendums in March 2004, it was predicted 
that there was a high probability for agreement on the UN peace plan in particular on 
the issue of property.226 But, the result of the April 2004 referendum was highly 
different. In a study conducted in May 2004, it was discovered that there were 
considerable divergences on the issues of territory, settlement and property rights.227 
More surprisingly, a survey conducted between September 2004 and January 2005 
showed that 67% of each community favoured a federal settlement on the basis of the 
Annan Plan.228 It should also be added that, although there was strong support by the 
Turkish government and the TCs in favour of the Plan, this did not prevent Denktaş 
from attempting to defeat it.229 But unlike Denktaş's campaign, Papadopoulos' 
rejectionist point of view had a considerable influence in south. In his campaign, 
Papadopoulos invoked old GC nationalist memories and sentiments of reactivating 
their sense of victimization and injustice, and sympathy for reactionary nationalist 
culture emphasizing on the “enemy”.230 The Plan was also reflected as a conspiracy 
by foreigners in favour of Turkey's interests. Although the Plan envisaged the 
withdrawal of a considerable number of Turkish troops, the rejectionist camp chose 
to emphasise that it allowed for the continuing presence of Turkish troops, and it was 
suggested that it legitimised partition and the occupation of Cyprus.231 The intense 
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emotions and anxiety among the GC community were exacerbated by the 
exaggerated speech Papadopolous made on TV just before the referendum resulting 
in the "No" vote.232 In this respect, Anastasiou views the failure as a lack of 
leadership. It can be said that the underlying issue behind the approach taken during 
the latest phase of negotiations has again been those fears which led to an impasse, 
especially with regard to the issue of security. On the other hand, ethnocentric 
nationalist approaches cannot be deemed to be the sole hindrance to the realisation of 
a united Cyprus since other factors explained in this section have an impact on the 
issue and cannot be separated from each other. 
 
 
4. Federalism Considered as a Concession/Compromise 
It was stated above that the impact of nationalist political leaders on politics and 
public opinion prevailed on both sides of the island at the most crucial historical 
junctures. As a result of this and the historical and political circumstances, state-
building has not been the key issue for either of the communities in Cyprus.233 The 
RoC was the result of a compromise since the national ambitions of enosis (union 
with Greece) and taksim (partition and union with Turkey) could not both be 
realised.234 However, these two aims had powerfully been on the minds of the two 
communities reflecting a lack of common political vision.235 Following the collapse 
of the Republic in 1963, and the intervention of Turkey in 1974, antagonism between 
the two major communities deepened further.236 Thus, Kızılyürek states that the 
question now is “how to achieve political attachment to a common state” that will be 
based on a compromise between two separate political communities which 
minimizes nationalist antagonisms.237 Although it is not possible to disregard the fact 
that there are different identities in Cyprus, a structure, according to which the two 
can live together under one roof without fear and with political equality, is 
necessary.238 As stated previously in this Chapter, a federal arrangement is a 
partnership reflecting power-sharing based on a mutual recognition by each partner 
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of the integrity of the other.239 Furthermore, it is a form of political accommodation 
which enables national cultures to be preserved not disregarded.240 In federations, the 
liberties of communities are emphasized and some of their powers are transferred to 
the common polity.241 Accordingly, Kızılyürek notes that federalism is the 
appropriate system for Cyprus.242 However, although it was accepted as a parameter 
by Makarios and Kyprianou as part of the 1977-79 High Level Agreements, a 
federation, in particular a bi-zonal one, has never been a goal for the GCs. 
Theophanous states that, both Makarios and Kyprianou had considered it a price 
worth paying to achieve reunification.243 It was stated previously that the TCs 
conception of a bi-zonal federation excluded the establishment of a strong central 
government. However, the kind of federalism needed in Cyprus is one in which each 
community makes sacrifices for the other, and there is room for cooperation and 
achieving consensus. Otherwise, a federal state would not be stable.244 In other 
words, federalism is about a common political culture which encompasses the 
protection of group rights as well as individual interests.245 No federal system can 
succeed where its citizens do not think in positive federal terms.246 Kızılyürek notes 
that in the post-Annan period, particularly the GCs having joined the EU seemed to 
prefer to preserve the status quo.247 He also states that: 
 Indeed a federalist approach to society and state based on respect and 
recognition of diversity and on the political will for a political union should not 
be seen as a compromise only which would help to solve the Cyprus problem 
but also a necessary reorganization in order to accommodate and integrate the 
“neo-Cypriot Communities” which came from different parts of the world and 
live in Cyprus and they will continue to live here.248 
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It is obvious that there should be political will and leadership for this to succeed. 
Such a political will is not solely about institutional structures that, as this 
Chapter has already demonstrated, have been the subject of negotiations since 
1963.  Reluctance of political elites to end division is among the obstacles lying 
in the path of a stable form of federalism in Cyprus. 
 
 
5. Is a Cypriot-owned Solution Possible? 
It was stated above that one of the arguments raised by the rejectionist campaign was 
the claim that since the international community made a significant contribution to 
the establishment of the RoC, the Annan Plan was a conspiracy of foreigners to 
favour Turkey's interests.249 As also already noted, most international efforts were 
hostage to negative perceptions on the part of the GCs and TCs and to the fact that 
the elites on both sides were unable to think outside the box.250 As a result, it is vital 
that a solution should be Cypriot-owned. However, whether this is possible is another 
matter. 
 Following the unsuccessful UN involvement in 2004, Kofi Annan stated that 
responsibility for finding a solution lay “first and foremost with the Cypriots 
themselves”.251 By the end of 2010, this became the guiding principle of the talks 
with the new UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stating that the leaders of the two 
communities should take the responsibility for the course of the negotiations and that 
they “must propel the process forward and defend it against those who would seek to 
derail it.”252 Again, following Crans Montana, Secretary General Antonio Guterres 
stated that the UN remains available to the parties should they request talks.253 
However, although the issue of “Cypriot-owned solution” is analysed separately 
here, it is intimately connected with tother factors. The lifting of restrictions on 
movement between north and south in 2003 has provided opportunities for the two 
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communities to interact, communicate and build relationships.254 According to the 
results of research conducted between September 2005 and July 2006, the more the 
interaction takes place across the dividing line, the more oriented the climate 
becomes towards reconciliation.255 However, it seems that the prospect of 
reconciliation remains remote.256 Another report about displaced persons states that 
the more time passes without a political solution, the more the problem becomes 
entrenched.257 This was also an issue noted by the ECtHR with respect to property 
rights as shall be examined in Chapter 3. As indicated in Chapter 1, a significant 
shortcoming of transitional justice is neglecting the causes of injustice.258 It was also 
noted that transitional justice practice is said to be dominated by international 
networks rather than local movements; i.e. the agenda is externally driven and those 
most affected by violations have little or no opportunity to participate and to impact 
on the process.259 Consultation with affected people is crucial,260 as is the integration 
of unofficial local initiatives, social and economic policies for social justice and 
radical approaches impacting communities directly.261 None of this is visible in the 
negotiations about the Cyprus Problem.  
 In May 2017, an initiative named "Unite Cyprus Now" gathered everyday in 
the UN Buffer Zone, Ledra Street, Nicosia calling the leaders to come to the 
negotiation table. The group defines itself as "a grass roots, independent, self-funded 
initiative of Cypriots from all communities promoting actions in support of peace and 
the reunification of the island through a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus 
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problem."262 However, it has yet to identify the kind of solution it wants. It is said 
that the initiative proves the island’s potential and it is believed that this will be an 
important "accelerator" in bringing people, institutions and businesses together.263 
However, it could be observed that, unlike the period leading to the referendums for 
the Annan Plan V when the TCs rallied in the streets, this group remained small. The 
reason for this might be disappointment following the Annan Plan and the emotional 
exhaustion caused by a lack of a solution on TCs.  
Attracting the attention of various circles needs perseverance for any fresh 
initiative to have an impact on the society. Civil society actors can play an important 
role in mobilizing public opinion, informing the public and reaching out to victims, 
survivors, and others about processes to be followed. It remains to be seen whether 
this kind of an initiative can evolve further in the future to tackle the obstacles 
obstructing a settlement agreement, to include victim participation and to lead to a 
real grassroots Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owned solution.  
 However, it should also be added that, a negotiation process carried out 
behind closed doors for such a long period of time, tends to exacerbate negative 
effects on people’s perceptions as a result of potential misinformation about highly 
sensitive issues.  
The Colombian peace process, which has been in progress for decades as in 
Cyprus, provides an illustration of the importance of inclusivity, the problem of 
impunity and reconciling the needs of IDPs and refugees, who have been displaced 
many times, with the quest for peace and stability. The process incorporated 
approximately 60 victims of FARC who became consultants to the process and the 
government, brought to Havana (Cuba) by victim associations. Delegates included 
indigenous communities, Afro-Colombians, LGBT groups, military, police, business 
and trade unions. Although fraught with difficulty, primary needs and concerns of 
victims were heard and met helping to bridge the gap between victims and political 
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elites, and giving victims access to networks to keep the process on track and 
enabling for lobbying in favour of the peace process during the 2016 referendum.264  
Yakinthou further refers to Tunisia as an example of both best practice and 
learning from its own mistakes.265 A Technical Committee for Transitional Justice 
was established in 2012 in Tunisia whose mandate included carrying out country-
wide consultations and proposing a law on TJ to the National Constituent Assembly. 
The Committee was largely made up of civil society leaders, with sub-commissions, 
each covering parts of Tunisia’s regional governorates. Public dialogues were held 
and victim and other stakeholders were consulted on their TJ needs. As a resul of all 
those efforts, the TJ law, passed in December 2013, led to the establishment of the 
Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC). This process shows the importance of civil 
society involvement to keep the democratisation process on track.266 
 
 
III.  Conclusion 
The process of negotiations to resolve the Cyprus problem has been a vicious cycle 
with only minor differences between its various phases. During the initial phases of 
negotiations, participation of the two Cypriot community leaders was limited and 
dictated by others causing internal dissatisfaction similar to that of which resulted in 
the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960.  
The Annan Plan has been the most comprehensive and detailed solution plan 
proposed so far. Although modified several times in an attempt to reconcile the 
demands of the two sides, it has ultimately been unsuccessful. The arguments in the 
south rejecting the Plan revolved around the issue of security, guarantees, property 
and the impact of Turkey on the politics of Cyprus. With respect to the property 
scheme of the Plan, the GCs continued to claim that it was in violation of 
international law, the principle of respect for human rights and the EU acquis. Most 
of them felt that their stance on the property issue was correct and in line with 
ECtHR judgments at that time. However, according to the principle of bi-zonality, 
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each federated state would be administered by one community having a clear 
majority of the population and of land ownership in its area. From this point of view, 
the provisions of the Plan were drawn up to preserve the said majority as a matter of 
principle. In any case, there was no political will to address these concepts in the 
south. Since one "Yes" vote was missing, the Plan failed.  
Although the new terminology starting from 2008 has been a “Cypriot-
owned, Cypriot-led” solution, this did not change the essence of the talks having 
been carried out behind closed doors without the inclusion of grass-roots groups. In 
other words, it seems that the idea of “Cypriot-owned, Cypriot-led” solution has 
been narrowly conceived. In other words, disagreement prevailed with alternative 
political agendas proposed. Surveys showing the tension between the desire for a 
solution and low expectations, draw attention to the need to encourage people to 
participate in the peace process.267 This might be considered as proof that the 
obstacles are in fact politically motivated. The main idea of "building trust" behind 
the CBMs also proved futile as Sözen observes.268 It is unfortunate that the parties 
considered every move towards CBMs as a political bargaining chip even when the 
aim was "building trust". 
 Other factors for the lack of a solution were also addressed in this Chapter. 
One of these was of the fact that Cyprus is a “comfortable conflict” considered as 
"peace" in the absence of an armed conflict. Despite the situation on the island being 
unsustainable, it still seems the status quo is accepted as it is and short-term political 
gains are at the fore for some on both sides. No one wants to leave their comfort 
zones. 
Federalism is not only an institutional arrangement but requires a distinct 
political culture. It is not clear whether people, when asked how they would vote in a 
referendum about it, realise that it is based on power-sharing and equality. More 
education is, therefore, required. 
Finally, prevailing ethno-centric nationalisms and manipulation by politicians 
had the greatest negative impact on people’s perception, of an appropriate solution. 
This has been a factor generating and revealing communal fears causing an impasse 
regarding the issue of security in particular. On the other hand, like all other factors, 
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ethnocentric nationalist approaches and manipulations cannot be considered the sole 
hindrance to the realisation of a united Cyprus. 
Even if a new model provides a new framework for negotiations as supported 
and argued by Özersay, the lack of trust is likely to remain. Nevertheless, “linkage 
politics” as Tzimitras and Hatay advocate coupled with pursuing piecemeal solutions 
as Hatay and Bryant propose, might contribute to “building confidence along the 
way”.269 A more clearly articulated proposal by Sözen and Pantelides, to enable the 
two communities to develop the necessary culture and experience for cooperation 
could be another alternative for finding a solution.270 Disputes and legal claims over 
property and uncovering the remains of the missing have “led to the realization that 
everyone has his or her own Cyprus problem, and that for many people solving their 
own Cyprus problems is more than enough”.271 These alternatives should be more 
thoroughly considered as alternatives to find a federal solution. 
In the final analysis, overcoming the impact of all relevant factors is not easy. 
Public perceptions take time to change andthe conflict do not always remain the 
same. Yet, any steps to build trust and a common understanding should be taken to 
pave the way for creating a power-sharing agreement regardless of the negotiation 
process. Addressing inclusive experiences in other contexts such as Tunisia and 
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Chapter 4 The Cyprus Problem and Property: A Human Rights Background 
I. Introduction 
Forcible displacement, property rights, the right to return home and freedom of 
movement have long been a problem associated with armed conflict.1 The restoration 
of pre-war property rights of internally displaced persons and refugees may also be 
critical to restore peace.2    
As in many countries, displacement has also been an issue for Cyprus, the 
personal, cultural and political significance of which cannot be underestimated.3 
Approximately 210,000 Greek and Turkish Cypriots, one third of the population, had 
to leave their property behind, and uproot themselves as a result of the "inter-
communal strife and/or military action" which took place, in particular, between 
1963 and 1974; the longest standing internal displacement situation in Europe.4  
The controversy over property ownership as a result of the displacement has 
been one of the most contentious aspects of the Cyprus problem for the UN-backed 
inter-communal negotiations to solve. It was also a core factor in the rejection of the 
Annan Plan by Greek Cypriots, as discussed in Chapter 2. Each side supports a 
different solution for property rights of the displaced. While GCs tend to speak about 
return, TCs have defended the post-1974 realities and demographic changes in the 
northern part of the island.5 This has also been reflected by some Greek scholars, the 
views of whom shall be addressed in this Chapter.  
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The property dispute has also been one of the most judicialised in the world6 
which the ECtHR has addressed among other things.7 Following Turkey's 
intervention in 1974, numerous cases have come before the the Strasbourg 
institutions. The Greek Government lodged three applications against Turkey under 
former Article 24 of the ECHR.8  In its report on 10 July 1976 in the first two of 
these, the European Commission of Human Rights found that the respondent State 
had violated Articles 2, 3, 5, 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol 
No 1. The third application was subject to a report adopted by the Commission on 4 
October 1983 under former Article 31 in which it expressed the opinion that Turkey 
was in breach of its obligations under Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention and Article 
1 of Protocol No. 1.  
 The Court became a more important factor for Cyprus in the 1990s following 
the individual applications of GCs especially with the landmark judgment of 
Loizidou v Turkey,9 and later with the Xenides-Arestis10 and Demopoulos and 
others11 cases. 
 Before tracing the ECtHR’s case-law regarding the GC property cases, this 
Chapter will first consider the right to return in international law, property restitution 
and the implementation of restitution schemes in several countries. Following this, 
the stance of the ECtHR regarding the restitution of property in transitional cases in 
the former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe will be outlined12 in 
order to shed some light on how the human rights legal framework fits within the 
transitional justice model. Recent surveys on the perceptions of both communities in 
Cyprus towards TJ and land disputes will also be considered. 
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II. The Right to Property and Transitional Justice 
A.  “The Right to Return Home” in International Law 
Although the "right to return" is recognized in international human rights law, it is 
said that it only applies to repatriation to one's “country of origin”, but not to return 
to one's "home" within that country.13 As a result of concerns with regard to the 
sustainability of repatriation of refugees and durable solutions for IDPs, there have 
been calls to extend the right to return to include "homes of origin".14 Buyse asks for 
example whether such a “right to return to one’s home exists under general public 
international law” and whether there is a “right to housing and property restitution”. 
This is important since the possible existence of an autonomous right to housing and 
property restitution could strengthen the chances of one’s regaining her/his home 
following conflict since such a right could serve “to limit the state’s discretion on 
what form of reparation to choose”. In the absence of a multilateral treaty on a right 
to property restitution, Buyse’s analysis is based on a review of international human 
rights treaties, the practice of the UN institutions, international humanitarian law, and 
state practice.15 According to him, the right to housing restitution can be based on 
either restitution as a “remedy for human rights violations” or on the general “right to 
return”. In this respect, he states that the right to return home could be inferred from 
international humanitarian law, human rights law, peace treaties or voluntary 
repatriation agreements as proof of state practice and resolutions and 
recommendations of the Security Council. However, the issue is not clear when it 
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comes to a specific right to housing restitution. Buyse argues that such a right 
logically follows from the right to return to one’s home. Referring to national 
contexts such as Bosnia and Herzegovina,16 he states that the right to housing 
restitution has made its main strides forward so far in the context of refugees and 
displaced persons. Nonetheless, when it comes to the question whether it is as yet a 
rule of customary international, he concludes that although there is a recent and clear 
trend towards the formation of a customary right to property restitution, the necessary 
criteria17 have not been fulfilled yet. Focusing on the UN Principles on Housing and 
Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, Buyse considers that the 
trends regarding housing restitution reached fruition here. The Principles ensure the 
return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and places of original 
residence and proclaim the right to housing restitution as a distinct right. However, 
Buyse is of the opinion that “one may question whether it is indeed an existing and 
independent right as yet, as the Principles assert”. As he claims, the Principles on 
Housing and Property Restitution as an important text of soft law in this field 
demonstrate this trend, but it still needs development.18 
Proukaki is of the opinion that there is “a right to return to one’s home and 
land” in international law. She particularly refers to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention which reads: “persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their 
homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased”.19 Furthermore, 
pointing at Article 12 of the ICCPR (freedom of movement) as the legal basis of the 
right to return home, she asserts: 
While […] derogations may be justified during armed conflict or unrest for as 
long as hostilities continue, they are not justified in situations in which there are 
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no longer such hostilities and the exigencies of the situation are no longer in 
place.  
Having said this, and failing to make a distinction between “right to return home” 
and “property restitution”, she refers to the case of Cyprus and indicates that Turkey 
still refuses to allow the return and restitution of property to displaced Greek 
Cypriots.20   
 Considering the discussions above, it could be stated that property restitution 
is one of the remedies for human rights violations. Although it could be considered as 
the preferred remedy, its implementation and its position within the hierarchy of 
modes of reparation should be considered in the context of factors causing the 
violations and other rights relevant and/or attached to it. To analyse the issue further, 
various examples from specific countries regarding the property restitution will be 
outlined in the next sub-section. 
 
 
B.  Property in Transitions  
The TJ paradigm struggles to confront socioeconomic inequalities21 with relevant 
mechanisms paying inadequate attention to questions of land rights and 
distribution.22  
Dominant TJ discourses favour restitution as a method of redressing 
violations of property rights only if it is impossible to return the land to the victims or 
if restitution would be unfair, should compensation be seen as the appropriate type of 
reparation.23 In other words, land questions are often considered as an issue of 
restitution to a pre-existing status quo which is influenced by economic efficiency 
and financial constraints. This, on the other hand, could mean ignoring wider 
structural problems.24  
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While restitution cannot be an adequate remedy for some in dealing with 
intergenerational land issues,25 there is no consensus in international law on the issue 
of compensation for expropriated land.26 Until now, conventional TJ approaches 
have arrived at a consensus on property rights,27 problems more evident in places like 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, where both countries’ land reform programmes had to 
correct land redistribution patterns which favoured white commercial farms and 
marginalized black communal areas.28 In other words, land redistribution and 
equalization was not prioritized where it should have been. The ANC government in 
South Africa, for example, adopted a “willing seller, willing buyer” policy to resolve 
the historically rooted economic and land ownership inequalities through a market-
based mechanism29 which resulted in payment of compensation to large landowners 
for unwanted land, and consequently, failed to transform conditions for the 
marginalized.30   
The majority of land restitution processes have ignored historically unjust 
land allocation patterns and various cycles of dispossession/occupation which have 
created competing claims to land which are sometimes intergenerational. This further 
complicates situations where inequalities are inherent in land access and ownership 
and are likely to erode reconciliation and development initiatives.31  
Adopting a transformative justice lens and utilizing restitution as one among 
several remedies could prove useful when redistribution is needed to reduce 
structural violence.32 In other words, distribution is important in contexts such as 
South Africa or Colombia. But this is not the case for land issues in Cyprus as noted 
in Chapter 1. Following this brief examination of property and transition, the 
subsequent sub-sections will further address restitution which is considered the 
primary remedy in resolving land issues in Cyprus both by GC officials and some 
scholars.  
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C. Property Restitution in Practice and Transitional Justice 
Restitution is a mechanism to restore victims to the condition they would have been 
in, had no violation of their rights occurred.33 As expressed in the previous sub-
section, in many political transitions and peace settlements, property restitution has 
been considered as a remedy for redressing past injustices, for example, for 
communist nationalization policies in Europe, for apartheid confiscations in South 
Africa, for ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, for refugees and displaced persons in 
Mozambique and 1994-1995 agreements in Guatemala ending the armed conflict.34 
Some of these cases will be touched upon below. 
Following the demise of communism, Central and Eastern European states 
dealt with the issue of loss of property in diverse ways. Some undertook large-scale 
restitution processes, while others created a right to partial compensation, with some 
offering no remedy to victims of property confiscations at all.35 Poland has, for 
example, resisted restitution and not instituted a restitution policy.36 The commitment 
of states to restitution schemes also varied.37 For example, in Romania the courts and 
administrative authorities often issued conflicting decisions for the same property.38 
In Czechoslovakia, restitution programs, for economic feasibility, limited to resident 
citizens39 were integral components of transition from socialism to a liberal economy 
and the laws were designed to re-institute pre-socialist ownership.40 Limitations were 
also based on nationality, the current use or ownership of the property, and the timing 
and circumstances of original loss.41 Although relevant restitution programs had been 
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initiated before the separation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics in 1992, 
the two successor states (the Czech Republic and Slovakia) also embarked on similar 
programs.42 In the Czech Republic, the issue of restitution has been complicated as a 
result of the high number of claimant groups, the passage of time since the bulk of 
confiscations, and sensitive political considerations regarding the groups to be 
included and excluded.43 In both the Czech Republic and Poland, restitution policies 
were designed to prevent ethnic Germans expelled at the end of war from returning 
or recovering title.44 Hungary offered compensation rather than restitution; restitution 
in kind was excluded to protect the interests of current owners.45 Germany initially 
offered a combination of compensation and restitution, but eventually opted for 
privatization over the two with restitution for expropriations during the Soviet 
occupation of 1945-49 denied.46 In other words, states did not restore every property 
to every dispossessed person.47  
As Allen observes, the diversity among countries is not surprising since the 
circumstances of each case vary. In other words, practical difficuties complicated 
restitution depending on the extent of nationalization in each state.48 Furthermore, 
resettlement of refugees following World War II affected states and impacted 
restitution policies differently.49 As a result, there has been no general consensus on 
the desirability of restitution and it is not clear whether restitution improves or retards 
economic growth or whether it has a positive effect on the rule of law.50 Resolution 
1096 (1996) of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Council of Europe’s guidance to 
handle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems, an example of 
transitional justice,51 states that the old structures and thought patterns have to be 
dismantled and overcome to re-establish a civilised, liberal state under the rule of 
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law.52 It notes that, in principle, restitution should take place “if this is possible 
without violating the rights of current owners who acquired the property in good faith 
or the rights of tenants who rented the property in good faith, and without harming 
the progress of democratic reforms”. If this is not possible, “just material 
compensation” should be awarded.53 In other words, the Resolution does not require 
restitution if the current owners' rights need to be protected. It also states that, “the 
key to peaceful coexistence and a successful transition process lies in striking the 
delicate balance of providing justice without seeking revenge”.54 From this point of 
view, it can be stated that while implementing restitution schemes in some cases the 
risks entailed during the process of transition and the delicate relationship between 
facing the past and governing the present cannot be underestimated.55 
In examining the role of restitution in redressing violations of civil or 
property rights which occurred before transition,56 Posner and Vermeule refer to 
critics of restitution programmes who argue that restitution does not adequately 
resolve property rights issues.57 According to these critics, for a successful transition, 
the economy must flourish. Otherwise, democratic transition and the restitution 
arrangements may themselves be blamed by those who suffer as a result of economic 
failure where this would undermine the transition and create the possibility of at least 
a partial restoration of the old regime. In other words, the old regime may regain 
power and credibility as a result of the economic failure of the new regime.58 The 
critics also suggest that, as a result of the potential burden on budgets creating new 
claims for victims of the old regime would also have a negative impact on the 
economy.59 Posner and Vermeule argue that, regardless of how properties are 
distributed during transitional periods, property holders will nevertheless deal with 
them in response to prevailing market forces. Furthermore, in every successful 
market economy, property is always subject to uncertainties including increased 
property taxes undermining their value.60 According to Posner and Vermeule, 
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frictions from uncertainties regarding  restitution rights (what they are, who owns 
them, how they will be enforced) could provide a more reasonable ground for 
objections to restitution programs because, where this is the case, people might stop 
investing in or buying property until they know how restitution claims will be 
adjudicated.61 On the other hand, this can be dealt with by limiting the period of time 
to lodge restitution applications.62 Citing post-war Germany as an example, the 
authors argue that restitution policies even contribute to economic or political 
development.63 While it is not easy to measure the impact of these criticisms and 
responses, it can be stated that restitution programs should be assessed on a case-by-
case basis particularly as far as post-communist regimes are concerned. Three points 
should be observed: First, restitution programs discourage future governments from 
expropriating "property" and, economically, send a signal to investors. Second, they 
limit the powers of post-transitional governments which usually have a connection 
with the antecedent regime. Finally, they offer the possibility of extinguishing moral 
and political objections to existing allocation of properties.64 In the final analysis, 
while these reflect the “restorative” aspect of transitional justice, each transitional 
case should be evaluated on its own terms where a fair and proportionate balance 
should be struck between the rights of current users and restoring the property 
concerned to its original owner.  
Allen argues that there is no consensus on the desirability of restitution.65 For 
example, the impact of restitution on economic growth/stability and the restoration of 
rule of law is disputed.66 Allen and Douglas note that restitution may have the effect 
of “restoring dignity and reinstating victims as full participants in the social, political 
and economic life of the community” and that it could be particularly important for 
the purposes of transitional justice.67 Referring to the Pinheiro Principles, Proukaki 
questions whether peace is attainable without restitution and considers that the return 
of property to initial owners is a tool for restorative justice and for the rule of law 
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since unresolved property disputes may give rise to further conflict.68 She also 
maintains that restitution is a means of providing for the participation of victims in 
the social, political and economic life of the community.69 However, the current 
users' rights over the said properties and their participation in the social, political and 
economic life of the community cannot be ignored.  Although it is argued that those 
who have unjustifiably been deprived of their property should have the absolute right 
to return, Blacksell and Born observe that such a categorical position would cause 
other injustices.70 In any case, supporting the existence of a right to return home and 
its implementation are different matters. It is true that “the right to return” would be 
meaningless if it did not include a “right to return home” However, it is difficult to 
support an absolute right to property restitution for original owners since this would 
marginalise other social considerations, a particular issue for Cyprus considering the 
sui generis situation it has been in for more than 50 years.  
 However, although controversial, it is also alleged that restitution programs 
strengthen and build social stability.71 Ballard states that, although return of property 
is a factor in rebuilding post-war social and economic stability, it is not sufficient 
since returnees need physical security, access to jobs, education, and social 
services.72 Although the right to return was considered as a means to achieve peace in 
the former Yugoslavia,73 whether this proved successful is another matter. In Bosnia, 
people did not want to return to their “homes” in regions without socio-economic 
stability,74 which also illustrates other challenges. The General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (The Dayton Peace Agreement),  
signed on 14 December 1995 by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, established a weak federal system where the majority of 
powers were divided between the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (the two Entities).75 The Entities were given all governmental functions 
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and were “some sort of mini-states” with sovereignty.76 It is even said that, the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, in fact, intensified the division along ethnic lines 
generated by the conflict.77 The Constitution (Annex 4 of the Agreement) states that: 
All refugees and displaced persons have the right to freely return to their homes 
of origin. They have the right, in accordance with Annex 7 to the General 
Framework Agreement, to have restored to them property of which they were 
deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any 
such property that cannot be restored to them. Any commitments or statements 
relating to such property made under duress are null and void.78 
The Agreement supported extensive property restitution, sought to reverse ethnic 
cleansing by way of a strong individual right to return to homes of origin, and 
privileged return as a matter of policy.79 However, out of a pre-war population of 4.5 
million, more than 1 million were internally displaced and over 1.2 million were in 
25 other countries primarily in the neighbouring republics of former Yugoslavia and 
throughout Western Europe.80 The international community strongly supported return 
in Bosnia both as a measure of corrective justice and as a means of repatriating 
Bosnian refugees from Western Europe and to begin with, they were not concerned 
for local authorities obstructing the process of return. However, once it became 
apparent that these efforts were insufficient to implement the policy of return, the 
international community took legal and practical steps to change the situation.81 
Having significant resources, such as peacekeeping forces, civilian monitoring 
networks and a multi-million dollar reconstruction program which could be used to 
reward compliance with return, they have been an actor in Bosnia to develop 
measures against the challenges confronted ever since. Thus, the difficulty was not 
only socio-economic instability as mentioned above, but also the unwillingness of 
relevant nationalistic local authorities to allow return of original inhabitants of other 
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ethnicities or to discourage departure of inhabitants of their own ethnicities from 
areas they controlled.82 Another substantial difficulty was the allocation of alternative 
properties to subsequent users. Due to the large scale of displacement, it was 
assumed that subsequent users would repossess their own pre-war homes and that 
alternative accommodation would only be provided as an interim measure. But the 
issue was more complicated. Pleading a lack of adequate space and the need to 
protect current occupants, local authorities hindered enforcement. While it was 
initially assumed that the local authorities would take the ownership for the 
implementation of the Agreement, the absence of progress in the initial years dashed 
these hopes.83 It was said that Dayton was more like a ceasefire than a political 
settlement, and the ambiguity regarding the fundamental issues such as the return of 
refugees and displaced persons left the issues contested rather than leading to 
cooperative state-building.84 As Donais states, the Agreement sustained the conflict 
“through a consociational political system which institutionalized ethnic divisions at 
all levels of the country’s political system”,85 and it is said that, in the final phase 
(2002 – 05) of the restitution process, it became obvious that restitution decisions 
were not always followed by actual returns.86 Lack of employment opportunities, 
difficulties in obtaining social benefits, local schools being hostile towards 
minorities, and the failure to return farm land and businesses simultaneously with 
housing made return difficult.87 Therefore, patterns of discriminatory action against 
minorities compounded challenges.88 Bosnia illustrates that restitution can be 
effective if implemented for durable solutions rather than as a means of dictating 
return.89 In other words, as Harvey states, “[...] the primary interests of different 
actors involved in promoting “durable solutions” for displaced populations 
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(international agencies, "host" governments, and "home" governments) frequently 
have not shared the interests of those populations. Efforts by nationalist parties to 
relocate refugees and displaced persons to politically sensitive areas, and a 
corresponding desire on the part of international actors to oppose local integration 
and promote return, have combined to make it very difficult for individuals to take 
independent action and to integrate locally."90 
 The passage of time is also a factor in discussions regarding restitution of 
property.91 In the Czech Republic, considered above, there have been challenges in 
this respect. By 1989, claims for nationalized and confiscated property were related 
to events which occurred almost twenty years before, claims of Sudeten Germans 
were over forty years old and most Jewish claims were up to fifty years old.92 In 
other words, because the claims for restitution were "intergenerational"93, they 
presented challenges94 such as parties to such proceedings might have died, evidence 
might have been lost, legal uncertainty for long-settled acts might have arisen,95 and 
current users, who have used or even owned the property concerned for decades, may 
have also acquired rights to it. Therefore, even if the expropriations were unjust, the 
legal interests of current users should also be taken into account.96 Furthermore, in 
the Czech Republic, the expropriations did not breach Czechoslovakia’s international 
obligations at the time.97 The final sub-section attempts to further explore reparatory 
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D. Redressing the Past with Restitution of Property? 
1. Reparations in Transitions 
Although there is a clear obligation upon states to remedy violations, the form this 
should take is another matter.98 It is said that reparations, being essential to any 
transitional justice initiative, include, “in some combination and as approppriate”, 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation in mind, body and status.99 Revealing the 
truth, holding perpetrators accountable and ending violations are also measures 
which can have a reparative effect.100 As Teitel observes, in national debates, the 
question of reparatory justice is a complicated problem inherited by the successor 
regime causing conflicts between the backward-looking purposes of compensating 
victims and the state’s forward-looking political interests.101 Transitional reparatory 
justice arguably reconciles the dilemma between the corrective aims and the forward-
looking goals of transformation.102 
Furthermore, reparations should not be empty promises or temporary 
measures103 but should instead focus directly on the victims’ situation endorsing their 
status as bearers of rights, delivering reparations, acknowledging past violations, 
indicating responsibility and commitment to respond to harms, and have the potential 
to build trust and restore dignity.104 Having said this, although typically absent, 
acknowledgment is referred to by victims as the most important element of 
reparations.105 In the final analysis, it is important to remember that reparations are 
part of a larger agenda of “peacebuilding, reconstruction, relief and nation-building, 
efforts”106 including planning, financing and immediate action as well as a long-term 
strategy.107 Emergent limitations should be addressed, norms should be designed to 
ensure continuity particularly for lack of political will in the future, and a national 
budgetary with a special fund relying on donations or another mechanism should be 
carefully considered and planned.108 
 
                                                            
98 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press 2000) 119 
99 Lisa Magarrell, Reparations in Theory and Practice (2007 ICTJ) 1-2; see also ibid 
100 Magarrell (n 99) 1 
101 Teitel (n 98) 119 
102 Ibid 
103 Magarrell (n 99) 1 
104 Ibid 2 
105 Ibid 
106 Ibid 3 
107 Ibid 11-12 




2. The Passage of Time as a Factor 
With the passage of a long time, reparatory acts become increasingly symbolic, 
mostly taking the form of apologies since the harm inflicted is considered as a 
reputational one in the public eye and, thus, redressable accordingly.109 Teitel notes 
that, reparatory acts having the backward-looking purpose of compensating victims 
of past abuses and foward-looking national political interests are often contested. In 
this regard, it i said that transitional reparatory justice reconciles the dilemma of 
balancing corrective aims with the forward-looking purposes of transformation.110 
It should be noted that, despite long passage of time, injustices may remain 
since deprivation of property is also likely to have destroyed people’s livelihoods.111 
On the other hand, although restitution of property may still be possible in some 
cases, it will typically not be possible to restore livelihoods, the community and the 
culture linked to property.112 This problem lies at the core of claims and creates a 
dilemma between corrective and distributive justice because, while corrective justice 
aims to remedy a past wrong by returning the property to the original owner, 
distributive justices targets the overall situation with a forward-looking approach.113 
Veraart notes that the South-African restitution process illustrates the effect of 
passage of time on large scale restitution schemes within a rapidly changing society. 
He notes that, restitution may still take place but its form and content will differ from 
corrective mechanisms in private law framed as disputes between original owners 
and current owners in good or bad faith.114 He continues: 
After a substantial lapse of time, the financial burden shifts to the collective as a 
whole and an ambitious restitution policy will inevitably become more difficult 
to implement and entangled in a myriad of redistributive and future-oriented 
policies, with ever-present risk of dissolving into them.115 
Clearly, introducing a legal response to injustices is crucial irrespective of the 
passage of time. On the other hand, restitution of property has its momentum and it 
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should take place as soon as possible following injustices.116 As the gap between 
injustices and the moment of restitution expands, the law’s function changes.117 In 
South Africa, according to Verraart, land reform and restitution were initiated on the 
basis of a constitution where the process had become lengthy and had not borne fruit 
as expected. In other words, what was envisaged by the constitution differed greatly 
from the actual progress on the ground.118 Thus, the break with the past might 
sometimes remain symbolic when it fails to deliver quick and clear responses to 
diverse past injustices.119 However, this should not mean that claims generally 
weaken over time.120 In other words, while the form of redress might change as 
traditional model of corrective justice recedes, the aim of repairing past wrongs 
should remain.  
How does the passage of time relate to the property of the displaced in Cyprus 
then? The answer to this question involves the extent of displacement.  
The escalation of intercommunal violence in the summer of 1958 led to the 
displacement of approximately 2,700 TCs from 36 villages and, 1,900 GCs from 
Nicosia and eight villages. When TCs proclaimed a separate municipality in 1958 in 
the north of the city, Nicosia was already divided by a barbed wire fence. When the 
RoC was declared in 1959, almost half of the TCs displaced in 1958 returned to their 
villages, while only a small number of GCs did so.121 In 1960, when the RoC was 
established, GCs constituted almost 77% of the total population of the island, while 
TCs constituted 18%.122 When inter-communal violence broke out again in 1963, 
TCs withdrew from the government and retreated into enclaves. Violence further 
caused the displacement of 1,500-2,000 Greek and Armenian Cypriots, and 
approximately 25,000 TCs. While the displacement of Greek and Armenian Cypriots 
was mostly from Nicosia, TCs displacement was distributed accross the island. 
Between December 1963 and August 1964, TCs abandoned 72 mixed villages and 24 
TC villages. Furthermore, eight mixed villages and the six largest towns were 
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partially vacated.123 Approximately 25% of the TC population was displaced during 
this period almost 90% of whom lived in 42 enclaves which were subject to 
economic and military siege. Following the Greek Coup and Turkish military 
intervention of Cyprus in July 1974, the majority of GCs fled northern Cyprus while 
others surrendered in their villages. The ones who fled were enclaved in various 
locations in the north, including camps and village neighbourhoods,124 some of 
whom were later expelled to the south, in retaliation for the mistreatment of TCs 
remaining there.125 Furthermore, approximately 6,000 Greek Cypriot prisoners of 
war were later released to the south in exchange for TC prisoners. Finally, the Vienna 
III Agreement signed by the leaders of the two communities in 1975 allowed 
voluntary and assisted movement of GCs and TCs from both sides of the island.126  
As a result of the 1974 military intervention, almost 162,000 GCs including 
other minorities were displaced. In 1975, approximately 25,000 GCs were resettled 
in houses abandoned by TCs in the south. TCs were also moved to areas under 
Turkish control for safety.127 By the end of 1975, apart from only 130 elderly 
persons, all TCs had made their way north. The number of TCs displaced was 48,000 
with another 12,000 who had already been displaced in the 1963-64 period living in 
enclaves in the north. Thus, the total number of displaced TCs originally from the 
south is almost 60,000.128 However, by contrast with the case of displaced GCs, there 
were enough houses belonging to GCs in the north to accommodate all TCs.129 Thus, 
the displacement routes in Cyprus span a period of more than 50 years, with some 
people displaced more than once, reducing the severity of humanitarian concerns, 
dire conditions or severe abuses and hardship in many cases. Furthermore, 
considering the existence of negative peace, transformation of relationships of the 
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3. Recent Research on Perceptions of the IDPs and “the Acceptance 
of Cohabitation” in Cyprus   
 
The implications, for Cyprus, of inclusive processes such as those in Tunisia and 
Colombia were considered in the previous Chapter. In a recent survey, Psaltis, Cakal, 
Loizides and Bonnenfant illustrate that the inclusion of displaced persons in the 
Cyprus peace process could positively influence the outcome of a future settlement 
depending on the extent of consultation on property issues and the right to return.130 
The authors support the view that the years of “peace talks have been wasted, with 
sides discussing technical and top-down criteria on the allocation of disputed 
properties rather than engaging directly with property owners/occupants”.131 A 
comprehensive census survey of preferences among all displaced persons could, at 
least, indicate how many GCs want to have their properties restored and where this 
could address and ease the insecurities of TCs in this regard.132 Since it is primarily 
the GCs who emphasize return to their properties, Psaltis, Cakal, Loizides and 
Bonnenfant present findings on GC IDPs’ relationship to their lost properties and 
their intention to return in case of a solution. The findings show that if the GC IDPs 
have the first say about what to do with their properties, this would bring a Yes vote 
in a referendum for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The survey also shows that 
in areas which would fall under the administration of the TC constituent state, only a 
small minorty of GC IDPs would request restitution of their properties. This point is 
important for TCs as they are concerned for losing demographic majority in their 
own constituent state.133  
Other recent research including both Turkish and Greek Cypriots’ perceptions 
on cohabitation which investigates the potential impact of TJ interventions and 
intergroup contact, acknowledges the lack of empirical research about whether GCs 
(including the IDPs) would be willing to live as neighbours with “settlers” and 
TCs.134 Two surveys, carried out in the GC and TC communities in this regard, show 
that “GCs are more likely to accept a TC neighbour than a TS [Turkish Settlers] 
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neighbour".135 As noted by the authors, this finding is consistent with the official 
narrative of the conflict in the GC community that revolves around “the Turkish 
invasion and occupation”. This is linked to the feeling of insecurity by GCs where 
the typical discourse includes comments such “our problem is not with TCs but 
Turkey” or “we used to live together with TCs and we can do it again in case of a 
solution as long as Turkey withdraws its troops from Cyprus.”136 However, among 
those who experienced displacement in 1974, “a retributive sense of justice is 
expressed by wanting to inflict harm on perpetrators – making them beg for 
forgiveness, withholding amnesty, assigning harsh punishments or seeking 
compensation, not as a means to restore relations with TCs or Turkey but as another 
means of inflicting a cost on the main perpetrator (Turkey)”.137 The authors note that 
they tend not to focus on a “more pragmatic, and restorative sense of justice 
expressed in forgiveness conditioned on giving testament in a truth and reconciliation 
committee”.138 The survey also shows that “the more GC participants adhere to 
notions of retributive justice, the less they are ready to live together with Turkish 
settlers.”139 This is a reflection of one-sided victimization which sees TSs as the 
enemy (from Turkey).140 On the other hand, this part of the research does not 
specifically reflect perceptions and the sence of justice on how the issue of property 
rights could be resolved. 
Levels of acceptance by the four subcategories of TCs (indigenous IDPs, 
indigenous non-IDPs, mixed background, Turkish settlers) do not differ significantly. 
In other words, these backgrounds do not significantly affect preparedness for 
cohabitation with GCs, indicating that in a future referendum TSs are unlikely to vote 
en bloc against a solution as often assumed by GCs.141 Perceptions of TJ are similar 
to that of GCs; i.e. the more TC participants adhere to notions of retributive justice, 
the less they are ready to live together with GCs.142  
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Other research confirms the conclusion of Psaltis et al survey that intergroup 
contact has an impact on the reduction of prejudice.143 Observing the positive effects 
of contact for all groups surveyed, the authors suggest the need to implement 
additional confidence building measures, such as contact schemes, new crossing 
points in isolated areas of the island, school visits and dialogue workshops.144 They 
further note that contact and dialogue workshops could be the topic of transitional 
justice itself.145 IDP/settlers inclusion is also key to reconciliation with respect to 
land disputes, where localized consultation mechanisms could be established as 
well.146 According to Psaltis et al, local commissions could address disputes between 
owners and current users for amicable win-win arrangements at individual level with 
expanded options available to all individuals affected by the conflict.147  
Thus, the research shows that potential returnees are likely to regard TCs as 
their neighbours than those less likely to returnand that, coupled with inclusive 
processes, intergroup contact is important to further tolerance. 
Before turning to GC cases against Turkey, the following sub-section 
examines the approach of the ECtHR as a regional adjudicator of human rights in 
property restitution cases in post-communist countries. 
 
 
III.  The European Convention on Human Rights and the Restitution 
of Property 
As explored above, property restitution has been a widely debated issue for post-
communist transitions in Central and Eastern Europe.148 In the Communist era, 
properties were often takn without compensation or with compensation that fell far 
below market value. Individuals were also sometimes forced to abandon their 
properties by coercive measures and those who emigrated later found that those they 
left behind were confiscated. Therefore, following the fall of communism many 
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people, unjustly deprived of their properties, sought restitution or compensation,149 
often relying on Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR.  
The Court's case-law on restitution in transitional cases can be examined 
under the temporal and material scope of the Convention.150 In the first line of cases, 
the Court often rejected claims for violation of property rights as a result of 
"anomalous" situations occurring during communist regimes on jurisdictional 
grounds, and the non-retroactive character of the Convention and its Protocols,151 It 
further referred to the principles of international law on interpretation of treaties and 
state responsibility where a State’s conduct is examined according to the law in force 
at the time without the treaties interpreted retroactively.152 In other words, the 
Convention and its Protocols do not apply to an act which occurred prior to the date 
upon which they came into effect for the respondent State. As Proukaki asserts, the 
provisions of the Convention and its Protocols are not intended to remedy past 
injustices153 and since the Convention did not come into force in the former 
communist states until several years after the fall of communism, many transitional 
justice claims were excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction. However, the Court 
makes a distinction between "continuing" and "instantaneous" acts. For example, in 
German cases, the claims were also rejected on temporal grounds.154 In Blecic, the 
Court concluded that the deprivation of the right to property was an “instantaneous” 
act, and that since the applicant had been deprived of his property by the Supreme 
Court of Croatia’s decision in 1996, prior to Croatia ratifying the ECHR in 1997, the 
case was rejected.155 However, the Court's approach in these cases differs from the 
Cyprus cases; especially from the landmark decision in Loizidou v Turkey where it 
held that the applicant had been refused access to her land since 1974 and had lost all 
control over it.156 Referring to the distinction between “continuing” and 
“instantaneous” acts, the Court concluded that the violation in question had the 
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former rather than the latter character.157 As Loucaides states, in most of the cases in 
the post-communist context by contrast, the acts in question have been considered 
"instantaneous".158 The Court excluded ratione temporis the complaints of 
individuals who sought restitution and, in this regard, Gross states that while the 
Convention cannot mend the past, it can reinforce democracy which ex-Communist 
states already have in place.159  
 However, it would not be wrong to state that, to avoid further instability, the 
Court has been reluctant to provide a forum for hearing individual complaints about 
past injustices.160 In other words, it attempts to provide a balance between the past 
and the future by giving priority to "stability". However, the main reason for the 
rejection of such claims has much more to do with the fact that a state, as a matter of 
justice and basic legal principle, cannot be held responsible for obligations before the 
point at which it agreed to undertake them, and also because it would otherwise 
massively increase the Court's case load. 
 In the second line of cases - those relating to “the material scope of the 
Convention” - the Court’s jurisprudence can be summarised in Kopecky v Slovakia161 
where it stated: 
Article 1 of Protocol No.1 cannot be interpreted as imposing any general 
obligation on the Contracting States to restore property which was transferred 
to them before they ratified the Convention. Nor does Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
impose any restrictions on the Contracting States’ freedom to determine the 
scope of property restitution and to choose the conditions under which they 
agree to restore property rights of former owners.162 
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In other words, it is outside the material scope of the Convention for it to provide 
restitution for confiscated property and to impose an obligation on states to create a 
framework for such claims. In this regard, Sweeney states that since “there is no 
Convention right to this form of transitional justice” a form of reparatory justice is 
denied.163 
 On the other hand, when the Contracting States decided to establish 
procedures for restitution, the Court supervised their application. While such 
schemes were not universally accepted, and were controversial in terms of their 
contribution to a peaceful transition or to economic good and might be considered to 
be in conflict with the Article 1 Protocol 1 rights of current owners, their consistency 
with the principles of the Convention was nevertheless reviewed by the ECtHR.164  
 In Pincova and Pinc v Czech Republic,165 the Court accepted that restitution 
laws pursue the legitimate aim of safeguarding the lawfulness of legal transactions 
and protecting the country’s socio-economic development.166 In other words, the 
Court not only accepts that restitution laws are reparatory, but that they are also 
forward-looking.167 Concluding that the applicants had to bear an excessive burden 
which has upset the fair balance between the demands of the general interest and 
protection of the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, the Court found a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol.168  
After the fall of communism in 1990, the Bulgarian Parliament enacted the 
Restitution Law 1992 to provide justice to those whose property had been 
nationalised without compensation. According to this regulation, if the property 
concerned had been nationalized and acquired by third persons by virtue of their 
position in the Communist party or through abuse of power, the former owners or 
their heirs could still recover it.  The applicants in Velikovi and Others were deprived 
of their property as a result of proceedings brought against them under this Law by 
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the pre-nationalisation owners or their heirs. The Court found a violation in two 
applications stating that the appplicants, as well as their heirs, took advantage of their 
privileged position or acted unlawfully to acquire property in a totalitarian regime 
and concluded that the punitive element in the restitution scheme was legitimate.169 
To sum up, while the Court does not require restitution schemes, where they 
have been provided by the Contracting States, it subjects them to Convention 
standards. It also allows States to exclude certain categories from their scope170 and it 
permits a wide margin for states in which local solutions can flourish.171 Pogany 
argues that this has allowed the Court to avoid addressing sensitive political 
questions of contested historical memory172 while, according to Sweeney, "[t]he wide 
margin of appreciation seen in the ECtHR's exclusion cases, which consequently 
forestalls substantive discussion of discrimination, can be seen as another attempt to 
avoid being seen to 'do' transitional justice.”173 However, often being the subject of 
considerable media scrutiny and political comment, the importance of the Court for 
transitional justice cannot be underestimated since it could have an impact on 
"national memorialisation".174 Although the Court does not make a decisive 
contribution to transitional cases where states choose to initiate restitution schemes, it 
still has a role in ensuring that the process is concluded and that procedural justice is 
maintained.175 Thus, on the assumption that once established they cannot be 
exempted from the guarantees of the Convention including Article 6(1),176 it imposes 
positive obligations on states to implement restitution fairly.177  
 As Sweeney puts it, since the Court allows a wide scope for transitional states 
and their circumstances, “the potential for outright conflict between human rights 
norms and the motivations behind restitution” is reduced.178  
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IV. The European Court of Human Rights and the Property Dispute 
in Cyprus 
A. The Cases 
As already indicated, following partition of Cyprus in 1974, numerous cases have 
come before the European Commission of Human Rights and the ECtHR in 
Strasbourg.179 But this section is concerned only with those relating to the issue of 
abandoned Greek property in the north, especially the landmark judgments in 
Loizidou,180 Xenides-Arestis,181 and Demopoulos and others.182  
The applicant in Loizidou v Turkey grew up in Kyrenia in northern Cyprus 
and moved with her husband to Nicosia when she married in 1972. She claimed to be 
the owner of a number of plots in Kyrenia and that, prior to the Turkish intervention, 
work had commenced on one of these to build flats intended for use as her family 
home. Although the applicant originally also claimed violation of Articles 3, 5(1) and 
8 ECHR, arising from her temporary detention during a protest in northern Cyprus, 
the complaint at Strasbourg was pursued only in relation to the alleged violations of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1 (the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions) and Article 8 
(the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence) on the 
grounds that she had been, and continued to be, prevented by Turkish forces from 
returning to her property in Kyrenia.183  
The majority of the Court held that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR had 
been breached because of the refusal of access by the TC authorities leading to the 
complete loss by the applicant of control over her property. The Court noted that the 
interference was unwarranted and it concluded that the Turkish Government did not 
explain how the need to rehouse displaced TC displaced could justify the violation. 
However, since Mrs Loizidou had never occupied the land concerned as her ‘home’, 
it was held that there had been no violation of Article 8 ECHR. By contrast, the 
dissenting minority took the view that it was not possible to separate Mrs Loizidou’s 
circumstances from the wider dispute on the island, and that since she remained the 
owner of the property, there had been no unlawful dispossession. The dissentients 
                                                            
179 See Cyprus v Turkey Apps Nos 6780/74, 6950/75 Commission Report (10 July 1976); Cyprus v 
Turkey App No 8007/77 Commission Report (4 October 1983) 
180 Loizidou v Turkey App No 15318/89 Merits (18 December 1996) 9 
181 Xenides-Arestis v Turkey App No 46347/99 Merits (22 December 2005); Xenides-Arestis v Turkey 
App No 46347/99 Just Satisfaction (7 December 2006) 
182 Demopoulos and others v Turkey Apps Nos 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 
14163/04, 19993/04, 21819/04 Admissibility (1 March 2010) 




also concluded that, since it could not be said that Turkey was solely responsible for 
the Cyprus problem, the applicant’s loss could not be solely attributed to the 
respondent state.184 The issue of just satisfaction was reserved.  
The Loizidou judgment opened the door to many other similar claims.185 In 
Xenides-Arestis v Turkey the applicant – who owns property in Famagusta including 
a plot with a shop, a flat, and three houses, one of which was her home – claimed she 
was forced by the Turkish military authorities to leave Famagusta with her family in 
August 1974 and, since then, had been prevented from accessing, using or enjoying 
her property, which had also been fenced-off for military purposes. Amongst other 
objections to the admissibility of the application, Turkey claimed that, since the 
applicant had not applied to the Immovable Property Determination, Evaluation and 
Compensation Commission (IPDECC), established in northern Cyprus in response to 
the Loizidou case by Law No 49/2003 on 30 July 2003, she had failed ‘to exhaust 
domestic remedies’ as required by Article 35(1) ECHR. However, the ECtHR 
rejected this claim and held, for the following reasons that, because the remedy 
provided by Law No 49/2003 did not satisfy the requirements of Article 35(1) 
ECHR, it could not be regarded as “effective” or “adequate” with respect to the 
applicant’s complaints. First, the compensation on offer was limited to damages 
regarding pecuniary loss for immovable property, there was no provision for 
movable properties or for non-pecuniary damage, and restitution was not possible. 
The compensation mechanism alone could not, therefore, be considered as ‘a 
complete system of redress regulating the basic aspect of the interferences 
complained of’.186 Nor did the Law address the applicant’s complaints under Article 
8 and 14 (the prohibition of discrimination) ECHR. The Court noted that the 
legislation only referred expressly to the retrospective assessment of compensation. 
But whether it applied to applications filed before its enactment and entry into force 
was unclear. Finally, expressing concern that most of the Commissioners on the 
IPDECC were living in homes owned, or built on, GC property, the ECtHR held that 
an international component would enhance the Commission’s integrity and 
credibility. In summary, the ECtHR concluded that the Commission could be 
                                                            
184 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bernhardt joined byJudge Lopes Rocha 25-6; Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Jambrek 32-3; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Petiti 35-6; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gölcüklü 
40-2 
185 Robin C A White, ‘Tackling Political Disputes through Individual Applications’ (1998) EHRLR 
61, 71 




considered an effective remedy if there were appropriate provisions regarding the 
status of its members, claims under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR were addressed, 
compensation for non-pecuniary losses and for movable as well as immovable 
property was provided, restitution was permitted, and, in addition to the retrospective 
assessment of compensation, the process applied to complaints filed before the 
legislation entered into force. 
The Court also found that the complete denial of the applicant’s right to 
respect for her home since 1974 constituted a continuing violation of her rights under 
Article 8 ECHR.187 It was further held that “the respondent State must introduce a 
remedy which secures genuinely effective redress for the Convention violations 
identified in relation to the present applicant as well as with respect to all similar 
applications pending before it” and that “such a remedy should be available within 
three months from the date on which the present judgment is delivered and redress 
should be afforded three months thereafter”.188 In addition, the parties were invited to 
submit their written observations on the issue of pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
damages, also within three months. Pending the implementation of the relevant 
general measures by the respondent state, the Court adjourned its consideration of all 
applications deriving from the same systemic source.189    
As a result of this judgment, the TRNC enacted a new compensation law, the 
‘Law for the Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties 
which are within the Scope of Sub-paragraph (B) of Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the 
Constitution’ (Law No 67/2005, the IPC law). Entering into force on 22 December 
2005, this abolished the IPDECC, which had only received a total of three 
applications, and established the IPC instead. The legislation states that its purpose 
is: 
to regulate the necessary procedure and conditions to be complied with by 
persons in order to prove their rights regarding claims in respect to movable 
and immovable properties within the scope of this Law, as well as, the principles 
relating to restitution, exchange of properties and compensation payable in 
respect thereof, having regard to the principle of and the provisions regarding 
protection of bizonality . . . without prejudice to any property rights or the right 
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to use property under the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus legislation or to 
any right of the Turkish Cypriot People which shall be provided by the 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem.190 
 
The Court welcomed the steps taken to establish a mechanism to redress violations of 
Convention rights in respect of all similar applications pending before it and, in its 
admissibility decision of 14 March 2005 and the judgment on the merits of 22 
December 2005, noted that the new compensation and restitution mechanism, in 
principle, met Convention requirements. It also recognised that, because the parties 
did not agree about what would constitute just satisfaction, it was not possible for all 
relevant issues regarding the effectiveness of the remedy to be addressed in detail. 
Since the merits had already been decided, the Court rejected the Turkish 
government’s argument that the applicant should be required to apply to the new 
Commission in order to seek reparation for damages. It therefore proceeded to 
determine the compensation to which the applicant was entitled in respect of losses 
arising from the denial of access and loss of control, use, and enjoyment of her 
property between 22 January 1990 (the date Turkey accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Court), and the date of the application. As a result, €800,000 for 
pecuniary, and €50,000 for non-pecuniary damage were awarded.191  
By November 2009, 433 cases had been lodged with the IPC, 85 of which had 
been concluded, mostly by friendly settlement. In four cases, the IPC ordered 
restitution and compensation, in two exchange of property was agreed, and in one the 
applicant accepted restitution when the Cyprus problem was eventually resolved. 
Compensation was awarded in more than 70 cases, some 361,493 square metres of 
property were restored, and approximately €47 million Euros were paid in 
damages.192 
The case of Demopoulos and others, lodged with the ECtHR between 1999 
and 2004 before Law No 67/2005 was enacted, provided a further opportunity for the 
compliance of these new arrangements with the ECHR to be determined at 
Strasbourg. The applicants claimed that, since August 1974, they had been prevented 
from having access to, and from using and enjoying, their homes, properties and 
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possessions in northern Cyprus. Reiterating its finding in Cyprus v Turkey that 
seeking to correct wrongs imputable to a respondent state does not amount to indirect 
legitimation of a regime unlawful under international law,193 the Court held that, 
notwithstanding the limited provision for restitution, the IPC constituted an effective 
domestic remedy.194 It is said that international law and the Court’s judgments had 
been acknowledged by the authorities of the TRNC, particularly the Constitutional 
Court which interpreted the IPC law in line with the ECHR.195 According to the 
ECtHR limited provision for restitution was not fatal to the effectiveness of the 
remedy because:  
At the present point, many decades after the loss of possession by the then 
owners, property has in many cases changed hands, by gift, succession or 
otherwise; those claiming title may have never seen, or ever used the property in 
question . . . The losses thus claimed become increasingly speculative and 
hypothetical. There has, it may be recalled, always been a strong legal and 
factual link between ownership and possession . . .  and it must be recognised 
that with the passage of time the holding of a title may be emptied of any 
practical consequences.196  
While the Court held that this did not mean that the applicants had lost ownership of 
their properties, it would not be possible to oblige the respondent state to restore the 
property to its lawful owners – and it would be unrealistic to expect it to provide the 
applicants access, and to obtain full possession – irrespective of who was living there 
or whether the property was in a militarily sensitive zone or used for vital public 
purposes. If, as in such circumstances, the nature of the violation did not allow for 
restitution, compensation could, therefore, be permitted as an alternative remedy.197 
Although the applicants argued that this would enable Turkey to benefit from its 
illegal occupation of the northern part of the island, the Court stressed that property is 
a material commodity, can be valued and compensated for in monetary terms, and 
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that if damages were paid in line with the Strasbourg case law, there would in general 
be no unfairness between the parties. In addition, it held, that an exchange of 
property is another form of redress in this respect. It added that there was no 
precedent in the Strasbourg case-law supporting the claim that ‘a Contracting State 
must pursue a blanket policy of restoring property to owners without taking into 
account the current use or occupation of the property in question’, and that it should 
be ensured that redress provided for old injuries would not create disproportionate 
new wrongs. Although the applicants claimed that, under the new mechanism, only a 
small proportion of property would be restored, the ECtHR stated that this did not 
undermine the effectiveness of the IPC as a remedy. It, therefore, concluded, that 
coupled with the admissibility decision in Xenides-Arestis, it had already been 
established that the lack of any provision for restitution was a shortcoming which the 
new Law addressed.  
Affirming that awards made under Law No 67/2005 should not be 
automatically considered unreasonable, the ECtHR also rejected the applicants’ 
arguments regarding the ‘accessibility and efficiency’ of the mechanism and their 
claims that the IPC was not sufficiently independent and impartial. It concluded, 
therefore, that Law No 67/2005 ‘makes realistic provision for redress in the current 
situation of occupation that is beyond this Court’s competence to resolve’ and that 





As was the case in Loizidou, the decision in Demopoulos and others was important 
both with respect to international and human rights law. According to Loucaides, this 
was the first time that the Court examined the effectiveness of a remedy established 
under such unique circumstances.199 The Court's decision in Demopoulos was not 
surprising since it had already been signalled in Xenides-Arestis.200 Its reasoning was 
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mainly based on the fact that the political climate had improved, the green line 
partitioning the island was no longer closed, the existence of “passage of time”, and 
the Namibia principle.201 Loucaides argues that the Court was wrong both with 
respect to its reasoning and its conclusion because the decision was inconsistent with 
its previous case-law, it misapplied the Namibia exception and other principles of 
international law especially by disregarding the right of restitutio in integrum, it 
relied on wrong comparisons by giving weight to authorities of an illegal occupying 
military regime, it disregarded the policy of Turkey towards rights of GCs, it 
accepted the independence and impartiality of organs of the regime in the occupied 
area, and it  was wrong in its findings as they were inconsistent with the true facts 
and objectives of human rights because it considered the passage of time to have an 
effect on holding title to property.202 The Namibia exception was an issue raised by 
the parties in both Loizidou and Demopoulos. The “Namibia principle”, in brief, 
provides that even if the legitimacy of the administration of a territory is not 
recognised by the international community, “international law recognises the 
legitimacy of certain legal arrangements and transactions in such a situation, [...] the 
effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the inhabitants of the 
[t]erritory”.203 In Loizidou, the Court did not find it necessary to elaborate on the 
lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts of the TRNC, but concluded that the 
applicant could not be deemed to have lost title to her property as a result of Article 
159 of the 1985 Constitution of the TRNC. However, in Demopoulos, when the same 
principle came into play once again, the Court, this time, stated that "the mere fact 
that there was an illegal occupation does not deprive all administrative or putative 
legal or judicial acts therein of any relevance under the Convention". It concluded 
that it would not be consistent to deny or regard the administrative, civil or criminal 
law measures of TRNC as having no lawful basis. The Court added that it is 
important to guarantee that "individuals continue to receive protection of their rights 
on the ground on a daily basis". In fact, one can ask whether the Court changed its 
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stance only because of these legal points. It may well have been influenced by the 
backlog of property cases pending before it.204 This is evident from the statement: 
"[.....] individuals claiming to own property in the north may, in theory, come to the 
Court periodically and indefinitely to claim loss of rents until a political solution to 
the Cyprus problem is reached."205 Loucaides criticised the Court stating that its 
decision amounted to “a serious setback" to its mission under the Convention.206 In 
this respect, it can be said that, in Loizidou, the Court's approach was "individual 
justice" centred, whereas in Demopoulos it was "European public order" centred as a 
result of the long-standing workload of the Court not only with respect to 1,400 
Greek Cypriot cases, but also the crisis faced by the Court in general.207  
 But did the Court build on or back-track from its previous case law?208 It had 
not reversed its previous case law since it also approved the illegal expropriation of 
GC properties under Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution.209 It stated that the GCs 
did not have to resort to the IPC and that they could await a political solution. In 
other words, it was of the opinion that GCs could not be forced to resort to the 
remedy established, but considered it a mechanism for those who wished to apply for 
remedies. On the other hand, controversially, the Court in Loizidou did not accept 
Turkey's argument regarding the "doctrine of necessity" as a justification for the acts 
of the TRNC: It stated that Turkey could not explain how the need to rehouse 
displaced TC refugees in the years following 1974 could justify disregarding the 
applicant’s property rights in the form of a total and continuous denial of access and 
a purported expropriation without compensation.210 However, in Demopoulos, this 
argument, in fact, was accepted by the Court implicitly. On the other hand, reading 
the Court's reasoning carefully, it can be said that it did not accept that the applicants' 
rights were completely disregarded. But again, one can ask, since the border dividing 
the island was closed at the time of Loizidou, how could the situation have been 
different?  
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According to Proukaki, Demopoulos deviates from the established ECtHR 
jurisprudence and arbitrarily undermines the significance of restitution in the context 
of Cyprus. She notes that the political nature of the Cyprus problem is undisputed. 
However, she adds that it is also undisputed that it remains firstly a problem that is 
subject to international human rights and humanitarian law. Accordingly, she is of 
the opinion that “the realpolitik, to which the ECtHR refers, provides an excuse to be 
exempted from principles of international law”, in particular to the rules on state 
responsibility dictating cessation of the wrongdoing, i.e. restitution, and, when this is 
not possible, compensation for any loss incurred. She further asserts that the political 
nature of the situation in Cyprus cannot bring it outside the realm of law, adding that 
international human rights law protects the individual from arbitrary state action in 
all circumstances. She accepts that the passage of time cannot be a legitimate reason 
for exempting a state from legal scrutiny so as to allow for legitimization of its 
arbitrary or discriminatory refusal to allow the entry of the individual to his or her 
“own country”. Noting that a state cannot benefit from its wrongdoing, she states that 
the Court should have ensured cessation of the violation and safeguarded the rights of 
the dispossessed against state abuse. Thus according to her, the Court should have 
held that the duty to exhaust domestic remedies through the IPC was inoperable as a 
result of the continuing serious violations committed by Turkey and that the “real 
access to justice” issue was to rectify a violation. However, both victims’ interests 
and the the society as a whole should be balanced and these interests should not be 
exchanged for the sake of the other by the general and abstract idea of “rectifying 
violations”. Otherwise, as the Strasbourg Court stated, the redress applied to those 
old injuries could create disproportionate new wrongs.  
As indicated in Chapter 2, there is real and continuing resentment between the 
two communities in Cyprus regarding the past. For its part, the resentment of GCs 
may be characterized as centring on the TC enjoyment of GC property, and TC 
resentment may be characterized as centring on the complaint that GCs silenced them 
before 1974, especially in the 1960s. However, considering TCs’ concerns about 
losing demographic majority in their own constituent state, supporting an absolute 
right to return home could undermine the possibility of lack of a solution at large as 




Annan Plan Referendum.211 Proukaki’s assessment that the Cyprus problem remains, 
in the first place, a problem subject to international human rights and humanitarian 
law, would however undermine its political nature. In any case, even if the violations 
of human rights are rectified as Proukaki suggests, the reasons underlying the conflict 
would remain and would cause further political consequences undermining the 
possibility of reconciliation. Contrary to what Proukaki claims, where, as in the case 
in Cyprus, transitional justice is required, remedies must be holistic and a variety of 
remedies should be used. Tzevelekos notes that, by allowing the payment of 
compensation instead of restitution, the Court, in fact, proceeded to assess the 
legitimacy and the necessity of the reasons allegedly justifying the deprivation of 
property.212 However, it also clearly stated that “allowing the respondent State to 
correct wrongs imputable to it does not amount to an indirect legitimisation of a 
regime unlawful under international law.”213 In other words, the Court did not assess 
the reasons justifying the deprivation of property, but attributed responsibility to 
Turkey instead. Tzevelekos further states that nothing justifies shifting from 
restitution to compensation in the case of forced displacement arising from unlawful 
use of force leading to occupation where such a displacement would prevent the 
Court from continuing with its habitual test of proportionality.214 In this respect, 
referring to Saghinadze and others v Georgia,215 he asserts that restitution is the 
optimal form of reparation in case of unlawful dispossession.216 However, the 
circumstances of Saghinadze and others are far from similar to those of Demopoulos 
and others. The key point in the former was the responsibility of the state not to leave 
the IPDs without accommodation. Furthermore, even under those circumstances, it 
can be seen from the Court’s judgment that restitution of property is not absolute and 
that the respondent State could also satisfy the applicant by providing with other 
accommodation or by paying reasonable compensation.217 Furthermore, the property 
in question in Saghinadze belonged to the State, whereas in Demopolous, as 
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mentioned previously, the Court referred particularly to the fact that some thirty five 
years had passed since the applicants lost possessions and that other people had 
established claims over those properties. In other words, the Court, in fact, attempted 
to balance the past and the future by giving priority to "stability” as it did in other 
transitional cases examined above. A point of agreement with Tzevelekos is that as 
the extract quoted above indicates, the Court aimed at protecting its own interests as 
a result of its workload.218 
Gross, also criticises the decision in Demopoulos and others. He argues that 
leaving the context of occupation aside, the Court ignored international humanitarian 
law, namely Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, in its entirety. Despite 
having referred to the north Cyprus territory as occupied, Gross states that it left 
Greek Cypriots, settled in the properties whose rights were violated, without 
protection against the occupying power under the law of occupation.219  
In the final analysis, the Court's approach cannot easily be separated from the 
political aspects of the issue. But nor can it be said that the result is particularly 
problematic since the Court nevertheless accepted a remedy provided for those who 
want to pursue their rights prior to a solution of the Cyprus problem. Supporting an 
absolute right to return home might create a burden which could result in a 
worsening of the situation and/or relationship between the two communities. In this 
respect, understanding the attitudes of the displaced could play a key role for 
reconciliation.220 As Psaltis, Cakal, Loizides and Bonnenfant argue, inclusion of 
displaced persons in the process could positively influence the outcome of a future 





In this Chapter, I attempted to examine the right to return in international law, 
property restitution and the implementation of restitution schemes in several 
countries. Although it is accepted that there is a general "right to return" in 
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international human rights law, the existence of a “right to return home” has been 
controversial. Nevertheless, the right to return home could be inferred from 
international humanitarian law, human rights law, peace treaties or voluntary 
repatriation agreements as proof of state practice and resolutions and 
recommendations of the Security Council. However, whether there is a specific 
“right to housing restitution” is even more controversial. Although such a right 
logically follows from the right to return to one’s home, a specific recognition of 
such a right is still rare. In the final analysis, the Pinheiro Principles, as an important 
text of soft law in this field, show that there is a trend towards a right to housing 
restitution, but further development is needed. In addition, it can be concluded that 
property restitution, as one of the remedies for human rights violations, could be the 
preferred remedy and its implementation and position within the hierarchy of modes 
of reparation should be considered according to the factors causing the violations and 
other rights relevant to it as alrealy has been the case in several countries examined in 
this Chapter.  
These implications also reveal the question of whether human rights legal 
frameworks relied upon by many in the TJ field have a negative impact in how they 
shape the property rights problems, and whether they provide appropriate redress 
across a variety of historical trajectories. It is stated in this Chapter that restitution 
becomes increasingly symbolic as time passes and it is more likely under such 
circumstances that reparatory justice will take the form of compensation. While it is 
clear that irrespective of the passage of time responding to injustice is crucial, 
restitution of property has its own momentum. This is also the case in the Cyprus 
property dispute. Since the displacement routes in Cyprus span a period of more than 
50 years, it should also be noted that peoples’ experience of it will change over time. 
The pressing humanitarian concerns, dire conditions, severe abuses, and hardship as 
a result of flight may no longer exist in some cases as in Cyprus. Furthermore, 
considering the existence of negative peace, transformation of relationships of the 
communities is of utmost importance to achieve positive peace. Thus, 
implementation of absolute property restitution schemes might prove both difficult 
and other reparatory measures such as apologies, acknowledgment and particularly 
just compensation might be required instead. In the final analysis, in addition to 
economic and political justifications, limiting the scheme of restitution can also be 




forward-looking purposes of transformation. However, more research would be 
useful to further assess whether restitution could play a key role in the reconciliation 
of the two communities or trigger new tensions, and to probe the attitudes of both 
communities towards return. Following an examination of recent surveys, it is 
observed that inclusive processes could play a positive role in overcoming land 
dipsutes. 
 The position of the ECtHR in transitional property cases in post-communist 
countries, has been to take “the potential for outright conflict between human rights 
norms and the motivations behind restitution” into consideration. Furthermore, in 
Demopoulos and others v Turkey, it has not been blind to concrete factual 
circumstances. As a result, the limited restitution scheme envisaged by the IPC Law 
No 67/2005 was accepted by the ECtHR. This has the potential to contribute more to 
the stabilization of the principle of bi-zonality in Cyprus. But the future can only be 
evaluated, if at all, following an examination of the IPC's work and its effectiveness. 
In other words, whether its contribution might result in worsening the relationship 
between the two communities will be considered further following an examination in 






















Chapter 5 The Immovable Property Commission (IPC)1 
I. Introduction 
As indicated in previous Chapters, the two principal elements in the background to 
the establishment of the IPC concern the Cyprus problem and the contribution made 
by the ECtHR to the challenge presented by GC property abandoned in the north.  
 It was also noted previously that the Parliament of the TRNC enacted “Law 
No 49/2003 on Compensation for Immovable Properties Located within the 
Boundaries of the TRNC” on 30 June 2003. The Immovable Property, 
Determination, Evaluation and Compensation Commission (IPDECC) was 
established under Article 11 of this Law. However, only a total of three applications 
were lodged with this Commission until it was replaced by the IPC established by 
Law No 67/2005.2 The submission of such a small number of applications was said 
to have been caused by the opposition of the GC leadership and public opinion in the 
south where the Commission was regarded as an authority of the "puppet" TRNC 
state.  It was observed that the first group of applicants to the Commission were also 
followed, harassed, and accused by the media and by several politicians of 
committing treason against the "national cause".3 The Government in the south also 
feared that resorting to the Commission as a remedy would have a negative impact 
on future applications to the ECtHR challenging the validity of the Commission.4 
As addressed in Chapter 4, the ECtHR's analysis of Law No 67/2005, which 
entered into force on 22 December 2005, confirmed that it had been enacted in line 
with the Court’s previous findings. Having further examined the said law in 
Demopoulos and others, the Court found that the applicants’ case was inadmissible, 
because the matter of remedies was now settled. It concluded that Law No 67/2005 
“makes realistic provision for redress in the current situation of occupation that is 
beyond this Court’s competence to resolve” and that applicants are not obliged to 
apply to the IPC as they may, alternatively, “await a political solution”.5 
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Situated on the Turkish side of the Green Line, a ten-minute walk from one of 
the three check-points along the Nicosia buffer zone, the IPC can easily be accessed 
by applicants. Its law, regulations, procedures and statistics are available in both 
Turkish and English on its website. After its establishment, the IPC received a 
growing number of applications particularly until 2013. However, since 2014 there 
has been a sharp decrease in numbers. There might be several reasons for the decline 
and, although it is not possible to accurately assess these, interviews carried out with 
lawyers/representatives of applicants shed some light on the matter. Leaving aside 
issues in the wider environment for which the IPC cannot be held responsible, it has, 
nevertheless, suffered from several problems including: excessive length and alleged 
unfairness of proceedings, the transparency of its decisions, corporate ownership, 
complications raised by encumbrances over properties on or before 20 July 1974, 
exchange, and the execution of decisions awarding compensation. 
In order to consider the matter further, the establishment of the IPC will be 
considered first below, before a review of the arrangements for its structure and 




II. Establishment  
Law No 67/2005 was adopted by the TRNC House of Representatives with very 
strong protests from the major opposition Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP, National Unity 
Party) and was challenged at the TRNC Constitutional Court.6 It was claimed that 
Article 159 of the Constitution only allowed monetary compensation for GC 
properties, but not restitution or exchange, and that allowing compensation for non-
pecuniary damages would be tantamount to accepting sole responsibility for the 
political situation in Cyprus. Furthermore, it was stated that establishing the IPC as 
an exceptional court and/or a commission with judicial powers also violated the 
Constitution. The appointment of the president, vice president and the members of 
the Commission by the Supreme Council of Judicature was also said to be against the 
Constitution because the duties of the Supreme Council of Judicature of the TRNC 
were limited under Article 141. In addition, the appointment of two foreign members 
                                                            





to the Commission was regarded as a violation of the principle of "sovereignty". The 
TRNC Constitutional Court rejected these claims. Taking the purpose of Law No 
67/2005 into account, it stated that the IPC is an "Administrative Tribunal" and it was 
thus possible that it was established as an administrative institution under the 
Constitution. The Court highlighted the fact that there was room within the 
Constitution for the TRNC National Assembly to assign other duties to the Supreme 
Council of Judicature. Furthermore, and most importantly, addressing the 
international conventions and treaties concerning human rights and the elimination of 
discrimination, texts and agreements under international law on property in occupied 
areas, and decisions and judgments of the Strasbourg Court, the TRNC Constitutional 
Court held that the Constitution should be interpreted in line with these principles. As 
a result, it concluded that Law No 67/2005 was not contrary to the Constitution.7 As 
Çolak states, this was a ground-breaking decision for property rights in north Cyprus 
and for human rights law in general since the Constitutional Court confirmed the 
direct applicability of the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR in the domestic legal 
system.8 Addressing the claims of UBP at the Constitutional Court, Oğuzhan 
Hasipoğlu, a representative of UBP, stated that the party’s arguments in that case 
should be analysed from a constitutional law perspective.9 He further noted that the 
party did not agree to a mechanism which would cause displacement of TCs, the 
current users of properties. Pointing out that they had concerns for the possible 
negative effects which could have arisen as a result of the operation of the IPC, he 
asserted that the party endorsed the contribution of the IPC. However, whether this is 
an acknowledgment of the wrongs faced by the displaced GCs is not clear. 
The IPC officially began its activities on 17 March 2006 following the 
appointment of its president, vice-president and members. According to its founding 
Statute, members, who are required to be lawyers or persons with experience in 
public administration and evaluation of property, shall be appointed by the Supreme 
Council of Judicature, from candidates nominated by the President of the TRNC for a 
period of five years, subject to re-appointment. In order to safeguard the objectivity 
of the Commission persons directly or indirectly deriving any benefit from GC 
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properties cannot be appointed.10 The Law states that no person or authority can 
order or instruct members11 and that they enjoy the same assurances with respect to 
termination of their term of office as a judge of the Supreme Court of the TRNC.12 At 
least two members must be nationals of States other than the TRNC, UK, Greece, 
Greek Cypriot Administration (the RoC) or Turkey.13 The IPC Law also establishes a 
secretariat with staff hired on a contractual basis as authorised by the Council of 
Ministers of the TRNC upon a proposal of its President.14 Although not confirmed by 
other sources, according to an interview with Ayfer Erkmen (President), Romans 
Mapolar (Vice-President) and Güngör Günkan (Member) in June 2017, 
approximately 50-60 civil servants, including prosecutors and those relevant land 
registry officers, are connected with the work of the IPC.15 
 
 
III.  Process 
As of 31 Januray 2019, 6,513 applications had been lodged with the IPC, 941 of 
which were settled by friendly settlement at the preliminary hearing stage and 32 by 
adjudication on the merits at the hearing stage. 951 of these were settled by the award 
of compensation. In addition, exchange and compensation was awarded in two cases, 
restitution in three cases, restitution and compensation in six cases, restitution after 
the settlement of Cyprus problem in one case, and partial restitution in another case. 
186 applications were also withdrawn, either because the applicants no longer wished 
to pursue them, because ownership was not proven, or because of other legal 
difficulties such as lack of documents requested by the defendant. The rate of 
applications to the IPC has also fluctuated with, in 2011, a sharp increase to 1,926, a 
decrease to 375 in 2014, 182 in 2015, 50 in 2016, 81 in 2017 and 117 in 2018.16 
According to the IPC President Erkmen, declining application rates may be 
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influenced by delays in the award of compensation.17 The IPC’s website states that a 
total of £300,090,876 has been awarded by January 2019.18 In an interview of June 
2017, Ayfer Erkmen (President), Romans Mapolar (Vice-President), and Güngör 
Günkan (Member) revealed for the first time that approximately £55 million of the 
total amount of compensation awarded had still not been paid, a figure which by 31 
May 2018 had increased to £86,689,608.19 According to President Erkmen roughly 
£2 billion will be needed to finalise the 5,000 or so applications awaiting resolution.20 
In the 2018 budget, the amount of compensation included is approximately £12.5 
million which was insufficient. 
 Article 159(1) (b) of the Constitution of the TRNC determines the scope of 
Law No 67/2005 and reads as follows: 
(b) All immovable properties, buildings and installations which were found 
abandoned on 13 February 1975 when the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus 
was proclaimed or which were considered by law as abandoned or ownerless 
after the above-mentioned date, or which should have been in the possession or 
control of the public even though their ownership had not yet been determined 
[…] 
[...]  
[...]shall be the property of the TRNC notwithstanding the fact that they are not 
so registered in the books of the Land Registry Office; and the Land Registry 
Office shall be amended accordingly.21 
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The Law provides, subject to the payment of a fee of 100 Turkish Lira for each 
application,22 that all natural and legal persons claiming rights over immovable or 
movable properties within its scope may bring claims against the Ministry of 
Interior.23 The legal deadline, which can be extended, is currently 21 December 
2019.24 The applicants may request restitution, exchange or compensation. 
Applications submitted to the Commission shall also be subject to the Rules made 
under the Civil Procedure Law25 and the Rules made under Law No 67/2005.26  
According to Article 6 of the Law, the applicants must prove "beyond 
reasonable doubt" that: 
(a) The movable or immovable property in question is the one claimed in the 
application.  
(b) The property was registered in their names before 20 July 1974 and/or they are 
the legal heir of the 1974 owner.  
(c) No other persons, apart from the applicant(s) claim rights in respect of the 
property in question,  
(d) If what is claimed is compensation, it represent 20 July 1974 value of the 
property plus compensation for loss of use.27 Where the compensation claimed is for 
non-pecuniary damages, it must be proved that the immovable property was used as a 
home prior to 20 July 197428 and if the subject of the application is movable 
properties, the compensation claimed is the market value at the date of the 
application.  
(e) Whether the immovable property is subject to mortgage and/or any other 
restrictions imposed by a judgment or order of a competent court before 20 July 
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1974, if it is whom the mortgage was in favour of, the amount of debt and the 
interest, if the debt was paid and the amount of payment.29   
(f) The movable property belonged to the applicant prior to 13 February 1975 and 
that it was abandoned without consent. 
 During interviews carried out with applicants’ lawyers/representatives, it was 
claimed that the wording of the Law enabling 1974 owners or their legal heirs to 
have locus standi before the IPC has caused problems. Applying the concept of 
“legal heirs” in the wider sense, the Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General’s 
Office did not initially raise any objections at the friendly settlement meetings before 
the IPC against potential legal heirs. However, for the past four years or so they have 
been doing so by resorting to the Law on Succession (Cap. 195) and claiming that if 
there are first degree relatives as envisaged in the said Law, the second-degree 
relatives of 1974 owners cannot have locus standi before the IPC. However, even in 
such cases, they accept locus standi for applicants whose grandparents were 1974 
owners even if their children were alive when the property concerned was gifted to 
the applicant by his/her grandparent (1974 owner). In other words, the defendant’s 
claim is that the legislation in force in the TRNC (Cap. 195) does not allow for the 
status of “heirship” of second degree relatives if there are first-degree relatives also 
ranked. Even in this regard, different litigators have different views. Some only look 
for proof that the original owner in 1974 had no legal heirs other than the applicant, 
while others ask for the estate documents of the deceased 1974 owner. Lawyer Y 
claimed that the Attorney General’s Office asserted that it would take a joint position 
in this regard, but that this has not been the case so far.30 No indication has been 
found from the minutes of the relevant legislative process of whether the intent was 
to restrict the class of property owners eligible to apply the IPC. In the Annan Plan 
V, the description of the “dispossessed owner” was “a natural or legal person who, at 
the time of dispossession, held a legal interest in the affected property as owner or 
part owner, his/her legal heir, personal representative or successor in title, including 
by gift”.31 However, Law No 67/2005 did not define the applicant as such. Whether 
excluding some applicants as eligible persons for application before the IPC can be 
considered as “control of the use of property” not acceptable within the meaning of 
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Article 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR is debatable and needs careful evaluation in order 
to avoid further problems for applicants. Clearly, accepting the applicants’ 
ownership, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 in Joannou v 
Turkey, where some of the properties were gifted to her by the applicant’s aunt, the 
1974 owner. In its judgment the Court stated that it was clear that the aunt had done 
so in 1997 while she was still alive.32 There was no arguments regarding the issue of 
“succession”. The IPC accepted the applicant’s heirship with its decision in March 
2019. Both parties appealed.33 
According to the Rules made under section 8(2) (a) and section 22 of the IPC 
Law34, an application shall be made upon the sample form attached.35 An applicant 
may apply to the Commission in person, by a representative or through a lawyer.36 
Every application is given a number and includes the name and surname of 
applicants, their identity cards/passport numbers, the request for confidentiality if 
any, the respondent party (the Ministry of Interior and/or Attorney General 
representing the Ministry), the name, surname and address of the lawyer if any, an 
address and contact number of the applicant if the application is made in person, a 
statement of claim, a description of the movable and/or immovable property subject 
to the claim, the share of the property in question, and whether it is subject to any 
mortgage or other encumbrance.37 Applicants are required to attach the originals or 
duly approved copies of title deeds and of their identity cards or passports. Apart 
from Güzelyurt (Morphou), and some parts of Nicosia district, the records are not 
available in the south. GCs whose title deeds from 1974 are missing can obtain these 
for their abandoned properties by way of a declaration made before the relevant land 
registries in the south by providing a “mukhtar certificate” from the mukhtar 
(principal representative) of the relevant neighbourhood having knowledge of the 
ownership of the property in question. Claims over the same properties by others are 
considered as encumbrances and, before they can proceed in such cases, applicants 
                                                            
32 Para 99 of the Judgment 
33 The details of the IPC decision is not public. It is not possible to address the grounds of the parties 
for appeal until it is finalised by the High Court. 
34 “Rules Made Under Sections 8(2)(a) and 22 of the Law for the Compensation, Exchange and 
Restitution of Immovable Properties Which are Within the Scope of Sub-paragraph (b) of Paragraph 1 
of Article 159 of the Consititution (Law No 67/2005)” available in English 
<http://tamk.gov.ct.tr/dokuman/Tuzuk-ING.pdf> accessed 3 December 2017 
35 Rule 3(1) 
36 Rule 3(2) 





are required to discharge these together with any mortgages, court orders or other 
charges registered on the properties on or before 1974.38  
For movable properties, applicants must either submit the originals, or duly 
approved copies of documents such as receipt, cheque, bank transfer, exchange 
transfers proving ownership before 13 February 1975, or that the property was 
hitherto acquired by way of inheritance or gift.39 Considering the manner and 
circumstances in which property in the north was abandoned, and the long passage of 
time since, this presents considerable challenges. 
 Within 21 working days from the date of filing, a copy of the application is 
served on the Ministry and/or the Attorney General representing it.40 In practice, the 
Ministry is always represented by the Attorney General's Office and the affidavit 
attached to the opinion/defence is signed by the Head of the Land Registry because 
the ownership in 1974 and the value of the properties subject to the applications are 
determined by the relevant land registry offices.41 Within 30 working days from the 
notice of the application, the Ministry and/or the Attorney General is then required to 
file a defence/opinion attached to the form in accordance with the Rules. For the 
purposes of preliminary hearing for a friendly settlement this consists of a summary 
of the facts and an evaluation of the value of the relevant property in 1974 including 
an attached affidavit of persons having knowledge of the matter,42 and also a 
statement of the current value of the property.43 The offer made at the preliminary 
hearing can either be of the same value as that stated in the defence/opinion, or 
higher as updated by the Ministry. At this stage, the IPC does not intervene in the 
assessment of the compensation offered.  
 The IPC has duties and powers to examine applications, determine the 
amount and method of payment of compensation, collect written or oral testimony, 
hear witnesses, summon any person residing in the TRNC to give testimony or to 
produce any document, compel any persons to give evidence or to produce a 
                                                            
38 TV program interview with Güngör Günkan (the President of the IPC at that time), 'Açık Kamera' 
['Open Camera'] (16 December 2014) (Not available online) 
39 Rule 3(5)(a) and (b) 
40 Rule 3(6) 
41 It should be added that the relevant Land Registry Offices prepare a research report for relevant 
properties and the defendant (Attorney General’s Office representing the Ministry of Interior) prepares 
opinions/defences in line with the said reports. These are then submitted to the IPC and served to the 
applicants at the direction stage of the proceedings (Direction stage is before the preliminary 
hearing/friendly settlement meeting) 
42 Rule 3(8); this is Form No 2 attached to the Rules  





document in their possession and award expenses to any persons summoned.44 It is 
an offence in the TRNC to refuse to produce any documents or information required 
by the Commission, or to fail to appear, or decline to give evidence without legal 
excuse. A monetary fine can be imposed upon conviction.45 
 Like court judgments, IPC decisions have binding effect, are executory and 
are required to be implemented without delay upon being served on the authorities 
concerned.46 Article 18 of the Law also states that the Ministry of Financial Affairs 
shall provide a separate item under the annual budget for the payment of 
compensation awarded by the Commission and other expenses incurred by 
application of the IPC Law. As a result of its administrative status the Commission 
does not, in other words, have an independent budget, and is subject to that of the 
Ministry of Interior, the defendant in the proceedings, which raises concerns about its 
de facto independence and credibility.  
In some cases the issues cannot be solved at the preliminary hearing. If the 
applicant does not accept the compensation offered at this stage, or if the parties 
cannot reach an agreement as a result of other legal issues, they might request a 
hearing date and also apply to the High Administrative Court against the IPC’s 
decision.47 Article 9 also states that the applicant may apply to the ECtHR if he/she is 
not satisfied with the judgment of the High Administrative Court.  
  According to Law No 67/2005, the amount of compensation awarded by the 
Commission entails both the value of the property and loss of use (if claimed by the 
applicant). Since the IPC cannot award compensation for loss of use only, Article 10 
provides:     
10.(1) Applicants who receive compensation in return for their rights over 
immovable properties in virtue of the application of the provisions this Law can, 
under no condition, make a claim of right of ownership over immovable 
property for which they have received compensation. 
(2) Applicants who receive new immovable property by way of exchange in 
virtue of the application of the provisions of this Law can, under no condition, 
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make a claim to a right of ownership over the immovable property on which 
their application was based. 
 Therefore, when a decision for "compensation" or "exchange" is executed, the 
applicants can no longer claim ownership over their properties. Article 6 of the Rules 
of the Commission states that the IPC's decisions regarding restitution, exchange and 
compensation, in lieu of the property/loss of use and compensation for non-pecuniary 
damages shall be executed by the Ministry of Interior. In this respect, the Ministry is 
required to prepare a friendly settlement agreement48 in accordance with the form 
attached to the Rules49 and to invite the applicant in order to sign it. Although Rule 
6(2) states that the applicants‘representatives can also sign the agreement, the Land 
Registry and the Ministry of Interior do not accept their signatures asking for the 
applicants’ presence. This has no legal basis. Thus, in practice, the applicants should 
be present in person. Once the applicant signs the agreement, compensation awarded 
by the IPC is transferred simultenaously to his/her bank account.50 Up to this point, 
the applicant retains the right to reject the offer and to appeal against the IPC’s 
decision to the High Administrative Court.51 Final friendly settlement agreement 
state that:  
I declare and accept that with the execution of the decision of the Immovable 
Property Commission dated _____ and numbered_________ served to me 
regarding the compensation and/or exchange and/or restitution, the damage I 
have suffered with respect to the relevant movable and/or immovable property is 
fully recovered.  
I declare and accept that I shall not claim any right regarding the movable 
and/or immovable property set forth in my application upon the receipt of 
                                                            
48 The term "friendly settlement" is used at two stages. The first refers to a preliminary hearing; a 
meeting before the IPC where the officials of the Ministry of Interior, the Attorney General's Office as 
their representative, the applicants and their lawyers/representatives participate. The Ministry makes 
an offer of compensation at this meeting. The parties sign minutes of the meeting of friendly 
settlement containing details of the subject matter properties and the offer made. The IPC then 
formally awards the sum agreed. The second stage at which the term friendly settlement is used is the 
execution of the IPC decision.   
49 Form No 3 
50 TV program interview with Güngör Günkan 'Açık Kamera' ['Open Camera'] (n 35) 





compensation in lieu of the said properties pursuant to the application of the 
Law (a).52 
Thus, when the compensation has been received, the applicant relinquishes all their 
rights over the property and transfers title to the TRNC. This is carried out at the 
premises of the IPC, in the presence of an official from the Land Registry and the 
Ministry of Interior. It should be added that applicants also need to bring an updated 
search document from the Land Registry in the south showing that there are no 
encumbrances on the property concerned.53  
In 2008, Law No 13/2008 was enacted by the TRNC General Assembly for 
properties within the scope of Article 159(1) (b) of the TRNC Constitution,54 which 
are not owned by any natural or legal person other than the TRNC under the TRNC 
legislation in force but are currently in possession of a natural or legal person by way 
of a contract (signed with the State) for a period of more than three years.55 Briefly, 
the law provides for natural or legal persons in possession of such property, to apply 
to the IPC seeking leave to purchase it from the GC who owned it on 20 July 1974, 
from the legal heir of such person, or from a person documenting that he has lawfully 
taken over the property from its 1974 owner or from legal heir of such person.56 The 
crucial point regarding the applications made before the IPC under this Law is that 
the property owner concerned is TRNC according to TRNC legislation. However, it 
should be noted that Article 6(3) of the Law provides for other possibilities and states 
that the IPC might grant leave for the purchase of subject matter property where the 
applicant (buyer) is a shareholder in the property concerned, the applicant had 
invested in a property which is closely related with the property concerned, or if the 
property is adjacent to that of the applicant. There has only been one application 
                                                            
52 In cases of exchange of properties, the statement is as follows: 'I declare and accept that I shall not 
claim any right regarding the immovable property set forth in my application upon the acquisition of a 
new immovable property in exchange and/or receipt of compensation in lieu of the said properties 
pursuant to the application of the Law (b).' 
53 TV program interview with Güngör Günkan 'Açık Kamera' ['Open Camera'] (n 35) 
54 This was also the case for Law No 67/2005 as previously stated. 
55 ‘Law for Transfer and Registration of Rights over the Immovable Properties which are within the 
Scope of Sub-paragraph (b) of Paragraph (1) of Article 159 of the Constitution, and which, are not 
owned by any natural and legal persons, apart from the State, under the TRNC laws, being currently in 
Possession of such natural and legal persons’, Law No 13/2008. The law contains more detailed 
provisions, but these are not examined here since the main purpose is to address the essence of the 
Law.  





under this Article so far.57 Following the examination of other conditions set forth in 
the Law, the IPC grants leave, authorizing the applicant (the buyer) to sign a sales 
contract with the vendor (the GC owner). The buyer then applies to the Ministry of 
Interior for the approval of the transfer of the ownership of the subject matter 
property to his name at the relevant Land Registry Office. Through this law, natural 
or legal persons who are in possession of such properties pay for the purchase price 
without imposing any material burden on the state. Five applications had been 
finalised under this law by January 2019.58  
 
 
IV. Remedies  
As already indicated, the three remedies provided under the IPC Law are 
compensation, restitution and exchange. Loss of use and/or non-pecuniary damages 
with respect to immovable properties may also be included, but not independently.59 
These are considered in turn below. 
 
A. Compensation 
Interviewed lawyers/representatives state that most of their clients claim 
compensation mainly for economic reasons.60 It was also noted that this is a 
consequence of the limited conditions for restitution set forth by the IPC Law and of 
difficulties regarding exchange of properties as will be addressed below in the 
relevant sub-sections.61 Lawyer Murat Hakkı further indicates that applicants who 
were born after 1974, having no sentimental attachments/emotional links with the 
north, generally prefer compensation. In addition, applicants have become more 
realistic through time. As 43 years have elapsed since they lost their properties, they 
mostly prefer to claim compensation.62 In this respect, 68 year-old applicant 1 
notes:63  
                                                            
57 Interview with the President Ayfer Erkmen and the Vice-President Romans Mapolar (n 28) 
58 See <http://tamk.gov.ct.tr/dokuman2/istatistik_ocak19.pdf> accessed 2 February 2019 
59 Article 8 of Law No 67/2005 
60 Interview with Minhan Sağıroğlu, Lawyer (Nicosia, 29 November 2017); Interview with X, 
Representative (Nicosia, 4 December 2017); Interview with Murat Hakkı, Lawyer (Nicosia, 16 
November 2017) 
61 Interview with Y, Lawyer (Nicosia, 1 March 2018); Interview with Murat Hakkı, Lawyer (Nicosia, 
16 November 2017 
62 Interview with Murat Hakkı, Lawyer (Nicosia, 16 November 2017) 





I know that I am not going to take my house back, so I decided to apply to the 
IPC to sell them because of economic problems. In the beginning I never 
thought to apply. There were no emotional issues either, because I have a good 
job, good salary so I did not have the need to sell my properties in the north. 
However, later on, because of personal reasons, I had to get a loan, my house is 
under mortgage, so I had to apply. And we have to take the money through my 
application to the IPC as soon as poosible to save my life. [….] Every month I 
have a letter from the bank about my loan.  
Having many TC friends in the north, he states he neither felt stressed nor was afraid 
to apply to the IPC. According to him, the fact that his property remains on territories 
under the control of Turkish administration does not have an impact on his decision 
to claim compensation. Having asked whether he would accept, as part of a 
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, a property scheme which involved 
compensation for his property but not its return, he states that he would not mind:  
I want to live in the north, if I could, I want to come and live here because they 
don't do anything bad to you if you don't do anything bad to them. If I didn't 
have economic reasons I would want to return and if your government give me 
my house, I would come even today. 
Pavlos Loziou, a 57 year-old applicant, also indicates that he submitted his case to 
the IPC in 2011 mainly for economic reasons and claimed compensation.64 
Participants further expressed their disappointment in the governments’ 
approach in the south which is also connected with their motive in resorting to the 
IPC and claiming compensation. One of them states: 
I don't mind what the authorities in the south think, they have their reasons, they 
take advantage of the fact that there is no solution. All political parties try to 
discourage people to come here [IPC]. But no stress for me, no fear. 
It is only before elections that politicans make commitments to us, but later they 
do not pay atttention to us, and furthermore they blame and criticise us for 
applying to the IPC to sell our properties almost for free. But in the first place, 
they do not protect us at all. People having economic problems can understand 
                                                            





us, others calling us traitors for applying to the Commission. This is why I 
rarely mention to other people that I have applications at the IPC.65 
Applicant 3, 67 years old at the time of this interview, and owner of the subject 
matter property in 1974, stated that his property is close to the seaside and consisted 
of a big house, shop, fields and plots of about 7,000 square meters.66 He asserts: 
I applied to the IPC in December 2011 because of financial resons as I had to 
have an open heart operation. Last December [2017] I was invited for a meeting 
but because of bureaucratic and legal difficulties my application was postponed. 
They asked me to submit more documents.  
He notes that he feels entirely abandoned by the government of the Republic of 
Cyprus. This is also the case for 72 year-old applicant 2.67 Applicant 3 also indicates 
that well known people, even the Priest, calls them traitors for applying to the IPC 
and “selling their property to Turkey”. He genuinely adds, “TCs are very friendly and 
I remember this since my childhood.” However, for Applicant 3, it matters whether 
he feels secure or not. In this respect, he states that he can only return to his property 
if he feels secure, and the fact that his property “is under control of Turkey had an 
impact” on his claim before the IPC.  He notes: 
 The political situation remains unsettled for 44 years and I cannot use or invest 
in my property. But, I cannot return if I do not feel secure. 
Mr Loizou and his family have highly valuable properties in the north and he also 
blames politicians for the current situation. He further records: 
I wanted a solution in 2004. In the Annan Plan it was mentioned that older 
people will be able to live there in the north if their porperty is not knocked 
down etc. My father is disabled, I wanted my father to live there and so did my 
father. 
According to Article 8(4) of the Law, if the applicant’s claim is for compensation, or 
if the Commission decides to award it, the following points are taken into account: 
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66 Interview with Applicant 3 (Nicosia, 9 February 2018) 





 market value of the property on 20 July 1974,  
 loss of income and increase in the value of the property between 1974 and the 
date of payment,  
 whether the applicant possesses property in the south belonging to a Turkish 
Cypriot,  
 whether the applicant receives income from such property or whether the 
applicant pays rent for such property,  
 if the claim is compensation for movables, the manner of use of the property 
and the links the applicant has with it in determining non-pecuniary damages 
and the market value at the time of the decision to award compensation. 
Unless there is a dispute between the parties, the IPC does not intervene during the 
friendly settlement meeting where the defendant makes an offer of compensation. 
The Vice-President of the IPC Romans Mapolar states that the Commission takes 
comparable sales values into account as submitted by the parties at the hearing stage. 
Nevertheless, most of the time the defendant Ministry calls an official from the 
relevant land registry to testify as a witness and to submit the relevant registry 
records. Since the applicant does not have access to these records, he/she generally 
calls a valuation expert and/or an estate agent as witness. In this regard, Mapolar 
asserts that if the valuation expert does not submit concrete evidence about how 
he/she determined the values claimed, the Commission does not take them into 
account and concludes that the applicant did not prove his/her claim. If neither of the 
parties prove their claim, the IPC makes an equitable assessment. President Erkmen 
states that lawyers complain about and blame the Commission for taking the wrong 
side. Maintaining that this is not the case, he asserts that the applicant party can also 
invite another official from the land registry to base his/her claim on other 
comparable sales.68 But whether this is possible in practice is debatable. 
Mapolar indicates that for “loss of use”, the Commission applies a method 
similar to that used in GC property cases before the ECtHR.69  
However, the IPC does not award interest payable from the date of its 
decisions. This is problematic considering the lengthy delays in payment of 
compensation, considered further below, and the fact that Law No 67/2005 does not 
                                                            
68 Interview with the President Ayfer Erkmen and the Vice-President Romans Mapolar (n 28) 
69 Mapolar notes that the IPC does not award loss of use for potential income, and examines whether 
the applicant had been generating income through the subject matter property to award compensation 





contain any provisions enabling the Commission to award interest, a problem in both 
friendly settlements and hearings. If the IPC is to be in line with the ECtHR, it should 
award simple interest at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European 
Central Bank during the default period, plus three percentage points70 or a rate as 
applied by the Law Courts in the TRNC. Otherwise would mean that applicants are 
obliged to lend money to the TRNC government with no interest which is neither fair 
nor reasonable.  
Interview participants indicate that they are not satisfied with the amount of 
compensation awarded either through friendly settlement meetings or hearings. 
According to Sağıroğlu, the difference between 1974 owners and their legal heirs 
regarding their choice of remedy concerns expectations about the amount of 
compensation to be offered which is much higher in the case of 1974 owners since 
they deem their properties very valuable. Nevertheless, he considers that valuations 
made by the relevant land registry offices, upon which the defence/opinion of the 
defendant is based, are far below market values. Although offers made by the 
Ministry of Interior at the friendly settlement meetings are higher than those of the 
land registry reports and the opinions by the Attorney General’s Office, these are still 
insufficient. He observes that, this stems from the fact that land registry valuations 
are made according to 2007-08 values which remain outdated until an application 
reaches the friendly settlement meeting when a new offer might be made by the 
Ministry. Sağıroğlu suggests that the IPC should intervene at this stage to improve 
offers made by the defendant. Murat Hakkı also considers that the amounts of 
compensation offered not only remain below the valuation parameters envisaged by 
the ECtHR, but also market values in the TRNC. He notes that this applies both to 
the offers made at the friendly settlement stage by the Ministry, and the amount of 
compensation awarded by the IPC in its hearings. 
Lawyer Y observes that the offers of compensation at friendly settlement 
meetings are markedly lower than the current market values and that the amounts for 
loss of use, supposedly included in the offers, are far from satisfactory since they are 
                                                            
70 See for example Joannou v. Turkey App No 43240/2014 Merits (12 December 2017). The issue of 
interest and losses incurred as a result of lengthy delays in payment of compensation were challenged 
before the Court of Appeal of the TRNC. The case was brought before the Court after the applicants 
received payment. The Court stated that, with the friendly settlement agreement signed simultaneously 
with the payment of agreed compensation, the applicants declared their satisfaction with the award. 
Thus, the applicants’ claims were rejected. (Constantinos Vassiades ve diğeri ile İskan İşleri ile 
Görevli Bakanlık ve diğeri arasında [Constantinos Vassiades and other v the Ministry of Interior and 





based on land registry evaluations, increased to a certain extent by the defendant as 
mentioned above. However, these increases vary and it is not possible clearly to 
assess the reasons and/or the rationale for it. Y considers that the political 
environment limits the powers of the Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, 
according to Y, the IPC members are actively involved as mediators with regard to 
values offered by the defendant during friendly settlement proceedings. It should be 
noted that Y is a minority view and none of the interview participants share this 
opinion on the grounds that it has no impact on the defendant who is reluctant to use 
the discretionary power to increase the values alleging that the IPC has settled similar 
applications using comparable values. Y asserts that using comparable sales recorded 
in land registries to estimate compensation offered by the Ministry can be 
problematic since these are always lower than the actual market value of properties 
because, when selling and/or buying properties, for tax purposes, people tend to 
declare lower amounts than the ones agreed with the actual sales agreements. 
According to Y, the clients either accept offers made by the defendant or do not want 
to proceed with their applications at all as a result of the time taken to come at the 
friendly settlement stage or awaiting a hearing date. Considering all of these factors, 
Y believes that the applicants, particularly the ones the subject matter of whose 
applications were their “home”, feel cheated by the defendant.  
Representative X, disagreeing with lawyer Y, states that IPC members are 
passive at the friendly settlement meetings. Y asserts that the IPC should itself obtain 
expert reports about the values of properties. In fact, Article 7(3) of the Statute of the 
IPC states that the Commission may at any stage of the proceedings on its own 
motion call any person to give evidence or produce any document for the purpose of 
reaching a fair decision. Furthermore, Article 4 states that any compensation to be 
paid shall be determined by the Commission in an equitable manner and in 
accordance with the criteria enumerated in the Law and, by taking into account the 
opinions of experts, if any. Thus, the IPC could intervene to ensure that a more 
equitable offer is made by the Ministry at the friendly settlement stage. X argues that 
expert reports submitted by applicants are not taken into consideration at all at this 
stage and that relevant land registries provide 1974 values and current values of 
properties in their research reports which are not re-valued at the time of friendly 
settlement meetings. X argues that, if the IPC made its own estimations, this problem 





regarding the defendant’s friendly settlement offers for same reasons, notes that 
increases made by the defendant remain far below market values of properties. He 
further adds that equitable principles suggest the IPC should intervene in this respect 
and support applicants, as the weaker party in the proceedings. 
Lawyer Tarık Kadri, agreeing with other respondents regarding the low 
amount of compensation offered, observes that until 2013, the defendant used to 
increase the values of properties assessed by relevant land registry offices up to 40%, 
however, since 2013 these typically only reach 10% of land registry values. 
Applicants generally prefer to accept these amounts instead of waiting a long time for 
hearing dates. Tarık Kadri adds that 1974 owners estimate the value of their 
properties according to the conditions at the time of abandonement considering, plus 
the fact that they had lives and memories there.71 Their legal heirs/later generations, 
however, having lost hope regarding the solution of the Cyprus problem, accept 
lower amounts of compensation. Kadri considers that, the defendant being aware of 
this, rejects making payment for awards to the estates of deceased applicants in 
finalised cases, thus, promoting the legal heirs to settle for lower amounts. He rightly 
notes that there is no legal justification for non-payment to the estates of deceased 
applicants. In December 2018, the Attorney General’s Office reconsidered its 
position deciding to carry on with payment in such cases. 
Applicant 1 also felt disappointed because of the amount of compensation he 
received for his property. He notes that he thought he could get a higher amount but 
this was not the case: 
I did not want to accept the offer made at the IPC, but I had to accept because of 
economic reasons. I have children to take care of and they also insisted I have to 
get what I can. 
When it comes to hearings, Kadri states that the compensation awarded by the IPC is 
much closer to the market values, but still remains below. Furthermore, there are 
problems with respect to “loss of use”, the value of which, according to Kadri, 
applicants are expected to prove. According to him, loss of use is not the real profit 
gained by the applicant at the time of loss of property, but an objective amount of 
rent to be gained through it, and that obliging applicants to prove their real losses is 
                                                            





not reasonable considering that more than 40 years have elapsed since the loss of 
their property. Kadri also observes that compensation for non-pecuniary damage has 
not been awarded so far in any application. 
Achilleas Demetriades frankly suggests that the amount of compensation put 
forward is “ridiciously low and, in fact, there is no offer for loss of use”. He further 
notes that this is “unacceptable” because, in some cases pending before the ECtHR, 
“the IPC made an offer - first heading being “loss of use” and second heading being 
“expropriation value” - but they now give the applicants very low prices, which 
allegedly includes loss of use”. He also questions the lack of compensation for 
“moral damage”.72 In Joannou held before the IPC following the ECtHR judgment, 
the defendant’s witness put forth comparable sales values of GC properties in 1974, a 
different approach from that of observations of Turkey before the ECtHR in the same 
case which included a method for calculation of compensation. GC properties are, in 
fact, worth less than the value of TC properties in the TRNC markets. The IPC 
decision is still pending in this case and its approach remains to be seen in this 
regard. Nevertheless, each case should be evaluated in its own circumstances and it is 
unfair that compensation awarded is considerably lower than real market values.  
The Ministry of Interior did not respond to a request for an interview, leaving 




Since the IPC Law is intended to address relevant property disputes in accordance 
with the principle of bi-zonality, a UN parameter for the negotiations of the Cyprus 
problem, restitution of immovable properties is subject to the following limited 
conditions:73 
(a) Immovable property, the ownership or use of which has not been transferred to 
any natural or legal person other than the State according to the legislation in force in 
the TRNC, can be restituted within a reasonable time. But for this, such restitution 
must not endanger national security and public order taking location and physical 
                                                            
72 Interview with Achilleas Demetriades, Lawyer/Representative (Nicosia, 15 December 2017) 
(Demetriades is registered in the Republic of Cyprus as a lawyer. He pursues applications before the 
IPC as a representative together with a registered lawyer in the TRNC. He questions the fact that he is 
eligible to pursue applications as a representative under the IPC Law, but he is not allowed to appear 
and/or participate meetings before the IPC)  





condition into consideration. If the property is allocated for the purposes of public 
interest, it cannot be returned. Furthermore, the property must be outside military 
installations or areas defined as under military control. 
(b) If the conditions set out above in paragraph (a) are not met74, and if the property 
has not been allocated for the purposes of public interest or social justice, then a 
more detailed examination should be made: 
(i) If the user of the property has improved it, and  
 if  any resulting  increase in value between the date it was abandoned 
and the date of application to the IPC for restitution, is less than the 
value of the property when it was abandoned; or  
 if there is no increase in the value of property between these dates; or  
 if no building project has been approved by the competent authorities 
which would cause such an increase; or  
 if such property in the north is not a property of equal value75 acquired 
by any person, who on having to leave southern Cyprus, obtained title 
to such property in exchange for his/her property he/she left in the south 
of Cyprus,  
 
the decision for restitution of such property may take effect after the settlement of the 
Cyprus problem and in line with the provisions of the settlement. However, in this 
case, the person who would have to abandon the property after settlement of the 
Cyprus problem, would not have to do so unless he/she has been compensated or 
provided with alternative accommodation under the provisions of a future settlement 
agreement. Therefore, the Law includes provisions which anticipate settlement of the 
Cyprus problem.  
                                                            
74 For example, if the property is allocated to a natural person. 
75 According to Law for Housing, Allocation of Land, and Property of Equal Value (Law No 
41/1977), the TC administration adopted a points-based exchange system, which assumed that the 
abandoned properties in the north and south were of equal in value. The administration allowed TC 
owners to apply for and receive abandoned property in the north in exchange of their property left 
behind in the south, on the condition that the owners agreed to assign all rights relating to their 
properties in the south to the Turkish Cypriot Administration. Furthermore, the Law allocated GC 
property to migrants who came from Turkey after 1974 and settled (“settlers” is the term used by the 
GCs for them instead of migrants), victims of the conflict, TC resistance fighters, Turkish soldiers 
who fought in the 1974 war and settled, and TCs with insufficient income. (Law No 41/1977 was also 
addressed in Chapter 1; see also Ayla Gürel, Mete Hatay and Chrystalla Yakinthou, 'Displacement in 
Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife Report 5' (Prio Cyprus Centre, Nicosia 2012, 13-





(ii) However, if the user of the property has improved it and, 
 if the increase in the value due to improvement between the date it was 
abandoned and the date of the application to the Commission for restitution is 
more than the value of the property at the time it was abandoned; or if a 
project that would result in such an increase in value has been approved by 
the competent authorities,  
exchange of property or compensation might be offered to such an applicant and the 
property concerned shall not be subject to the provisions stated above.76 It should be 
added that if the applicant’s claim is restitution of his/her property, and restitution is 
not possible according to the criteria envisaged in the Law, the Commission may 
offer "exchange" or "compensation" which the applicant is not obliged to accept and 
may await a political solution instead. 
 Thus, while considering restitution, the Law pays particular attention to the 
improvement of properties by current users. In practice, a situation where 
improvement is less than the value of the property between the date it was abandoned 
and the date of application to the IPC is unlikely to arise. 
Representative X observes that, as a result of the limited conditions addressed 
above, properties which can be returned are generally situated in isolated areas,77 an 
example being an application pursued by their firm, where access to the concerned 
property was almost impossible because of its location. Lawyer Achilleas 
Demetriades particularly points out to properties located in the fenced-off Varosha. 
According to him, since restitution is not possible for these properties, which is a 
military zone under Turkish control, the IPC should award “restitution after the 
solution of the Cyprus problem”, and “compensation for loss of use until the property 
is returned”.78  
Although the conditions for restitution are limited, the ECtHR stated in 
Demopoulos and others that the choice of redress for breaches of property rights is 
left to Contracting States, who are in the best position to assess the practicalities, 
priorities and conflicting interests at the domestic level. The discretionary nature of 
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the restitutionary power of the IPC was not, therefore, considered to pertain to the 




A third remedy provided by the IPC law is “exchange of a property” in the south for 
one of equal value to that which the applicant claims in the north. If the property in 
the south is of a higher value than the one in the north, the applicant must pay the 
difference. However, if the latter is of a higher value than the former, the difference 
shall be paid to the applicant. Applicants requesting “exchange” may also claim 
compensation for loss of use and non-pecuniary damages arising from violation of 
the right to respect for their home. 
 As stated earlier, the IPC has ruled for exchange and compensation only in 2 
cases so far, known as Tymvios,80 where the applicant also had a case before the 
ECtHR.81 The claim concerned 51 plots of land, and the Court, making reference to 
its previous case-law, held that there was a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 
reserving the question of just satisfaction. In 2006, Tymvios applied to the IPC which 
granted him compensation of $1.2 million as well as the exchange of his land in 
Kyrenia (north), for a large TC owned plot situated in Larnaca (south).82 In this 
regard, the parties informed the Strasbourg Court by letters dated 22 May 2007 that 
they had reached a friendly settlement including property transfer, and the applicant 
requested that the Court strike the case out of its list. The parties also submitted 
formal declarations dated 7 February 2008 and 15 February 2008, accepting friendly 
settlement with further correspondence on other matters. Thus, the Registry of the 
Court invited the Turkish Government to clarify the conditional nature of the 
transfer.83 On 14 January 2008, the respondent Government informed the Court that 
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80 See <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/?p=290226>  where the issue was also covered on 30 August 
2008 accessed 6 December 2015 
81 Eugenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd and Michael Tymvios v Turkey App no 16163/90 Merits 
and Just Satisfaction (31 July 2003) 
82 Deniz Ş Sert,  ‘Cyprus: Peace, Return and Property’, (2010) 23(2) JRS 238, 248; see also 
International Crisis Group, ‘Cyprus: Bridging the Property Divide’ (Europe Report No 210, 9 
December 2010) 11  
83 Part of the declaration signed by the applicant which the Court received on 7 February 2008 was as 
follows: “I, Michael Tymvios, the applicant, declare that I have reached agreement with the 
Government of Turkey according to the terms of a settlement dated 21 May 2007 which provides for 





the transfer would be executed in the RoC since this was outside its jurisdiction. As a 
result, the Court concluded that the settlement between the parties was based on 
respect for human rights as protected by the Convention and its Protocols, and it was 
equitable within the meaning of the Rule 75(4) of the Rules of Court.84 It should also 
be noted that, although the RoC (the intervening party) submitted that due to 
bankruptcy the applicant was not able to enter into a friendly settlement agreement or 
to receive compensation, the Court stated that this might be of relevance only at the 
domestic level.  Thus, the Court welcomed the agreement made between the parties 
and struck the case out of its list.  
In August 2008, Mr Tymvios complained that despite the ECtHR's ruling, the 
GC Government refused to transfer ownership of the TC property in the south to him, 
and filed a case at the District Court of Larnaca against the Ministry of Interior, the 
Ministry of Education and the Larnaca School Commission.85 A complaint was also 
lodged with the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.86 The Attorney-
General in the south then intervened and settled the case. However, since there were 
schools on the relevant plots, they could not be let to the applicant. Therefore, the 
Government of Cyprus purchased the land from Mr Tymvios and the property was 
exchanged. The Attorney-General insisted that the Tymvios case did not set a 
precedent since there were special circumstances and the deal had been endorsed by 
the Strasbourg Court and brought to the attention of the Committee of Ministers. By 
contrast, the President of the IPC considered it a "landmark" case which would set a 
precedent for others.87 As Achilleas Demetriades rightly predicted at the time, the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
as the exchange decision can be executed within the control and power of the authorities of the 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” See para 13 of the Court judgment of 22 April 2008 (just 
satisfaction) (friendly settlement) and para 14 for the Government's declaration. 
84 Rule 75(4) reads as "If the Court is informed that an agreement has been reached between the 
injured party and the Contracting Party liable, it shall verify the equitable nature of the agreement and, 
where it finds the agreement to be equitable, strike the case out of the list in accordance with Rule 43 
§ 3." 
85 US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, ‘2008 Human Rights 
Reports: Cyprus’ (Human Rights Reports on Democracy 25 February 2009) (available at 
<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119074.htm> accessed 6 December 2015); the plot of 
land in Larnaca was protected under the Guardian Law and housed two schools, shops and businesses, 
See International Crisis Group, ‘Cyprus: Bridging the Property Divide’ (n 82) 11; see also the 
interview with Achilleas Demetriades by Rosie Charalambous 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dj1kBLjsGY0> accessed 8 December 2015 
86 See also International Crisis Group, ‘Cyprus: Bridging the Property Divide’ (n 82)11 
87 Stefanos Evripidou, ‘IPC insists Tymvios case sets precedent’, Cyprus Internet Directory (no date 





Government of Cyprus "would have to give a plausible explanation for opposing a 
similar case of exchange in the future, considering it had already approved it once".88  
 The attitude of the Government in the south is not the only obstacle for 
"exchange" of properties since, as Çolak maintains, this option could be made more 
effective. Currently, the applicants requesting exchange are asked to propose a 
property in the south that would be acceptable to the defendant. But, there is no 
catalogue or list of properties capable of being offered through the IPC and 
applicants rarely receive an early or positive response.89 As seen in the Tymvios case, 
better cooperation and coordination by both sides of the Cyprus conflict could make 
it easier for the IPC to operate.90 Practical difficulties could for example be 
eliminated by way of a joint or parallel mechanism providing remedies for both GC 
property claims in the north and TC property claims in the south91 as proposed in the 
Annan Plan.92 
Lawyer Sağıroğlu also observed the difficulties for “exchange of properties” 
with respect to the practice before the IPC. He notes that, among those applicants he 
has represented so far, only one or two have claimed “exchange of property”. One of 
these was filed in 2010 and following a preliminary friendly settlement meeting 
which took place approximately two years ago, still awaits a response from the 
defendant. Sağıroğlu states that, to accelerate the process, he has also provided 
details of the property in the south which the applicant wants to exchange. However, 
at the time of this interiew, the respondent has still been trying to find out if the TC 
owner of the property has received a property in the north in exchange for this 
property in the south and whether he relinquished his rights over this property in 




In addition to issues integrated to the three remedies, the IPC has encountered five 
additional main problems: length and fairness of proceedings, transparency, 
                                                            
88 See the interview with Achilleas Demetriades by Rosie Charalambous (n 85); see also Stefanos 
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mortgages and other encumbrances over the properties on or before 20 July 1974, 
corporate ownership, and the execution of its decisions; i.e. payment of 
compensation. 
 
A. Length and Fairness of Proceedings 
Although the Attorney General's Office representing the Ministry is required to file a 
defence/opinion93 within 30 working days from the notice of the application, this is 
not the case in practice.94 Thus, for judgment to be delivered in such circumstances, 
applicants usually file an application by summons (a “default application”) against 
the defendant in line with the Civil Procedure Rules of the Law Courts. However, 
since the IPC adjourns these applications, applicants do not have the opportunity to 
prove their cases and and obtain judgment.95 According to Çolak, the number of land 
registry civil servants preparing relevant reports,96 and the prosecutors preparing the 
opinions/defences in line with them should be increased.97 Whether this would solve 
the length of delays issue is questionable. 
According to the President of the IPC, the delays are not attributable to the 
IPC since it operates in line with its duties under Law No 67/2005 by serving the 
applications to the defendant within the legal period of time and awaiting an opinion 
to be filed to proceed further. He states that delays might have been minimised had 
there been more staff working at the Ministry of Interior, the relevant land registry 
offices and the Attorney General’s Office.98 In Meleagrou and others v. Turkey,99 the 
first application brought at Strasbourg concerning this issue, the ECtHR has also 
ruled on the question of excessive length of proceedings before the IPC. The 
applicants claimed, among other things, that the length and unfairness of 
proceedings, and the lack of independence of the IPC, violated Article 6 (1)100 of the 
                                                            
93 It was stated earlier that this consists of a summary of the facts and an evaluation of the value of the 
relevant property in 1974 and also includes a statement of the current value of the property for the 
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94 Çolak (n 3) 62 
95 O 26 r 10 of Civil Procedure Rules states, “If the Respondent fails to deliver statement of defence in 
all actions other than the actions specified in the aforementioned rules of this order, the Plaintiff can 
apply through application by summons in order for a ju,dgment to be delivered and a decision which 
the plaintiff deserves can be delivered in accordance with the opinion of the court or judge.” 
96 It was stated previously that this is a report with details of relevant subject matter properties. 
97 Çolak (n 3) 62 
98 Interview with the President Ayfer Erkmen and the Vice-President Romans Mapolar (n 28) 
99 Eleni Meleagrou and others v. Turkey App No 14434/09 Admissibility  (2 April 2013) 





ECHR.101 The Court noted that a period of four years and eight months, including the 
procedure at the High Administrative Court for appeal, had elapsed between the 
lodging of the application and its resolution which, it concluded, was not 
unreasonable given the newness of the procedure, the nature of the proceedings, the 
number of claims raised and the technical character of the property disputes 
concerned.102 The Court rejected complaints of unfairness stemming from language 
difficulties at the IPC and the High Administrative Court on the grounds that the 
applicants were represented by a lawyer who understood Turkish, interpretation 
facilities were available and they were able to get translations of key documents in 
English.103 The applicants' claim that the IPC lacked independence because the 
majority of the IPC and TRNC officials spoke Turkish, was also rejected on the 
grounds that no “concrete elements sufficient to establish bias or lack of 
independence” had been presented.104 The applicants also alleged that their 
arguments were not fully adressed at the IPC and the High Administrative Court. 
Compensation for non-pecuniary damages was not awarded since "the applicants had 
not made claims in accordance with the provisions of the applicable law, and, as 
regards the one plot of land which had been subject to restitution, the IPC considered 
that as it was a field, no non-pecuniary damage from loss of enjoyment had been 
shown to arise".105 As a result, the application was rejected as manifestly ill-founded 
according to Article 35(3)(a) and 4 of the Convention.106 
 It should be noted that, in this case, the applicants filed the application with 
the IPC on 7 November 2006. The direction stage which required the production of 
further documents in line with the Civil Procedure Rules took place in October 2007. 
The preliminary hearing was held on 19 November 2007 where the representative of 
the Ministry made a friendly settlement offer. A number of preliminary hearings 
were listed and adjourned during 2008 where the applicants further attempted to 
obtain a settlement agreement. The applicants' request for a hearing was made on 4 
August 2008 and the hearings were held on 3 November 2008, 19 January 2009 and 
5 May 2009. Finally, the IPC issued decisions on 14 October 2009.107 According to 
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Civil Procedure Rules, the direction meeting should take place after the defence is 
filed.108 The delay in this case was mainly a consequence of the fact that the 
opinion/defence was not filed within the specified period of time as prescribed by 
Law No 67/2005; i.e. 30 working days upon the notice of the application to the 
defendant. As addressed previously, there are not enough civil servants investigating 
the properties, and prosecutors drafting the defences/opinions.109 While concluding 
that the application was manifestly ill- founded regarding the lengthy delays, the 
ECtHR based its decision upon "the number of claims raised" and "the technical 
character of the property disputes". This raises the following questions: Is this 
conclusion reasonable? Did the government put forward any arguments capable of 
justifying the length of proceedings? When should the Court decide whether the 
proceedings fail to meet the reasonable time requirement? Was the delay imputable 
to the applicants?110 If the total length of proceedings was 5 years 8 months would 
this still be reasonable? It can be said that the ECtHR uses various criteria to 
determine whether the length of proceedings is reasonable or not, some of which are 
related to the nature of the case (its complexity and what is at stake), while others 
concern the conduct of the parties (the applicant and the relevant authorities).111 The 
Court has repeatedly emphasised in its judgments that:  
[T]he “reasonableness” of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the 
light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following 
criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the 
relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute. In 
addition, only delays for which the state can be held responsible can justify a 
finding of failure to comply with the reasonable-time requirement.112 
According to Ovey and White, Article 35(3) requires "an initial assessment of the 
substance of the case and enables the Court to deal effectively with its immense case-
load" by eliminating unmeritorious cases at an early stage. The Court declares an 
application inadmissble if the allegations are unsubstantiated or do not suffice to find 
                                                            
108 Order 30, rule 1(a)(i) of the Civil Procedure Rules of the Law Courts in the TRNC 
109 Çolak (n 3) 62 
110 See Smoje v Croatia No 28074/03 Merits and Just Satisfaction (11 January 2007) 
111 Council of Europe, ‘The length of civil and criminal proceedings in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (Council of Europe Publishing, Human Rights Files No. 16)  39 





a violation even if substantiated.113 As stated previously, in Meleagrou and others, 
the Court declared the case to be "manifestly ill-founded" by referring to the "the 
newness of the procedure, the nature of the proceedings which incorporated a 
specific settlement procedure, the number of claims raised and the technical nature of 
property disputes".114 However, the Court could have analysed the circumstances of 
the case in more detail to assess the reasonableness of the period of time the process 
took. For example, Meleagrou and others filed their application at the IPC in 
November 2006. A total of 12 applications were lodged in November 2006 and 21 in 
December 2006 with the IPC. The total number of applications in 2006 was 100. In 
2007 and until the end of October 2007 (the date which the directionstage of the 
application took place115), 176 applications were submitted to the IPC. Considering 
the number of applications by October 2007, it can be said that there was no backlog 
of cases before the Commission at that time. Therefore, “the number of claims 
raised” should not have been raised as a ground for rejecting the applicants’ claims in 
this respect. Furthermore, as stated previously the land registry reports contain 
information with respect to the ownership and the value of the properties concerned. 
Furthermore, the IPC issued its final decision in approximately three months 
following the hearing of the case, indicating that the issue was not that complex. 
 The issue of length of proceedings was also litigated before the High 
Administrative Court of the TRNC.116 In application no 167/2010, the applicant’s 
lawyer filed a “default application”117 at the IPC requesting a final decision on the 
merits since the defendant had not filed its defence/opinion within the period of time 
prescribed by Law No 67/2005. The IPC rejected the request stating that Article 6 of 
Law No 67/2005 requires that, for a decision to be taken in his favour, the applicant 
must satisfy the Commission beyond any reasonable doubt as to the conditions 
                                                            
113 Claire Ovey and Robin C A White, The European Convention on Human Rights  (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 40  
114 Para 18 of Meleagrou and others (n 96) 
115 Direction stage is the part of the procedure according to Rules of Civil Procedure applied at the 
Law Courts. At this stage the parties to the application declares the documents which they will submit 
to prove their claims and the ones which they request from the other party.  
116 K.V. Mediterranean Tours Limited ile Taşınmaz Mal Komisyonu arasında [K.V.Mediterranean 
Tours Limited v Immovable Property Commission] YİM 262/2012, D 32/2015(6 November 2015) 
(This is the first instance High Administrative Court where the decision is given by a single judge and 
may further be appealed by the parties.) 
117 Filed by the applicant since the defendant did not file the opinion/defence within the legal period of 
30 working days according to Article 3(8) of the Rules of the IPC. The applicant requested a final 
decision on the merits of the application through a default application according to O 26, r 2 of Civil 





envisaged in the law. Among other things, the applicant claimed at the High 
Administrative Court that the decision of the IPC should be quashed since it 
arbitrarily postponed the "default application" eleven times without any reasonable 
grounds. The applicant also claimed that the IPC favoured the defendant by not 
giving a final decision on the merits of the application and argued that the rights of 
access to a court and to a fair trial, plus relevant provisions of the ECHR and the 
TRNC Constitution regarding the prohibition of discrimination, had been violated. It 
was further claimed that the decision of the IPC violated Article 1 of Protocol 1 and 
Article 13 of the Convention since no remedy was available within a reasonable time 
with respect to the applicant’s property rights. Referring to Article 6 of the Law No 
67/2005, the defendant stated that the applicant should prove the case beyond 
reasonable doubt and therefore, could not request a final decision on the merits from 
the IPC. Addressing the provisions of the Civil Procedure Rules,118 the High Court 
stated that the IPC has the authority to decide whether the default application shall be 
postponed or a final decision given on the merits of the application. It further noted 
that the IPC has discretionary power and concluded that its decisions could not be 
considered encompassed by the concept of "negligence" for the purposes of 
administrative law. Therefore, although the applicant's "default application" of 1 
November 2010 was repeatedly postponed from 7 December 2010 until 23 October 
2012, the Court rejected the applicant's claims under this head, a decision 
subsequently appealed.119 Referring amongst other things to the definition of 
“negligence” within the meaning of Article 152 of the TRNC Constitution, the High 
Court stated that negligence means that an authority, a body, or an individual, who or 
which exercises executive or administrative power, has failed to make a decision as 
required by law. Addressing the reasoning of the single judge and stating that the IPC 
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has the authority to adjourn the default application, the High Court of Appeal120 
approved the decision of the single judge. Murat Hakkı, the lawyer in this case, 
considers the decision of the High Court as unfortunate because it left the issue of 
length of proceedings judicially uncontrolled. Achilleas Demetriades, the GC lawyer 
who was also an authorised reprensentative in this case before the IPC, states that if 
the procedural rules including time limits are not adhered to, the remedy cannot be 
deemed effective. He adds:  
In a normal court procedure, the court gives you judgment in default. 
Everything is adjourned automatically at the IPC. In relation to the delays, there 
is no effective remedy to exhaust. Our argument at the ECtHR in the K.V. 
Mediterranean is that there are no remedies to exhaust.  
Murat Hakkı also notes that applications were filed at the ECtHR complaining that 
there are no effective domestic remedies for pending cases, in particular for those 
concerning properties located in the fenced-off area of Varosha at the IPC. He 
believes that the defendant and the IPC have no policy for dealing with such 
complaints. He further notes that he has almost 50 applications concerning properties 
in fenced-off Varosha, all pending for opinion/defence from the defendant. Although 
the defendant alleges rights of the Turkish Muslem Religious Trust (Vakf) over these 
properties in Varosha, Hakkı considers the issue to be political. According to 
Demetriades, a likely explanation is that a decision has been taken not to proceed 
with these applications due to the Turkish side’s intention to open the area up. He 
also points to the cases filed at the ECtHR alleging that there is no effective remedy, 
particularly, for properties located in the fenced-off area.  
In an interview on 10 March 2018, Ayfer Erkmen, the President of the 
IPC, stated that 275 cases related to properties in fenced-off Varosha are 
pending before the IPC.121 It should be noted that a declaratory judgment of the 
Famagusta District Court of TRNC issued in 2005 states that the 1472 properties 
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in fenced-off Varosha belong to Abdullah Paşa Religious Trust (Vakf).122 In any 
request for intervention, the IPC referring to this declaratory judgment, permits 
the Evkaf Foundation to be involved as a third party in its proceedings.123 In case 
no 1/2017124 lawyer Murat Hakkı attempted to challenge the said declaratory 
judgment of the Famagusta District Court stating, among other things, that 
according to land registry records his client is the legal owner of Argo Hotel 
located in fenced-off Varosha as of 20 July 1974. The High Court, consisting of 
a single judge, rejected the claimant’s requests stating that he had no locus 
standi before the Court to ask for remedies other than those he might claim 
before the IPC provided by Law No 67/2005. Hakkı appealed and the High 
Administrative Court, consisting of a panel of three judges, also rejected the 
claims. However, the Court noted that, while the IPC could consider the matter, 
it could only take the title deeds for 1974 to decide who the legal owner of the 
properties was at that time. This means that the IPC does not have the power to 
change Land Registry Records for 1974 or to decide whether there had been 
fraudulent acts against Evkaf back in the 1900s with respect to transfer of 
relevant properties.125 Thus, the declaratory judgment of Famagusta District 
Court does not have a negative impact on applicants’ rights over their properties. 
It should be stressed that, in a number of cases at the ECtHR, Evkaf also sought 
leave to intervene as a third party alleging that it was the owner of some of the 
properties claimed by the applicants and that the latter had registered them in 
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their own names according to the principles set out in the “Ahkâm-ül Evkaf 
Laws”. Turkey, the respondent, had pointed out that the property allegedly 
owned by the applicant was listed in the books of the Turkish Muslim religious 
trust (vakf) and thus, following the registration of a deed of vakf, it could not be 
alienated or transferred. The respondent maintained that the transfer of this 
property to the applicant was unlawful and therefore, null and void. However, 
the Court noted that the applicant had provided the Court with official 
certificates of ownership from the Department of Lands and Surveys of the 
Republic of Cyprus which proved that she was indeed the owner of the relevant 
property. It had also been claimed that the respondent Government had not 
substantiated its case against the applicant's victim status.126 This has significant 
implications with respect to Evkaf’s claims on properties in fenced-off Varosha. 
Evkaf claims that relevant properties in this zone had been illegally transferred 
to other persons in the 1900s. Since then, the said properties had belonged and 
been used by third persons other than Evkaf. Hakkı, objecting Evkaf’s claims, 
supports that the properties concerned should be returned to their lawful owners 
as shown by the 1974 land registry records.127 Most importantly, even if the 
alleged claims by Evkaf were accepted, it should be remembered that in 
Demopoulos the precedent had been based on the fact that: 
[…..] many decades after the loss of possession by the then owners, property has 
in many cases changed hands, by gift, succession or otherwise; those claiming 
title may have never seen, or ever used the property in question . . . The losses 
thus claimed become increasingly speculative and hypothetical. There has, it 
may be recalled, always been a strong legal and factual link between ownership 
and possession . . .  and it must be recognised that with the passage of time the 
holding of a title may be emptied of any practical consequences. 
In other words, accepting Evkaf’s claims would result in a serious setback for current 
users of GC properties in the north as recognised by the ECtHR in Demopoulos. In 
the final analysis, demilitarization of the fenced-off Varosha would enable the IPC to 
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award restitution after the solution of the Cyprus problem. This could prevent the 
ECtHR from deciding that the IPC is not an effective remedy. In this case, awarding 
loss of use would be necessary. Considering the continuing delays in payments of 
IPC awars as a result of lack of financial resources, this burden could almost be 
impossible to carry out, which would bring us back to square one. It should also be 
recalled that the members of the Security Council reminded, in October 2019, the 
previous UN Security Council resolutions, including resolution 550 (1984) and 
resolution 789 (1992), reiterating that no actions should be carried out in relation to 
Varosha that are not in accordance with those resolutions.128 In either way, the 
process should be inclusive of stakeholders. 
 Lawyer Tarık Kadri also argues that the IPC cannot be considered as an 
effective remedy for applications concerning properties in the fenced-off Varosha. 
He notes that the defendant has only filed a defence/opinion in 5 of the applications 
he has been pursuing which were submitted to the IPC in 2010. He maintains that 
Evkaf intervened as the third-party, that the applications are pending, and this has no 
legal basis according to the requirements in the IPC law to prove ownership. As 
outlined previously, Article 6 (2) states that the applicant shall prove the property 
was registered in his name before 20 July 1974 and/or he is the legal heir of the 
individual in whose name the immovable property was registered. On the other hand, 
Evkaf’s intervention to the said applications as third-party does not mean the final 
decision will be in their favour. However, Kadri is pessimistic in this regard, and how 
the IPC will decide these applications remains to be seen. As indicated in Chapter 2, 
the opening of the fenced-off Varosha (ghost city) has been among the confidence 
building measures (CBMs) produced by the UN Secretary General in 1992 and was 
one of the most important measures that were seriously discussed by both sides under 
UN auspices. In addition, at various times, the UN Security Council called for this 
area to be handed over to the UN prior to its resettlement by its rightful 
inhabitants.129 Having been fenced-off by the Turkish army in 1974, it has always 
been assumed that Varosha would be among the areas to be returned to GC 
administration as part of any territorial adjustment in the framework of a 
comprehensive solution. Under the given cirucmstances, it can be said that the area 
will remain as a challenge for the IPC as a result of the fact that such applications 
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have no prospect of moving ahead unless there is political will. In August 2019, the 
TRNC government has initiated a process to open the area up under the TRNC 
administration. For this, meetings have been held under the auspisces of the TRNC 
Foreign Ministry while the Foreign Minister emphasized back in August 2019 that 
they have no intention to include the GC administration in the process.130 More 
recently, another neeting was held in February 2020 in the fenced-off Varosha in the 
presence of Republic of Turkey Vice-President, other Turkish officials, the TRNC 
government officials, the IPC President and a few associations sharing similar views 
with those of the TRNC government and Turkish government. The meeting was 
protested by various NGOs, GCs and some left-wing political parties calling it a 
provocative step for short-term political gains prior to the presidential election in 
April. The TRNC President Akıncı who was not invited to the said meeting criticised 
it stating that any step should be taken without being in contravention to the UN and 
with the intention of contributing to the solution of the Cyprus problem. Main 
opposition Party CTP has not attended the meeting either, criticising, in particular, 
the absence of the President Akıncı where the issue of fenced-off Varosha is 
undeniably included within his duties and powers.131 Apparently, the issue of fenced-
off Varosha is being carried out behind closed doors in the absence of an inclusive 
process, not only without the right holders (GCs) but also without acamedia from 
different backgrounds, NGOs and political parties having different views on the 
issue. This issue is an example of how piecemeal approaches could have a negative 
impact on the views of other stakeholders in the absence of an inclusive process. 
In a more recent Joannou v Turkey case, the ECtHR held that Article 1 of 
Protocol No 1 had been violated because the manner in which the IPC had proceeded 
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lacked ‘coherence, diligence and appropriate expedition’ as this provision requires.132 
The ECtHR noted that the proceedings before the IPC, which began in 2008 and had 
still not been formally concluded by 2017, were marked by repeated requests by the 
authorities for the applicant to submit additional documents and that the IPC itself 
had “remained passive as regards these ... making no effort to assess their 
reasonableness or relevance or to ensure that the parties’ submissions were properly 
obtained and administered”.133  
Murat Hakkı states that only about 30-40 of 250-300 applications he has been 
pursuing have been finalised and paid. Approximately 4-5 applications have been 
pending for payment while 3-4 have not even been given a hearing date for the last 
two years.  For the rest of his applications, the defendant has not filed an 
opinion/defence. Hakkı adds that the defendant Ministry and the Attorney General’s 
Office claim that they prioritize applications in line with their date of submission to 
proceed. This is neither reasonable nor fair since some applications might be 
processed promptly by the relevant land registries, as a result of the fact that they do 
not concern complex issues or the land registry in question might have less 
applications before it while this might not be the case for others.  However, 
uncomplicated applications nevertheless wait for a considerable time as a result of 
the “policy” of chronological assessment by year of submission.  
Having nearly 150 applications before the IPC, Lawyer Minhan Sağıroğlu 
states that 95% of these have been pending for an opinion/defence from the 
defendant.  
Representative X pursing almost 2,200 aplications including the finalised 
ones before the IPC, states that 684 of these were filed in 2011 and 111 of these have 
still been pending for the opinion/defence by the defendant. According to X, this is 
one of the most criticised issues before the IPC and a fatal one since, as the time goes 
by, some applicants pass away. In addition, the Attorney General’s Office has 
proposed that payment to the estate of the deceased was not possible, a matter the 
IPC leaves to the discretion of the defendant, creating another issue for applicants. As 
addressed previously, the Attorney General’s Office reconsidered its position in this 
regard, but the implementation remains to be seen. 
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Applicant 1, having applied to the IPC in 2013, claims that his application 
concerning more than one property, one of which is the family home where he used 
to live together with his parents and brother, is still pending for an opinion/defence 
from the defendant. He complains about the length of proceedings before the IPC 
adding that there is nothing he can do to overcome this. He feels it is unfair to wait 
for such a long time, but notes that he has not heard of finalised cases which were 
filed later than his finishing earlier in an unfair manner. Despite delays, this applicant 
frankly states that his compaint is not about the IPC itself, because, he considers it to 
be under the control of Turkey which offers applicants a “take it or leave it” choice.  
Applicant 2 submitting his application to the IPC in 2010, states that it was 
finalised in 2014 and was paid in 2018. The case concerned a water source and citrus 
fields: 
The property belonged to my father in 1974 and he later transferred it to me. We 
used to derive our revenue from this field. I used to work with my father in this 
field so I have emotinal links to it. I also filed another application to the IPC in 
2013 for another property, a cornfield. The latter is still pending. In the very 
beginning, I never thought to apply to the IPC. I also thought that there will be a 
comprehensive solution in Cyprus. In the south we have a system; for displaced 
Greek Cypriots the government provides us with loans with low interest rates. 
Recently, it has been very difficult to benefit from this system though, and I have 
economic problems. 
Applicant 3 records that he has not experienced any kind of unfairness yet, adding his 
case is not at the payment stage. 
Pavlos Loizou was paid after a year his application was finalised at the IPC, 
but he states that this was because he had brought his case to the ECtHR. He 
complains about the lengthy procedure at the IPC and the distress he has suffered 
including the period of time which passed since he first applied to the Strasbourg 
Court in 2004 before he was referred to the IPC. Expressing his disappointment as a 
result of the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004, he stresses that he applied to the 
IPC since he could not have awaited a political solution to the Cyprus problem. 
Another issue having an impact on the length of proceedings is the limited 





are present.134 The President and Vice-President of the IPC were inclined to give the 
number of pending applications forhearing.135 The Vice President Mapolar states that 
there are several reasons for the delays: The Commission consists of seven members, 
the two foreign members live abroad and are present for hearings only three times a 
year, and there have been practical difficulties as a result of intervals between those 
periods. He proposes that the IPC could have held more hearings and could have 
worked more efficiently if it had convened in the form of committees consisting of 
smaller number of members, each chaired by the President and/or the Vice-President. 
The President also agrees that more hearings should be held, but he also adds that 
other reasons such as inviting the valuation experts and other witnesses to testify 
before the IPC have prolonged hearings. Article 11(2) of the Law states that it is 
possible for the IPC to convene by a minimum of a two-thirds majority of the total 
number of members and to take decisions by an absolute majority of those attending. 
However, the IPC is not willing to hold hearings in the absence of the two foreign 
members, a positive indicator of its objectivity, though causing delays. Another 
factor causing the delays is the fact that research reports prepared by the relevant 
land registry offices include the status of ownership in 1974, current user of the 
property (if any), the value of the property in 1974 and its current value which take 
time to compile. Assuming that it might take longer to evaluate the property 
concerned, the IPC and/or the Ministry of Interior could classify applications where 
the main claim is exchange or restitution to provide for an accelerated procedure for 
these applications, instead of awaiting adjournment for additional research on the 
conditions of the property as envisaged by Law No 67/2005. Another solution might 
be to amend the legislation, to include an automatic admissibility stage to determine 




The criteria under which the IPC can award compensation are provided by Law No 
67/2005, but since decisions of the IPC are not made public, it is difficult to 
determine how it applies the statutory criteria. However, if the applicant appeals to 
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the High Administrative Court some light can be shed on the matter. In application 
no. 23/2008,136 for example, one of the arguments before the High Court was that the 
IPC’s decision was not reasoned. In arriving at its verdict, the High Administrative 
Court considered whether the material and legal reasons could, nevertheless, be 
inferred from its decision. It noted that, while the IPC awarded £2.5 million for loss 
of use and market value, it did not set out how it arrived at this figure and how much 
had been awarded separately under each head. The IPC stated that “in assessing the 
value of the property” it had taken “into account the purchase price of 135,000 
Cyprus Pounds paid in 1973; the purchase price of GBP 1,400,000 agreed in 2006; 
the offer of the Interested Party in 2007 to pay GBP 1,750,000 for the property”.137 
The High Administrative Court quashed the IPC’s decision on the grounds 
that it had been delivered without justification because, although during the hearings, 
expert witness testimonies were heard and reports submitted as exhibits, the 
Commission had failed, as required by Law No 67/2005, to explain how the sum of 
£2.5 million had been determined, indicating in particular to which pieces of 
evidence it had given credit, how much weight had been attached to them, and which 
had been discarded.138 The parties to the case appealed but the case was withdrawn 
once the IPC decided to revise its decision. 
Applying the phrase used by the ECtHR in its just satisfaction decisions,139 
the IPC has stated that it makes an “equitable assessment” when deciding on the 
amount of compensation. While this may, prima facie, seem laudable, merely 
invoking the Court’s terminology is no substitute for a reasoned explanation. 
Furthermore, on the grounds that it militates against consistency and predictability, 
commentators have criticized the Court itself for not disclosing the basis of its 
calculations in determining the quantum of just satisfaction awarded.140 For example, 
according to Mowbray, “the Court’s consideration of damage claims reveals a 
worrying lack of transparency in the reasoning” and, ironically, while it criticized the 
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applicant’s method it “totally failed” itself to provide any basis for its own 
determination.141 Furthermore, in view of the fact that the IPC considered the 
applicant’s claims ex officio, and offered a method for the calculation of pecuniary 
damages in Xenides-Arestis,142  it is difficult to understand why it has been so 
reluctant to provide reasons for its own awards. The Vice-President noted that there 
have been eight applications to the High Administrative Court by the parties against 
the decisions of the IPC claiming that the decisions were unjustified. In this respect, 
the IPC has started to revise its decisions.143   
“Transparency” is also relevant for offers made by the defendant at friendly 
settlement meetings. Lawyer Y notes that the Ministry of Interior claims to make 
offers according to comparable sales from finalized applications before the IPC 
and/or similar properties around or in the vicinity of those subject to the application 
in question. Although the Ministry increases the values to a certain extent while 
making an offer, Y argues that details of comparable sales are not being set forth 
transparently by the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, although the Ministry claims 
that a sum for loss of use is also included in the amounts offered, since these are not 
separated, applicants are unable to distinguish the value of their properties from the 
amount for loss of use.  
Lack of transparency is also an issue regarding payment of compensation, 
execution of judgments and fairness of proceedings. Claiming that the process with 
respect to payments is not transparent, lawyer Sağıroğlu, gave a recent example from 
his files to illustrate that some representatives are given priority over others with 
respect to payments. Although a particular file had been finalized before another, the 
latter was paid earlier:  
There was a finalised application which they paid approximately two months 
ago, I have realised that there have been other payments for more recent 
decisions, but the one I mentioned was paid after those. 
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He believes that the IPC should interfere to prevent unfairness during the process.  
On the other hand, according to representative X, neither the IPC nor the 
Ministry of Interior have responsibility for the timing of payments since this is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. 
According to Tarik Kadri, the fact that the process of payments is not 
transparent has been causing arbitrariness tantamount to abuse of power by the 
Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance: 
I have seen applications awaiting payment for three years. There have been 
payments for more recent applications but not for older dated decisions. I 
believe that there’s an unfairness related to the order of payments. The Ministry 
of Finance has discretion regarding the order of payments and I believe that this 
discretionary power is not being used in line with objective criteria. 
During the interview of 2 July 2018, neither the President nor the Vice-President 
wanted to comment on this, stating that payment of compensation is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance. The 
information regarding the amount paid so far has not been provided on the IPC's 
web-page. In this regard, it can be queried whether the process is fully transparent. 
The fact that the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance are responsible for 
execution of awards might be the reason. However, this is not an adequate ground 
against greater transparency. Article 13 of Law No 67/2005 provides that the IPC has 
the power “to take necessary measures and decisions in order to conclude the 
proceedings concerning the amount of compensation to be paid to the applicants”. 
However, the IPC in fact absolves itself from the process of execution and the 
powers in this respect have not been used so far. A solution could be to amend the 
IPC Law in order to place execution proceedings under the supervision and contol of 
the IPC. 
 A new database containing detailed information on applications, except for 
those where a special decision for confidentiality has been taken by the IPC, is 








C. Mortgages and other encumbrances 
Another problem faced by the IPC arises from the fact that the Ministry of the 
Interior is unwilling to make an offer for friendly settlement and to take over 
properties unless encumbrances, such as mortgages created on or before 20 July 
1974, have been discharged. Applicants have two choices in such circumstances. 
They can either contact the lender (usually a bank – and if not applicants face further 
problems as revealed by the interviews carried out with lawyers) to have the 
encumbrance discharged from the title at the Land Registry Office in the north, or 
file a case at the relevant District Court in the north to have it cancelled.  However, 
the former is very difficult in practice and obtaining a decision from the Law Courts 
to cancel a mortgage is also time consuming in some cases. Nevertheless, it can be 
achieved as two applicants to the IPC proved the first time the mortgage issue was 
brought before the law courts of the TRNC.144 Both the District Court and the Court 
of Appeal cancelled the mortgage in question stating that the applicant proved that 
the payment had been made.145 
The obligation to discharge mortgages/encumbrances on abandoned property 
might be considered an obstacle for applicants in IPC litigation, since it involves 
interests in addition to those of the applicant. But it is not a matter which the 
domestic legal system can simply ignore. There is, however, scope at the preliminary 
hearing stage for improving how this issue is managed. Currently, the Ministry does 
not make an offer where there are mortgages/encumbrances on the property and, in 
such circumstances, the IPC also postpones the application indefinitely. A new 
preliminary hearing date is only provided once it has been proven that the 
mortgage/encumbrance has been discharged. However, if a conditional offer were 
made at the first preliminary hearing, the IPC could reach a final decision once all the 
requisite documents had been submitted without the need for a second preliminary 
hearing. 
Lawyer Murat Hakkı, who acted for Christopher Stylianou as outlined above, 
also considers the issue of mortgages as an obstacle for applicants. Hakkı mentions 
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that he was surprised when the Attorney General’s Office strongly argued at the 
District Court that a 43-year old mortgage still existed, while, the creditor Bank of 
Cyprus did not even appear to claim the existence of such a debt. According to 
Hakkı, Law No 24/1979 of the RoC cancelled the mortgages existing on or before 
1974 over GC properties abandoned in the north. However, the TC authorities insist 
that this law has no applicability in the north. Hakkı filed another case in this respect, 
rejected by the Famagusta District Court currently pending for hearing at the Court of 
Appeal. According to him, whether a debt exists or not should be determined by the 
legislation governing the conditions giving rise to it. Since debts, and thus mortgages, 
concerned here were created in line with the laws of the RoC, their extinction should 
be assessed according to these. Thus, Hakkı contends that the issue of mortgages, 
being an obstacle for GCs before the IPC, could be solved if the TC authorities, 
taking Law No 24/1979 into account, deemed the said mortgages extinct. Lawyer 
Tarik Kadri agreeing with Hakkı, states that the procedure prevents applications 
being processed before the IPC. He adds that, bringing the creditors to the land 
registries in the north to have the mortgages discharged is almost impossible, not 
least because of non-recognition of the TRNC authorities in the north by them.  He 
also refers to previous practice which was simpler where the applicants used to 
submit a statement from the creditor that “the debt in question no longer existed”. He 
notes that he finalised an application by submitting this statement to the IPC, whereas 
in another file with the same mortgage, the same document was not accepted as a 
result of the change of stance of the defendant. On the other hand, lawyer Minhan 
Sağıroğlu is of the opinion that the recent practice with respect to mortgages is in line 
with the relevant legislation in the north, but is not practical. He suggests that, instead 
of obliging applicants to apply to district courts and to prove payment of debts, 
mortgages could be discharged from the land registry books through examination of 
documents submitted by them including a written statement from the creditor 
showing the debt no longer exists. According to Sağıroğlu, the current process of 
obtaining a court order to have the mortgage discharged is time consuming. He also 
points out that the Attorney General’s Office obliges applicants to appear during the 
court proceedings which causes an unreasonable burden, particularly for older ones. 
Representative X also agrees that the current practice regarding mortages is a clear 
and correct one which prevents abuses. However, when the creditor is a natural 





highly difficult to find legal heirs for necessary procedures. Presenting the same 
difficulties, lawyer Y states that a more practical way such as reserving the amount of 
debt in a fund or an account for any possible future claims by creditors can be found.  
Referring to the current procedure to have the mortgages discharged through 
an order of the law courts and stating that applicants file search documents at the IPC 
showing that there are no mortgages and/or encumbrances over the properties, 
Achilleas Demetriades states: 
[…] this means the IPC does not recognise the documents issued by the 
Republic of Cyprus They recognise the title in relation to the ownership, but not 
in relation to the extinction of mortgages. People declared their ownership and 
got title deeds, the same applies for mortgages as well, they declared that the 
mortgage is extinguished, so it should be accepted. If you recognise the title 
deed of the Republic of Cyprus, by logical implication, you have to recognise the 
charges as well, if the documents say there are no charges on that title you have 
to recognise that as well. 
In fact, this is because the original land registry records showing ownership and other 
encumbrances on or before 20 July 1974 are with the Turkish authorities. Thus, the 
Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General’s Office assert that encumbrances 
could only be discharged after going through the necessary procedures governed by 
the legislation in the TRNC. However, according to Demetriades, if the IPC were 
willing to solve this issue, other ways could have been found to overcome the 
problems with mortgages. One solution could be to set the amount of mortgage aside 
and make an offer accordingly as Demetriades suggests. He further notes that, the 
opportunity to object, if any, by creditors could be provided through publications in 
newspapers in the RoC. As Demetriades claims, interrupting the whole procedure 











D. Execution of Judgments Awarding Compensation 
Problems regarding the payment of compensation, including the lack of provision for 
interest, have also arisen.146 For example, Murat Hakkı, a lawyer who represented an 
applicant at the IPC in application no. 1496/2011, filed a writ of seizure and sale (to 
enforce court decisions) for eleven cars, possessed by the TRNC Ministry of Finance 
and Ministry of Agriculture, in respect of which the IPC had awarded his client 
£2,121,830.147 On 9 July 2015, the Chief of the Nicosia District Court Registry 
requested a directive from the Nicosia District Court to dismiss it. On 10 July 2015, 
the District Court of Nicosia cancelled the writ stating that the applicant had not 
signed the friendly settlement agreement relinquishing his rights over his properties 
and that, under these circumstances, the decision of the IPC could not be executed. 
The applicant appealed.148 Referring to Article 14 of Law No 67/2005 and Article 6 
of the Rules of the IPC, the appellant claimed that the decisions of the IPC have 
binding effect and, like the judgments of the judiciary, are executory and should be 
implemented without delay upon service to the authorities concerned within a period 
of one month. Hakki also claims that the relevant friendly settlement agreement149 
should have been signed simultaneously with the payment of the agreed 
compensation. In other words, it was alleged that the agreement is intended to act as 
a receipt confirming payment and full satisfaction of the award. The Court of Appeal 
affirmed Article 14 of Law No 67/2005, which provides that: “The decisions of the 
Commission have binding effect and are of an executory nature similar to judgments 
of the judiciary. Such decisions shall be implemented without delay upon service on 
the authorities concerned.” But it observed that the IPC Law did not make the 
procedure and mode of enforcement clear. Article 6 of the Rules of the IPC was also 
noted. The first three paragraphs of this provision are as follows: 
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6. (1) The Ministry responsible for Housing Affairs shall execute the decision of 
the Commission relating to restitution, exchange, compensation in lieu of the 
immovable property, compensation for non-pecuniary damages due to loss of 
the right to respect for home and compensation for loss of use. In execution of 
such decision, the Ministry responsible for Housing Affairs shall prepare a draft 
friendly settlement agreement in accordance with Form 3 and serve it to the 
applicant who has demonstrated his legitimate rights together with an invitation 
letter.  
(2) The invitation letter shall state that the applicant who has demonstrated his 
legitimate rights should either personally or through a representative come to 
sign the draft friendly settlement agreement within one month. Otherwise, the 
draft friendly settlement agreement will be deemed rejected and he shall have 
the right to apply to the High Administrative Court. 
(3) Should the applicant who has demonstrated his legitimate rights either 
personally or through his representative accept the draft friendly settlement 
agreement, this draft shall be signed by the Minister responsible for Housing 
Affairs and by him or his representative. 
In this respect, the Court held that, unless the steps described above are taken, a 
decision of the IPC is not “complete”. It further addressed paragraph 5 of the same 
provision which states that the interested parties have the right of appeal if the 
dispute is not resolved through a friendly settlement agreement. As a result, the Court 
concluded that, until the friendly settlement agreement is signed by the parties, the 
defendant is not obliged to pay compensation awarded by the IPC and thus, it is not 
possible to file a writ of seizure and sale against the defendant for execution of the 
decision.  
This is a surprising judgment. As maintained previously, a friendly settlement 
agreement is signed simultaneously with the payment of the agreed compensation. 
By signing it, applicants relinquish all their rights over their properties. In the 
presence of an official of the relevant land registry, they also sign land registry 
documents to transfer their properties to the TRNC. Thus, the issue of payment of 
compensation, which, in fact, is the execution of a decision of the IPC, and the issue 





binding effect of the IPC decisions" cannot be considered separately from them 
since, otherwise, the defendant would have sole authority to initiate the process for 
payment. The execution of a judgment or an award issued by any court or tribunal is 
an integral part of the trial and the remedy provided would be illusory if a binding 
decision remained inoperative. As expressed by the Court of Appeal, Article 14 of 
Law No 67/2005 does not provide a mechanism and/or a procedure for the 
enforcement of IPC decisions. Thus, the applicant, pursuant to Article 9 of the Rules 
of the IPC, resorted to the Civil Procedure Rules applied at the Law Courts to enforce 
the relevant decision.150 By concluding that the enforcement of IPC decisions is only 
possible following the signing of the friendly settlement agreement, the Court, in 
fact, decided that they can only be enforcable once the applicant is fully satisfied by 
the payment of the compensation awarded. In other words, since the applicants are 
fully satisfied on the day of signing the friendly settlement agreement, it should not 
be necessary for them to proceed for the execution of a decision after that stage as 
well. The Court should have weighed the rights of the applicants against the interests 
of the defendant and should not have left it to them to enforce a decision to the 
detriment of the respondent. This has meant that compensation agreed between the 
parties remains unpaid and unenforcable until the respondent decides to do so, and 
the applicant is deprived of an effective remedy in this respect. Following the 
decision of the Court of Appeal, the applicant applied to the ECtHR. The respondent 
then decided to execute the decision of the IPC and the compensation awarded to the 
applicant immediately. Consequently, the applicant withdrew his case at 
Strasbourg.151 However, the problem caused by the decision of the Court of Appeal 
remains. The applicant only managed to receive the payment as a result of his 
application to the Strasbourg Court. If he did not have the necessary means, he might 
still have been waiting for payment. As Hakkı indicates, the decision of the Court 
provided the defendant with the opportunity to pay applicants when it suits. Hakkı is 
of the opinion that there is no effective means at applicants’ disposal to execute the 
decisions of the IPC and this is a violation of the rights to a fair trial and to property. 
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In pursuit of this claim he filed ten applications at the ECtHR, seven of which were 
withdrawn since the Turkish authorities paid a few months after the cases had been 
communicated to them. According to Hakkı, the payment was made to protect 
Turkey’s reputation in the international community.   
Representative X, contemplating on the same problems, affirms that there 
have been applicants who filed cases at the ECtHR and were paid within three 
months once the ECtHR cases had been communicated to the respondent. 
Lawyer Y notes, for example, that in 2011, payments were made in 
approximately three or four months, whereas currently this has been taking more than 
two years.  
Achilleas Demetriades also points out: 
We do not have applications pending for payment now. But some clients come to 
us from other lawyers and say that they have judgments awaiting payment for 1 
year, 18 months etc. Asking us what to do. We used two of these as examples in 
Andriani Joannou case at the ECtHR as proof of delays. And why there is no 
interest, why are we, in fact, lending money to [the] IPC when this is our 
property? 
Yet, in spite of all these issues, not only is prompt payment apparently not 
happening, but, as already indicated, delay also seems to have led to a sharp decrease 
in the number of applications to the IPC and to an increase in lack of trust by the 
applicants to it. Solutions under discussion include a legal requirement upon current 
owners to contribute to the payment of compensation. If this will be porposed asa 
solution for lack of resources for payment of compensation, it should be carefully 
considered. It is not possible to comment on this under current circumstances since 
there is no concrete proposal before the TRNC Assembly. Providing that the item in 
the budget for this would be under the control of the IPC itself could be another 
solution to prevent the arbitrary use of resources instead of payment of 
compensation.  
According to Erkmen, the President of the IPC, finalising more applications 
under Law No 13/2008 which was touched upon above under sub-section “Process”, 





payment of compensation under Law No 67/2005.152 However, this could only make 
a minor contribution to solving the problem on account of the scope of the former. 
 
 
E. Corporate Ownership 
Article 6(2) of the IPC law states that the applicant must prove beyond reasonable 
doubt that, inter alia, the immovable property was registered in their name on 20 July 
1974 or that they inherited it legally. This creates difficulties where abandoned 
property is in corporate ownership because, in Meleagrou and others v. Turkey the 
ECtHR rejected complaints that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Article 8 and 14 ECHR 
had been violated in respect of fourteen plots of land owned by a registered company 
on the grounds that they were incompatible with the Convention on the ratione 
materiae criterion since the applicants could not claim property rights in land owned 
by a company, still in existence, in which they were shareholders.153  
But what if the company which was the owner of a property in 1974 no longer 
exists and the properties have been transferred to its shareholders?  The question of 
whether a company can have "legal heirs" within the meaning of the Law was raised 
before the Strasbourg Court on 7 October 2015 in another case.154 The applicant 
Pavlos Loizou born in 1961, whose family lived in Kyrenia and owned property there 
prior to the military intervention in 1974 has been living in Nicosia since. The 
properties include the family home (plot 146), which was registered in the name of 
the applicant’s mother, and two commercial properties (plots 213 and 233), which 
were registered in the name of a limited company, Neocles Loizou Successors 
(NLS), the sole shareholders in which were the applicant’s parents. According to 
NLS’s articles of association, the two commercial properties were to be distributed 
between the applicant and his two brothers if the shareholders so decided. When the 
applicant’s mother died in 1990, his father transferred all three properties to the 
applicant and his brothers and in 2010, the applicant’s brothers transferred their 
shares to the applicant, making him the sole owner. On 23 September 2011, the 
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applicant lodged an application with the IPC for all three properties. At a preliminary 
hearing on 20 November 2014, the Ministry of the Interior informed both the 
applicant and the Commission that no offer could be made in respect of the family 
home unless the claims made in respect of the two commercial properties were 
withdrawn. The applicant withdrew his claims to two commercial properties without 
prejudice based on his understanding that the relevant legislation, as interpreted by 
the TRNC High Administrative Court155 did not allow for an award of compensation 
unless it could be proven that the claimant was the legal heir of the individual in 
whose name the immovable property had originally been registered. On 17 April 
2015, following an agreement between the parties, the IPC decided that the TRNC 
authorities should pay £190,000 (approximately €270,000) to the applicant in respect 
of the family home. Before the ECtHR the applicant claimed that there had been a 
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR with respect to the two commercial 
properties. Referring to his GC origins, he alleged that there had also been a violation 
of Article 14 taken in conjunction with this provision. Furthermore, relying on 
Article 13 ECHR (the right to an effective remedy), he alleged that he had been 
denied an effective remedy because the relevant law, as interpreted by the TRNC 
High Administrative Court in Eleni Meleagrou v the Immovable Property 
Commission, does not allow compensation for a property transferred from a company 
to a natural person. The Court was of the opinion that the mere existence of doubts as 
to the prospect of success of the applicants’ property rights cannot be considered a 
valid reason for failure to exhaust of domestic remedies. Thus, the case was declared 
inadmissible.156 
According to Minhan Sağıroğlu, the lawyer representing the applicant in 
Pavlos Loizou v Turkey, the fact that the government of Cyprus did not intervene in 
the proceedings at the ECtHR sent a political message to other GCs. In fact, the 
government of Cyprus had not intervened in either Joannou v Turkey or Pavlos 
Loizou v Turkey. On 30 March 2018, I sent a registered letter to the Attorney 
General’s Office of the Republic of Cyprus, requesting an answer to the question of 
“what the official position of the Government of the RoC is regarding the IPC and 
the reason(s) behind the decision not to intervene in the proceedings concerning GC 
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property cases at the Strasbourg Court in which the subject matter is the Immovable 
Property Commission”. The reply, which was received on 24 April 2018 through e-
mail, was as follows: 
Unfortunately, the specific information you have requested, which first and 
foremost concerns the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, is not in the 
public domain. The Attorney General of the Republic is therefore not in a 
position to comment in his official capacity, on the official position of the 
Government regarding the IPC, nor on the reasons for which the Republic 
decided not to intervene in the said procedure. 
For Pavlos Loizou v Turkey, Sağıroğlu states:  
I was of the opinion that there was no need to exhaust the IPC as a domestic 
remedy in this case. The properties in question belonged to the applicant’s 
family company. My client, in this case, became the owner of the properties 
following the dissolution of the said company. Law No 67/2005 is silent whether 
it is possible to claim ownership for such properties. The Law does not allow for 
an award of compensation, unless it can be proven that the claimant was the 
legal heir of the “individual” in whose name the immovable property had 
originally been registered. We had also discussed this with the president and the 
primeminister of the TRNC and the Deputy Attorney General and they had 
agreed with us that the Law should be amended in this respect to expand its 
scope. 
From a practical standpoint, it seems that the applicant’s lawyers could have asked 
for a hearing date if they believed there was room for discussion and scope for 
counter arguments. However, as revealed by Sağıroğlu, the Deputy Attorney General 
also considered that the Law should be amended to expand its scope. Furthermore, 
the TRNC authorities informed the applicant at the preliminary hearing stage that no 
offer would be made in respect of the family home unless the claims for the two 
commercial properties were withdrawn. In this regard, such a conditional offer might 
force the applicant withdraw some of his properties from the application since it had 
taken more than three years to reach a preliminary hearing. In 2018, Pavlos Loizou 





family company which he had to withdraw as explained above. How the case is 
going to be finalized by the IPC remains to be seen.  
 
 
VI. The Politics of the IPC 
As addressed in Chapter 1, interviewing representatives of political parties in the 
north and south of Cyprus was part of this research. Since one of the wider objectives 
of the thesis is to discover the relationship between the IPC and transitional justice, 
setting out their views on the negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem, the 
contribution of the IPC and their opinions on the process before it and the property 
dispute in general adds a valuable dimension.  
Eight political parties are currently represented in the Republic of Cyprus 
House of Representatives in the south. Democratic Rally (DISY) (centre-right) has 
18 seats, Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) (left-wing) has 16 seats, 
Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) (centre-left) has 3 seats, Citizens’ Alliance 
(centre-right to centre-left) has 3 seats, and Green Party (centre left) has 2 seats.157 
Their position is addressed below. On the other hand, Democratic Party (DIKO) 
(centre-right) with 9 seats, National People’s Front (ELAM) (far-right) with 2 seats, 
and Solidarity Movement (centre-right) with 2 seats are amongst political parties in 
the south which did not participate in the research.158 DIKO believes that it must be 
agreed that the RoC will continue to exist after a settlement agreement, intervention 
rights must be abolished, Turkish troops must leave before a referendum on an 
agreed solution is held, and they must depart completely before the implementation 
of any solution.159 ELAM, having an ultranationalist stance, takes a strict anti-
federalist line concerning the Cyprus dispute.160 On 26 March 2014 for example, 
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amongst other violent attacks, ELAM members attempted to interrupt and stop a 
reunification conference in Limassol, one of the speakers at which was the TC 
politician Mehmet Ali Talat.161 Finally, Solidarity Movement, is against a bi-zonal 
bi-communal federation, emphasizes the need to safeguard the Republic of Cyprus, 
and supported DIKO leader Nicholas Papadopoulos for the Republic of Cyprus 
presidential elections in January 2018.162 
Six parties are currently represented in the TRNC General Assembly in the 
north and I managed to interview all. National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi, 
UBP) (centre-right) has 21 seats, Republican Turkish Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk 
Partisi, CTP) (centre-left) has 12 seats, People’s Party (Halkın Partisi, HP) (centre) 
has 9 seats, Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) (centre-right) has 3 seats, 
Communal Democracy Party (Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi, TDP) (centre-left) has 3 
seats, and Rebirth Party (Yeniden Doğuş Partisi, YDP) (centre-right) has 2 seats.163  
 In the north, CTP, the party of the current TRNC Prime Minister Tufan 
Erhürman, was unwilling to participate in a face-to-face interview but the questions 
were answered by a member of the Party in writing. Questions on the current 
situation in Cyprus and further questions to clarify some other issues were left blank. 
In the south, DISY answered the questions via e-mail, but with clear answers. A face-
to-face interview was held with EDEK, and further questions were answered with 
full cooperation via e-mail. Interviews with the rest of the political parties in the 
north and south were carried out face-to-face with either the President/Leader of the 
Party or another person to whom I was referred.  
In the beginning, my aim was solely to add flavour to the thesis. Yet, it can be 
said that interviews with the parties provided me with a sample representing a 
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significant percentage of the electoral vote. In any case, the comments I gathered 
should not be taken as representative of the views of the whole population, but as 
representing the views of some key players and stakeholders who can provide insight 
into the process.  
The main results of the interviews according to themes relevant to “the 
Cyprus Problem”, “the IPC” and “Property Issue as Part of the Cyprus Problem” are 
addressed below, followed by a brief analysis. 
 
A. The Cyprus Problem 
1. Political Parties Represented in the House of Representatives of 
the Republic of Cyprus164 
None of the political parties in the RoC is against a solution of the Cyprus problem 
but they do not agree about what this should entail.   
While EDEK and Citizens’ Alliance support continuation of the Republic of 
Cyprus, DISY and AKEL support a comprehensive, lasting and a viable solution, 
based on a bi-zonal – bi-communal federation, in line with UN Security Council 
Resolutions, international and EU law. The former desires a truly independent and 
sovereign federal state, where the latter cannot accept partition as a solution. 
Stephanou from AKEL notes:  
Partition will function as a source of problems. The Greek Cypriot displaced 
will accuse Turkish Cypriot community for occupation and violation of their 
property rights, and the Turkish Cypriots will accuse Greek Cypriots. Partition 
will strengthen hatred and will prevent the two communities from building 
cooperation. 
The Green Party’s main concerns are the changing demographic situation in 
the north, Turkey’s influence and the presence of Turkish troops even if a solution 
agreement is reached by the parties. Addressing the same issue, Stephanou, AKEL 
Spokesperson, states:  
If the current situation continues, I am not so sure about the future of the Greek 
Cypriot community, but I worry more for the future of the Turkish Cypriot 
                                                            





community - a small community with the presence of so many settlers from 
Turkey in north, I don’t know how they will survive. 
For DISY, the Chapters on “territorial adjustments” and “security and guarantees” 
are at the heart of the negotiations which will ultimately define whether a solution 
can in fact be reached. The Party maintains that the failure in Crans Montana, 
Switzerland in June 2017 was caused by Turkey’s insistence on the continuation of 
the system of “Guarantees” with permanent presence of its troops. Stavrides states:  
We consider the current regime of Guarantees and Intervention Rights as 
anachronistic. Cyprus is, and will continue to be an EU member state post 
reunification. A viable, functioning, modern state that is a member of the EU is 
in no need of guarantees from a third country. The best guarantee for security is 
a well-functioning state. 
Lillikas, the President of the Citizens’ Alliance, also claims that the new deadlock 
following the Crans Montana conference is due to Turkish insistence upon the 
continuation of guaratees and the presence of Turkish troops on the island: 
From my point of view, no modern state, especially a member of the EU, can 
have guarantors and foriegn troops on its land; otherwise it is not a real 
independent State.  
He further adds that the Cyprus problem is a matter of “foreign invasion and 
occupation”, that it is not a problem between the two communities and that no 
serious incidents between the two communities have been observed for the last 15 
years since the opening of check points which allowed cross-border visits by both 
sides. Indicating the media news regarding the attacks on Turkish Cypriot cars or 
other incidents in the south, Lillikas notes that these are exaggerated by the Turkish 








2. Political Parties Represented in the General Assembly of the 
TRNC165 
Both UBP and YPD maintain that an open-ended negotiation process is 
unacceptable, arguing that, in the absence of a timeframe, a two-state solution would 
be preferable. YDP further cites the examples of Kosovo, Taiwan and Nakhchivan 
Autonomous Republic (an exclave of Azerbaijan), suggesting these as alternative 
models for the TRNC. DP blames GCs for not endorsing the parameters (bi-
communal – bi-zonal federation), in fact, agreed by the parties with the 1977-79 High 
Level Agreements, and is of the opinion that it is difficult to achieve a just solution as 
long as GCs consider TCs as a “minority”. TDP advocates both sides should make 
compromises to reach a consensus, claiming that the Turkish side showed its 
readiness to do so in Crans Montana. HP, on the other hand, claims that the problem 
is the lack of a common understanding of “a bi-zonal – bi-communal federal state 
based on political equality of both sides”. In the absence of a solution on the basis of 
UN parameters, Özersay, the President of HP, suggests a different model which 
would leave room for more concessions to be made by both sides. For example, 
according to him, TCs could compromise more with respect to territorial 
adjustments, reinstatement of properties, security and guarantees than those 
necessary to achieve a federal solution. In other words, he supports a model based on 
the “cooperation” of two states, instead of a model based on “sharing” in a 
federation. 
Unfortunately, CTP did not answer the question about how the Party views the 
current situation and the Cyprus problem for this research. Yet the Party is known to 
back a federal solution. 
 
 
B. The IPC 
1. Political Parties Represented in the House of Representatives of 
the Republic of Cyprus166 
None of the interview participants in the RoC recognise the legitimacy of the IPC. 
While some parties have a policy of discouraging people from applying to it,167 
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others just inform them of its character and consider that people are free to resort to it 
or not.168 
Satvrides, DISY Secretary for Political Planing, particularly notes: 
There is no logic in having the victim applying to the offender for justice. We do 
know, that, the IPC claims that it examines impartially the applications of Greek 
Cypriot refugees for restitution, compensation or exchange of their property in 
the occupied areas, but in reality, the procedure is very slow, it almost never 
includes restitution as a measure of therapy and calculates the value of the 
Greek Cypriot properties in humiliatingly low prices. This is the main reason 
why applications from Greek Cypriots to the IPC have decreased dramatically 
the last few years. 
This extract summarizes the issues addressed by other political parties to a great 
extent. Some also argue that applicants should have had the right to claim for loss of 
use only, instead of compensation for the value of their property, which, in essence 
leads to relinquishing their rights over them.169 However, accepting this would meant 
that applicants can come to the IPC periodically and indefinitely to claim loss of use 
until a political solution to the Cyprus problem is achieved, which is not in line with 
the essence of the system established by the IPC.170 They also observe that a vast 
majority of applicants do not want to be dispossessed of their land,171 yet they resort 
to the IPC for economic reasons.172 For example, Pavlides, the International 
Secretary of the Green Party, notes that they do not denounce people as “traitors” for 
applying to the IPC, but consider them as “people in dire economic necessity”. Or, 
for example, Stephanou, the Spokesperson of AKEL, states that his party does not 
believe that the IPC is effective and that the property issue can only be solved with 
the solution of the Cyprus problem itself. They neither consider people resorting 
there as “traitors”, nor publish “name and shame lists” in the press. 
None of the parties is of the opinion that the IPC can have a role in building 
trust and understanding between the two major communities in Cyprus. Lillikas 
observes that the IPC cannot be deemed as “acknowledgment” of the suffering of GC 
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displaced persons. He states that Turkey had to establish the IPC, otherwise “the 
ECtHR would continue to take decisions against [it]”. 
DISY also claims that the IPC enhances hostile feelings between the two 
communities for imposing humiliatingly low level of compensation on displaced 
persons facing financial difficulties, and for “legitimizing the illegal occupation of 
their properties”. Stavrides, the Secretary for Political Planning of DISY, also states 
that this has resulted in a dramatic drop in the number of applications to the IPC by 
GCs during the last few years. He suggests that the property issue can only be dealt 
with in the context of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem.  
EDEK also regards the IPC as an outcome of “the Turkish invasion and the 
continued occupation”, noting that it would be “a paradox” if it had a role in 
acknowledging the suffering of victims of displacement. Indicating that the Republic 
of Cyprus governments have not sufficiently supported displaced GCs,173 the party 
backs the establishment of a “support fund” to provide compensation for “loss of use, 
harassment or exploitation of land”, which would eventually discourage anyone from 
resorting to “the illegal committee” to “sell” their property.  
Lillikas, the President of Citizens’ Alliance, observes that governments did 
the most they could for the displaced, yet notes that mistakes were made at later 
stages when a special tax was introduced as a contribution, but used for other 
purposes. Lillikas adds that if this had been managed wisely, the position of the 
displaced would have been much better today.  
AKEL is of the opinion that the RoC governments have sufficiently supported 
the displaced, yet the party notes that there is always room for improvement. DISY 
also shares the same view while indicating that:  
The Turkish Invasion displaced almost 200.000 Greek Cypriots from their 
homes and properties and resulted in the illegal occupation of 37% of the 
island, 60% of the coast line and more than 50% of 1974's natural resources of 
the island (water supply, farm land, animal stock etc.). Therefore it was - and 
still is - impossible for the Republic of Cyprus to compensate refugees for their 
suffering and loss of property. However, it is true that all governments from 
1974 could do more to ease the suffering of refugees and help them to re-enter 
in the economy. Having said that, it is crucial to underline that only through the 
                                                            





solution of the Cyprus Problem and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the 
island, we can hope to deal with the injustices and problems that the division 
brought to refugees and persons that lost their properties, Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots. 
2. Political Parties Represented in the General Assembly of the 
TRNC174 
All interviewed parties addressed the financial difficulties arising from payment of 
compensation and lengthy delays before the IPC. CTP, HP, DP and TDP which 
formed the coalition government in February 2018 included in its program that: 
[…]the necessary arrangements should immediately be made and the necessary 
international relations will be re-established for the immovable property 
commission to work as an effective domestic mechanism in line with the criteria 
established by the ECtHR within the framework of the ECHR, the work for the 
establishment of a predictable system of immovable properties will be among 
our priorities. Measures will be taken to support the immovable property 
commission with a new and reasonable financing model. Necessary amendments 
will be made to enable the Commission to work effectively and rapidly. 
Despite the framed intention and the desire for improved effectiveness of the IPC, the 
interviews revealed that the coalition parties neither have concrete proposals nor have 
any steps been taken so far, but only have abstract ideas for the IPC’s improvement.  
For example, CTP acknowledges the need to find local sources for funding 
awards by the IPC, so far provided by the Republic of Turkey, but the party did not 
want to clarify this issue.175 
HP, on the other hand, has further ideas about the issue. Özersay is of the 
opinion that alternative methods should be introduced if partition remains. For 
example, instead of a full process before the IPC, registration of private deals and/or 
amicable settlement agreements between individuals could be a more flexible 
process.176 Another suggestion is to broaden the scope of Law No 13/2008177 to 
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include persons holding title according to TRNC legislation as applicants before the 
IPC enabling them to reach settlements with GC property owners to diminish the 
financial burden on the State in payment of compensation.178  For problems with 
respect to the “exchange of properties”  addressed in the relevant sub-section above, 
HP notes that the Committee of Ministers and the ECtHR could have a role in 
reinforcing and making this remedy fairer in practice. 
All respondents considered that a special form of tax would burden current 
users of GC properties, but nevertheless stated that this kind of a legal arrangement 
needs careful consideration. It is said that this could contribute to awards by the IPC. 
Except for YDP, the parties neither addressed what the percentage of tax should be 
nor any other details.  
Nevertheless, UBP and HP particularly noted that such a tax payment should 
only take place at the time of sale of the relevant property by its current user, instead 
of, as some propose, the time of payment of compensation awarded by the IPC. UBP 
also suggested that this tax could be imposed on condition that there had been an 
increase in the value of the relevant property. TDP noted that the characteristics of 
current users as tax payers are also important; for example, whether they hold GC 
property titles “in exchange of their property in the south” or in another capacity. DP 
added that this kind of tax could contribute to the process but would not suffice to 
overcome the present challenges faced by the IPC. YDP claims that the IPC’s 
problems are, to a great extent, the result of the unwillingness of TRNC governments 
to establish a concrete position with respect to any improvements such as the 
proposal by Turkey to introduce a special form of tax as a burden on current users of 
GC properties as noted above. Arıklı, the President of YDP, also explains the logic of 
this proposal: At the time it was proposed, Turkey was of the opinion that the 
relevant properties become “undisputed” through payment of compensation to GC 
owners, causing a considerable increase in their value. The proposed contribution 
ratio was 50% of the amount of compensation at the time of payment of the award by 
the IPC, while the TRNC government managed to reduce this to 20%. Arıklı states 
that the TRNC governments have not introduced necessary legal provisions and thus 
Turkey cut its contribution to the IPC awards in this respect. Arıklı stresses that his 
Party fully supports Turkey’s position and proposals. According to him, the most 
                                                            





affected users of GC properties are those who came from Turkey after 1974-5 who 
insist that an option to contribute to compensation to GCs should definitely be 
provided for them, stating that their rights as being referred to as “settlers” have also 
been subject to negotiation under UN auspices.  
Respondents’ views vary when it comes to the impact of the IPC on the 
relationship between the communities in Cyprus.  
CTP states that the IPC can have a positive impact on the process of 
reconciliation, helping on one hand for the TCs to understand that they have to 
respect rights of persons who lost their properties while on the other hand, for the 
GCs to appreciate that there are other deserving parties, and to consider 
compensation as an alternative remedy. Both CTP and HP note that the IPC can also 
be considered as a mechanism to acknowledge the sufferings of the GCs. While UBP 
implies that there is nothing wrong to be acknowledged, TDP considers that it is not 
an acknowledgement of a wrong, but the backdrop for acknowledging a bi-zonal – 
bi-communal solution. Referring to the years between 1963 and 1974 in which TCs 
lived in ghettos and tents, YDP blames GCs for this, concluding that they should be 
responsible for payment of war damages, adding also that they do not deny GCs’ 
property rights. Indicating that they respect the individual right to property, DP notes 
that, the IPC being a one-sided mechanism, it can serve as a tool neither for securing 
nor acknowledging property rights of TCs. 
 
 
C. Property Issue as Part of the Cyprus Problem 
1. Political Parties in the House of Representatives of the Republic of 
Cyprus179 
It is widely assumed by the political parties in the RoC that “restitution”, 
“compensation”, “exchange of properties”, or a combination of these three will be 
available both for the GCs and TCs following resolution of the Cyprus problem. 
DISY, Citizens’ Alliance, Green Party and EDEK particularly state that legal owners 
should have the first right of say over their properties.  
Accepting that exceptions will apply to this general rule, DISY notes that 
these must be agreed upon specific criteria. Claiming that Turkey and the Turkish 
                                                            





Cypriot leadership’s aim is to create “a pure ethnic TC State in the occupied areas, 
where the vast majority of property owners are either TCs or Turkish settlers”, 
Stavrides adds: 
This is why we cannot accept the logic of Turkey that in a bizonal, bicommunal 
federation, we have two geographically ethnic-clear entities that will form a 
united Cyprus. It is obvious that the financing of the property issue in a solution 
will be complex and it has already been agreed that a Property Council will be 
formed after a solution to act as a judicial body for the property issues. The IMF 
and the World Bank have already examined the economic aspects of a solution 
and the function of the Property Council and provided the two leaders with very 
helpful suggestions on how the property issue should be dealt with. 
According to the Green Party, territorial adjustment areas to be agreed within the 
framework of a settlement agreement are of particular importance and should cover 
population centres to allow a significant number of GCs to have their properties 
back. They insist that, unless this is the case, the property issue will remain pending 
for a significant period of time. However, Citizens’Alliance, strongly opposing to it, 
contends that a bi-zonal – bi-communal federation is the legalisation of partition. In 
this respect, party President Lillikas states:  
[…] with this model, the EU citizens will be able to live in Kyrenia or in Paphos 
for example, they will have more rights and freedoms than a Cypriot, a Cypriot 
will not be able to live in Paphos or Kyrenia, and for me this is not acceptable. 
For AKEL, it is important that “ownership” is recognised but, addressing the current 
users of properties, the party states that new circumstances arising as a result of the 
passage of time cannot be ignored and that improvements over the properties should 
be taken into account.  They also argue that the emotional element cannot be 
disregarded, for example, an attachment of a GC to the house in which he/she was 
born. In other words, Stephanou rightly appreciates that each community should get 
into the shoes of the other. 
EDEK and Citizens’ Alliance note that the Annan Plan included unacceptable 
property provisions. On the other hand, for AKEL security and guarantees were of 





to postpone the referendum for amendments in the Plan with respect to “security” to 
convince the GC community to vote “yes”.  
DISY, then led by Nicos Anastasiades, backed the Annan Plan at that time. 
Stavrides states that the Plan’s property scheme limited the right of legal owners to 
reclaim their property, gave priority to current owners, introduced long-term 
government bonds (compensation bonds) which needed 25 years to mature, and 
consequently did not address expectations of the GCs to reclaim their property or to 
be compensated in a reasonable period of time. 
 
 
2. Political Parties Represented in the General Assembly of the 
TRNC180 
TDP and CTP supported the Annan Plan V and thus its property scheme in the 2004 
referendum. TDP further emphasizes the importance of the criteria to be introduced 
by a settlement agreement according to which property disputes would be solved, and 
CTP emphasizes the importance of negotiating a scheme which would be acceptable 
and feasible for both sides. 
YDP insists that the Turkish side should take “advantage” of the decision in 
Demopoulos and others, suggesting that international law set the ground rules for the 
solution of the property issue through “global exchange of properties” in the first 
place but that the Annan Plan would have complicated the property issue. DP also 
supports “global exchange” according to an evaluation of properties both in the north 
and the south to establish foundations for the solution of the property issue with a 
settlement agreement where the administration of the two sides would be responsible 
to recompense their respective communities. UBP states that while this was not the 
case for the TCs in the Annan Plan, the criteria under which the property issue would 
be resolved should be very clear and predictable.  
Noting that 14 years have passed since the Annan Plan V, HP advocates 
increasing the number and/or percentages of properties to be settled by 
“compensation”, instead of “restitution”, compared to the Plan. The Party considers 
that complications brought by the passage of time cannot be ignored and contends 
that this would be a “cost” for the GCs rejecting the Annan Plan V in 2004.  
                                                            







D. Remarks  
None of the parties are against a solution of the Cyprus problem, but when the details 
and motivations are examined, it is seen that their understanding of what this might 
involve differ to a great extent.  
It can be observed that political parties in the south mostly refer to Turkey as 
their main concern and consider it as the main party to the problem. As a left-wing 
party, AKEL is the most moderate one. Yet their understanding of bizonality also 
differs from those in the north, and the Party is keen on the consistency of a solution 
agreement with the EU acquis.   
When it comes to the IPC, political parties in the south do not recognise it as a 
remedy and, despite the fact that it was set up in line with the standards envisaged by 
the ECtHR, question its legitimacy and/or legality. Furthermore, they also do not 
want displaced persons to resort to the IPC while some even have a policy of 
discouraging them from doing so. Given these circumstances, it would be utopian to 
expect that the IPC could have been seen as a legitimate remedy by the majority of 
the GCs in the south.  
It seems the political parties in the north do not have concrete plans nor have 
they taken any steps for the improvement of the IPC so far. As long as this is the 
case, frustration faced by the applicants before the IPC is unlikely to be overcome. 
Furthermore, unless a concrete position is defined, the current situation could be used 
as a means of propaganda in the south against the IPC, which could further erode 




The IPC Law was drawn up in line with the findings of the ECtHR and it is unlikely 
it would ever have been established had it not been for a series of applications from 
GCs claiming violation of the ECHR right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
relating to property abandoned in the north. Through these cases, its character was 
effectively negotiated by the authorities of the TRNC and Turkey with Strasbourg, 
particularly the replacement of a previous version (Law No 49/2003) with a more 





recognise the IPC as a remedy and question its legitimacy and/or legality. Given that 
they also would prefer the displaced persons not to resort to the IPC, it seems 
unlikely that the IPC could have been regarded as a legitimate remedy by the 
majority of the GCs in the south.  
Although the Law offers three remedies for applicants, the most favoured and 
most straightforward is compensation. Judging the IPC, in the first instance, 
according to its own rationale and mandate, it would be difficult not to conclude that 
it has been, at the very least, a modest success. A total of £300,090,876 has been 
awarded by January 2019. Exchange and restitution have however been difficult 
although alleged unfairness regarding the amounts of compensation awarded without 
interest remains as revealed by the interviews.  
There have also been other problems. While the ECtHR has found IPC 
proceedings to be fair, they have nevertheless been lengthy, and there have been 
problems with their transparency and with the execution of judgments awarding 
compensation. While the IPC Law could be amended to address and clarify the issue 
of corporate ownership, this is not so easy for mortgages and other incumbrances. 
Lengthy delays in execution of judgments awarding compensation show the 
importance of early planning of financial resources. 
Some suggestions for possible improvements made in relevant sub-sections 
include classification of applications claiming restitution and exchange, inclusion of 
admissibility procedures to clarify locus standi of applicants in particular, and 
introducing a system for the execution of decisions under the supervision and contol 
of the IPC. Despite political difficulties, an assessment should be made to award 
and/or implement “restitution following the settlement of the Cyprus problem” as a 
remedy for properties in the fenced-off Varsoha. This could at least be considered as 
a moral remedy in the absence of the resolution of the Cyprus problem. 
Demilitarisation of the area as envisaged by the UN Resolutions could prove a more 
sustainable solution. Recent initiatives by the TRNC and Turkey, to open up the 
fenced-off Varosha, neglect the views of other relevant stakeholders to open the area 
under the administration of the TRNC. Social transformation is unlikely to emerge 
through such closed technocratic routes.181 Various institutional tracks could work 
more productively via communication with victims and affected communities.182 
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The IPC could exercise the powers envisaged in its Law on its own initiative, 
hold more hearings even in the absence of two foreign members, and coordinate 
more meetings for friendly settlement. Above all, it is open to question whether 
adversarial proceedings with the inclusion of a defendant party before the IPC is an 
appropriate process. A structure which could reflect the distinct functions consisting 
of divisions responsible for process of claims, examination of issues and execution 
could be more productive and could accelerate resolution of claims. 
The patchwork and piecemeal nature of the solutions provided by the IPC 
might undermine the confidence and trust of affected communities unless the process 
is improved.183 In the final analysis, improvement of the process at all stages and 
minimising alleged arbitrariness by the applicants’ lawyers/representatives regarding 
the process are important for the IPC’s reputation as well as building trust towards it, 
and could contribute to improving the relationship between the communities. 
However, given the fact that political parties in the north neither have concrete plans 
nor have they taken any steps for the improvement of the IPC so far, the future seems 













                                                            





Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
I. Transitional Justice and Cyprus 
 
It was addressed briefly in Chapter 1 and further in Chapter 2 that the history of 
Cyprus has been marked by the interethnic struggle between GC and TC 
communities. The underlying historical, economic, social and cultural reasons for the 
communal antagonism on the island have made achieving a political solution 
difficult, if not impossible. The history of negotiations for a solution under the UN 
“peace process” and factors having an impact on the quest for a solution were 
addressed in Chapter 3. Although UN efforts have continued for more than 40 years, 
as was observed, the issues addressed have mainly concerned structural and 
institutional dimensions of a future federal state solely in a political and legalistic 
context. Furthermore, seeking to further its own needs and aspirations, each side 
expected the other to make compromises and concessions unilaterally; i.e. there has 
been no concern for transformation of relationships between the communities. As the 
interviews with political parties revealed, while none is against a solution of the 
Cyprus problem, their understandings of what it means differ radically. Furthermore, 
political parties in the south mostly regard Turkey as the main element in the 
problem.  
As some scholars maintain, as a result of the absence of an armed conflict 
Cyprus is a “comfortable conflict”.1  Although this is unsustainable in the long term 
and despite the fact that the latest surveys show that the majority of the populations 
of both sides support a solution, it seems that leaving comfort zones has not been 
easy for many. It is not clear whether the people of Cyprus appreciate that federalism 
is based on a culture of power-sharing and equality, an understanding which could be 
improved through education and awareness raising. At the same time, prevailing 
ethno-centric nationalisms and manipulation by politicians have had the greatest 
negative impact on people’s perceptions of solutions, a factor generating communal 
fears causing an impasse regarding, in particular, the issue of security. This has not 
allowed policy options pursued so far to be replaced by more constructive ones. On 
the other hand, these approaches cannot be deemed the only hindrance to the 
realisation of a united Cyprus. Arguably, the biggest obstacle is the fact that the 
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concept of “other side” has been “institutionalized as a political strategy".2 Yakinthou 
states that, there is an “infrastructure that perpetuates a culture of mistrust” in 
Cyprus.3 Furthermore, as Yakinthou observes, there is resentment between the 
communities on the island with respect to the past; the GCs’ is centred on TC 
enjoyment of GC property, while TCs’ is centred on the view that GCs silenced them 
before 1974.4 Furthermore, the period between 1963 and 1974 is referred to and 
remembered by many TCs as a siege, while it is referred to as “the troubles” by 
GCs.5 July and August 1974 are remembered by GCs as a period of destruction and 
invasion.6 While referring to those who were killed, threatened or suffered during the 
period between the 15 July Greek Coup and the 20 July 1974 Turkish intervention, 
the TC narrative views the latter as a victory and a sacrifice required for their 
collective freedom.7 There is a lost balance in Cyprus in the sense that one side took 
possession of the RoC and prospered, while the other possessed an unreasonable 
percentage of territory/property compared to its population yet sank into economic 
stagnation. A core issue concerns the type of justice which can only be achieved once 
this lost balance is restored, at least, to a reasonable extent “without creating 
disproportionate new wrongs”8. Territory and property have been living symbols for 
the GCs since the partition of the island, and the presence of Turkey continues to 
impact the current rhetoric. Reconciliation is therefore important as a prerequisite to 
establish a regime supporting human rights and to counteract mutually antagonistic 
collective blame. Pragmatic compromises in the name of stability are also essential to 
establish a viable human rights regime in Cyprus.9 All these facts complicate the 
difficulties faced by those trying to negotiate a settlement. However, achieving 
positive peace in Cyprus is not only a matter of negotiating a solution but also of 
radically reorienting the present.10  
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 With all this in mind, it was indicated in Chapter 1 that the starting point of 
this research has been the work of the ICTJ emphasising the importance of a cross-
communal discussion in Cypriot public opinion about coming to terms with the past 
in Cyprus.11 The report of this project pointed at four particular areas of TJ deemed 
relevant to Cyprus which came to fore over the course of their work - truth-seeking 
initiatives, criminal prosecutions, memorialisation efforts, and documentation 
projects.12  
In general, TJ provides a framework for dealing with the past in transitions 
from armed conflict and/or authoritarianism. It attempts to advance more peaceful 
futures through institutional reform/guarantees of non-recurrence, reparations, truth 
and justice. While the limitations of TJ were addressed in Chapter 2, it was observed 
that the field has expanded to include a more transformative approach emphasizing a 
longer term vision. This was also essential as a result of the kind of transition in 
which Cyprus finds itself and together with TJ, TTJ was chosen as a framework for 
this thesis. At this point, negative peace where the conditions which caused violent 
conflict remain, and a positive peace which eradicates the causes of violence, and 
focuses on broad social, and the demands of transformative justice were also 
distinguished,13 because, there is still no positive peace, but rather an “absence of 
war” in which there is also injustice and personal discord and dissatisfaction; 
“negative peace, “weak or fragile peace”.14  
 The members of both communities in Cyprus do not feel they belong to a 
common State, and their mutual distrust and suspicion prevents each from seeing the 
other in a positive and constructive spirit. The collapse of the RoC is an example of 
how inadequately constructed relationships tend to provoke repeated crises. It is 
evident that it will take a long time for the communities in Cyprus to restore their 
relationships while addressing the root causes of the conflict. While TJ could provide 
insights and tools, TTJ as the final stop on a TJ continuum should be considered as 
another useful framework blending the restorative and reparative justice approaches. 
The institutional reform/GNR components of TJ have been the main linking points 
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between the two frameworks. Cyprus is not in transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy. As considered in Chapter 1 there are separately governed States on both 
sides of the island and partition only brought a temporary end to active violence.15 
Further transitions are also possible but not imminent. The problem and the 
complexity is that TJ has not been accepted by both sides as part of an official policy 
in Cyprus. The establishment of a Reconciliation Comission as proposed by the 
Annan Plan did not enter into force in 2004 and it had not been an object of public 
discussion at that time. Instead of expecting a comprehensive settlement agreement 
for the solution of the Cyprus problem to automatically overcome the distance 
between the communities, the latter must be dealt with separately. As Bryant puts it, 
the ceasefireline dividing the island operates as Lloyd’s “unclosed gash,” “a wound 
on the body politic that must be healed”.16 This “wound” or “gash” represents past 
suffering and is a reminder of the possibility of suffering in the future. Bryant notes 
that the line also signals the impossibility of “putting the past behind us.”17 For this, 
TJ should be part of a wider debate in Cyprus as well as its clear inclusion within the 
process of negotiations under the UN mediation efforts; i.e. the “peace process” as 
the UN itself calls it. 
On the other hand, on both sides of the island, the authorities attempt to deal 
with the effects of partitition, such as the property rights of each community which 
can be considered as in transition. In current circumstances, Cyprus “is not a post-
conflict society”.18 It is difficult to situate the case of Cyprus in any of the types of 
transition considered in Chapter 2. At the same time, the fact that it is unknown what 
Cyprus is transitioning to does not exclude TJ and TTJ as frameworks for analysis. In 
fact, the presence of negative peace make them even more important for Cyprus. 
Bozkurt and Yakinthou argue that, on a deeper level, if “one of the aims of 
transitional justice is the restoration of trust between citizens and institutions, there 
should be at the very least some internal agreement on the legitimacy of those 
institutions”. As a society dealing with the legacy of conflict-related issues, which, at 
the same time being held hostage by an ongoing peace process, Cyprus presents a 
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rather complex case for TJ.19 Since negotiations to solve the problem are ongoing, 
disputes and legal claims particularly over property and uncovering the remains of 
the missing have “led to the realization that everyone has his or her own Cyprus 
problem, and that for many people solving their own Cyprus problems is more than 
enough.”20 Alternative truth-seeking approaches have also been in progress, 
documentation efforts have been increasing, and some form of compensation and 
restitution have been offered to GC displaced persons.21 Though there is no agreed 
solution to the overall problem, there have been attempts to seek redress for human 
rights violations. However, these processes sit alongside, and often at odds with the 
peace process.22 It is this context and background which makes the IPC such a unique 
institution, worthy of the attention it receives in this thesis. 
 
 
II. Transitional Justice and the IPC 
This project examines the IPC through a TJ lens since, as previously noted, it 
provides an opportunity to those GCs who wants to pursue their rights over their 
properties in the north rather than awaiting a political solution. In other words, it 
gives rise to a form of transition of property rights with respect to GCs until the 
solution of the Cyprus problem. However, whether it is an effective TJ mechanism 
which could help and provide for GNR/institutional reform is another matter. 
Furthermore, since it aims to remedy property rights of displaced GCs, the attempt 
was to discover the IPC’s potential, if at all, for transforming the relationship 
between the communities in Cyprus.  
The difficulty entailed here has been the fact that TJ has not been part of an 
official policy in Cyprus, but, as the literature relevant to Cyprus indicates, more and 
more people from civil society, academia, the arts community, and within political 
circles contemptale thow to overcome the burden of the past in order to create a more 
peaceful future. However, as the interviews with political party representatives 
showed, we do not know whether a substantial will exists to include TJ as an official 
policy in Cyprus.  
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How the IPC was set up and how it operates were addressed to provide 
whether any indicators of TJ and/or TTJ were and are involved. The IPC Law was 
drawn up in line with the findings of the ECtHR and it is unlikely it would ever have 
been established had it not been for a series of applications from GCs claiming 
violation of the ECHR right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions relating to property 
abandoned in the north. Through these cases, its character was effectively negotiated 
with Strasbourg by the authorities of the TRNC and Turkey, particularly the 
replacement of a previous version (Law No 49/2003) with a more Convention-
compliant alternative. Because it was established under pressure from the ECtHR, it 
is not the result of an inclusive process bypassing an essential indicator – 
participation - in TJ mehanisms such as those in Colombia and Tunisia. On the other 
hand, despite the ECtHR’s involvement in the process (where its decisions were 
deemed as victory for GCs until the Xenides-Arestis and Demopolous cases), political 
parties in the south do not recognise the IPC as a remedy and question its legitimacy 
and/or legality. Given that they would prefer displaced persons not to resort to the 
IPC, it seems unlikely that the IPC is regarded as a legitimate remedy by the majority 
of the GCs in the south.  
Among the three remedies the IPC Law provides for applicants, compensation 
has been the most favoured and most straightforward. Exchange and restitution have 
however been difficult although, as revealed by the interviews, alleged unfairness 
regarding the amounts of compensation awarded without interest remains.  
There have also been other problems. IPC proceedings have been lengthy and 
there have been issues concerning their transparency and the execution of judgments 
awarding compensation. Some suggestions for possible improvements, made in 
relevant sub-sections of Chapter 5, might contribute to finding solutions.  
From a material point of view, recompense for abandoned property is merely 
a matter of money. However, individuals and families may also have strong 
sentimental attachments specific places. Moreover, the identity of traditional 
communities, as in Cyprus, is often deeply connected with territory.23 A process such 
as that offered by the IPC is incapable of addressing these issues which many 
transitional socities face. The patchwork and piecemeal nature of the solutions 
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provided by the IPC could also shed light upon the weaknesses of such approaches if 
they are inadequately conceived and constructed. This might undermine the 
confidence and trust of affected communities in the ability of such institutions to 
deliver justice.24 In the final analysis, improvement of the process at all stages and 
minimising alleged arbitrariness are important for building trust towards it, and could 
contribute to improving the relationship between the communities. However, given 
the fact that political parties in the north neither have concrete plans, nor have they 
taken any steps for the improvement of the IPC so far, the future seems bleak. This is 
also where the distinction between “transition” and “transformation” becomes 
important. The former does not necessarily reach "deep into the soil of the new 
society where the commitment to democratic values actually takes root".25 On the 
other hand, transformation "implies long-term, sustainable processes" to establish 
conditions to provide for a longer term vision rather than an "interim process that 
links the past and the future".26 In the case of Cyprus, the destination of the transition 
will depend on whether partition is permanent or temporary. But, as long as it 
remains, it is important whether institutions, processes and developments affect it 
positively or negatively. This is why TTJ is also important both for the IPC and 
Cyprus as a whole. 
In Chapter 1 of the thesis, it was stated that initiatives like the CMP and 
education initiatives continue regardless of the peace process. Thus, TJ issues are not 
far from what is already being done in Cyprus as discussed by Bozkurt and 
Yakinhtou.27 It was also noted that a much closer analysis of what is needed by those 
directly affected by the conflict possibly indicated at least partially by the IPC, is 
required. Since a core issue with respect to the IPC concerns a type of justice and the 
concept of reparations (e.g. remedying the loss of property) which could contribute to 
institutional reform/GNR, both of which figure in TJ undertakings, the IPC could 
have provided an opportunity to create space for justice and peace. However, 
following a detailed examination of the IPC, its work, lawyers/applicants’ 
perceptions towards it and the political parties’ positions, it was found that the task 
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would not be easy and may even be impossible. With regard to institutional 
reform/GNR, an institution’s role should be to contribute to societal transformation 
by creating more responsive and democratic state structures that are able to address 
violence and inequalities. The reparations component has also been noted as 
important here since the IPC was established to be “an effective remedy” for GC 
property rights. Reparations encompass various measures to repair the damage 
suffered by victims of human rights violations; i.e. restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. They can further support 
victims’ dignity.28 It was observed that the IPC Law lacks these kind of various 
measures having only compensation, restitution and exchange at hand. The UN 
Special Rapporteur Pablo De Greiff’s report in 2014 also pays particular attention to 
participation of victims in defining, designing, implementing and monitoring 
reparations processes.29 This has also been absent from the IPC which makes it 
difficult for reparations to have transformative potential.30 Furthermore, a process 
such as that of the IPC prevents it from being seen as a public space in which the 
groundwork for reconciliation is laid.31  
Civil society and governments provide important sites for reconciliation. In 
other words, the actual work cannot be done by transitional institutions themselves 
which, at best, can merely start the process.32 Another problematic issue has been the 
initiative by Turkey and the TRNC with respect to the fenced-off zone in Varosha 
which lacks an inclusive process, not only excluding former legal inhabitants but also 
TC academics and researchers, NGOs and political parties which have different 
views on the matter. This illustrates how piecemeal approaches could have a negative 
impact on the perceptions of those excluded from processes and prevents 
reconciliation processes from taking root. Gacaca courts of Rwanda provide an 
example of a first step towards reconciliation, although they could not provide trust 
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between many perpetrators and survivors.33 Furthermore, the promises of reparation 
and compensation were not fulfilled either in Rwanda or in South Africa.34 On the 
other hand, a longitudinal study showed that Rwanda’s gacaca courts had positive 
intergroup effects.35 This could also be the case for the IPC if the process is 
improved. In this regard, as noted in Chapter 2, the way the institutions are created, 
their terms, their structural features and their transparency are all important aspects36 
as in the inclusion of a variety of voices reflecting an inclusive process.37 If 
excluding a part of the population is repeated, the political justice necessary for 
successful implementation of measures is unlikely to be achieved. This was relevant 
in Rwanda where a perception of victor’s justice caused displeasure among the Hutu 
majority, while the government was seen as being controlled by the Tutsi minority.38 
Furthermore, it is essential to guarantee that the structural features of an institution 
reflect the values of the new regime, the new government, and society as a whole.39 
Furthermore, for a successful mechanism, these values should be digested not only in 
theory, but also in practice. In this vein, the institution’s authority and/or its mandate 
are crucial. It should of course have sufficient resources and/or budget to do its work 
appropriately and effectively.40 It is a fact, even for ordinary times, that a mechanism 
insufficiently empowered cannot work effectively. In transitional times, an 
insufficient mechanism, i.e. one favouring the status quo, would even be more 
prejudiced for the purposes of transformative justice since it would harm the entire 
process.  In transitional societies if the state’s legitimacy is too weak, the legitimacy 
of the institution will be affected accordingly with potentially widespread negative 
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effects.41 Institutions should not be constrained by past practices as it is the past 
practice which is often challenged in transitional times.42 These were all considered 
in this thesis as components of TJ mechanisms relevant to the IPC. Problems 
surrounding the process before the IPC have been captured by the circumstances on 
the ground such as the lack of both political will and the capacity of the relevant state 
and the resources available to translate initiatives into policy which might prevent 
mechanisms delivering transformation. UN “peace process” as a parallel track to that 
of the ECtHR precedents could be considered as another aspect causing 
contradictions at times, an example of which are the UN resolutions with respect to 
fenced-off Varosha pending unimplemented for years since the parties could not 
come to a solution on how to open the area up under UN administration to allow for 
the resettlement of its legal inhabitants. At the same time, some properties in the area 
are subject of 280 applications pending before the IPC and there have been cases 
before the ECtHR claiming the IPC cannot provide for an effective remedy for these 
complaints. 
Again, inclusive processes such as those in Tunisia and Colombia have also 
been considered as possible models for Cyprus. A recent survey in Cyprus found that 
the inclusion of displaced persons in the process could positively influence the 
outcome of a future settlement depending on the degree they were consulted on 
property issues and the right to return.43 A comprehensive census survey of 
preferences among all displaced persons could address how many GCs would want 
to have their properties restored, where this could address and ease the insecurities of 
TCs in this regard.44 Research shows that TC perceptions of TJ are similar to that of 
GCs; i.e. the more TC participants adhere to notions of retributive justice, the less 
they are ready to live together with GCs.45 Taking these findings into account with 
other research showing that intergroup contact has an impact on the reduction of 
prejudice,46 it can be concluded that the IPC could have provided a space for the 
building of trust. However, under current circumstances this is not viable unless the 
practices change. In addition to problems the IPC has faced, this also resulted from 
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the fact that it has a one-sided character established by pressure from the Strasbourg 
Court and having limited “reparation” tools at hand. There is no comparable process 
for TCs who abandoned property in the south when they fled north. The thesis 
attempted to make proposals regarding the need to improve the process before the 
IPC. However, it did not propose answers for all relevant problems. The key 
conclusions here could be taken forward as areas to be explored further by scholars 
and practitioners, particularly regarding the need to explore strategies of inclusive 
processes to promote TJ and TTJ. The aim in highlighting these themes is to develop 
further initiatives through future research and practice to arrive at more detailed 
conclusions regarding the content of effective TJ/TTJ strategies. 
Despite the fact that the IPC provides remedies to GCs within the limited 
framework provided by its Law, it is currently not possible for GCs to achieve more 
rights than afforded by this Law. From this perspective, the property problem with 
respect to GC properties could be considered as stalled within the current mandate of 
the IPC, while the same is also true of those of TCs within the mandate of the 
Custodian in the south. This is why liminality is considered a feature of 
contemporary Cyprus. Where the transition will lead to depends on whether partition 
is permanent or temporary.  It is acknowledged that remedies provided by the IPC 
alone could not transform the root causes of conflict since this would be to latch 
duties to an institution more than it can deliver. But, as long as the situation remains 
as it is, it is important to understand the extent to which institutions, processes and 
developments affect this positively, negatively or not at all. The potential of the IPC 
in this regard is important since it serves as an example for a pre-solution mechanism 
to be established both for GC and TC properties abandoned in both sides of the 
island, thus paving the way for delinking the issue of property from a wider solution 
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